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SOLVENCY II: 
THE AMBITIOUS MODERNIZATION OF THE 
PRUDENTIAL REGULATION OF INSURERS AND 
REINSURERS ACROSS THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) 
 
Michaell J-H. Smith* 
 
 
This [Solvency II] is an ambitious proposal that will completely overhaul 
the way we ensure the financial soundness of our insurers.  We are setting a 
world-leading standard that requires insurers to focus on managing all the 
risks they face and enables them to operate much more efficiently.  It’s 
good news for consumers, for the insurance industry and for the EU 
economy as a whole. 
 
Charlie McCreevy, EU 
Internal Market and Services 
Commissioner1 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
The prudential regulation of the EU insurance and reinsurance 
markets is poised to undergo a radical and modernizing sea change, 
affecting not only EU insurers,2 but also those foreign insurers with 
operations in the EU.  This transformation will come in the form of the new 
Solvency II regime, the overriding principles of which have been agreed 
among the European Commission, Parliament and Council as set forth in 
the Framework Directive (the “Framework Directive”) which was adopted 
by the European Parliament in April 2009 and subsequently adopted by the 
European Council on November 10, 2009.3 
                                                                                                                 
* Paris, France; Member of the Connecticut and New York bars; Solicitor of 
the Supreme Court of England and Wales. 
1 See Press Release, European Commission, ‘Solvency II’: EU to Take Global 
Lead in Insurance Regulation (Jul. 10, 2007), available at 
http://europa.eu/press_room/index_en.htm (Search “Solvency II”; then follow 
“0.9102” hyperlink).  
2 As a general matter, references herein to “insurance” and “insurers” include 
“reinsurance” and “reinsurers” respectively, unless otherwise noted. 
3 See Council Directive 2009/138, art. 1, 2009 O.J. (L 335) 1 (EU),  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:335:FULL:EN:PDF 
[hereinafter Framework Directive].   It is important to point out that the 
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Solvency II is designed to address the various shortcomings of the 
current Solvency I regulatory regime, a system which has been in place 
since the 1970’s and which is widely seen as having failed to keep pace 
with the changing reality of the financial and insurance markets.4  Once 
fully implemented through various measures, the sweeping provisions of 
Solvency II are designed to establish, among other things, EU-wide capital 
requirements, valuation techniques and risk management standards.  As a 
result, Solvency II is expected to foster improved protection of 
policyholders, stability of the financial system, modernize supervision, 
deepen market integration and increase the competitiveness of insurance 
undertakings.  Moreover, considering that the EU represents the single 
largest market for insurance, generating approximately 37 % of worldwide 
total direct premiums written,5 Solvency II will necessarily play a 
significant role in shaping insurance standards on an international level. 
This Article provides a survey of certain of the more significant 
provisions of the Solvency II regime, and by way of brief comparison, 
highlights certain areas of divergence from the U.S. system.  In addition, 
this Article examines certain key difference between Solvency II and the 
Basel framework (the regulatory standard applicable to financial 
institutions),6 as well as addresses some of the concerns with Solvency II 
based on comparisons to the Basel framework. 
 
                                                                                                                 
Framework Directive has relevance to the larger European Economic Area, See 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eea. 
4 For an overview of Solvency I, see information on the European 
Commission’s website, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/insurance/solvency_i_en.htm (last visited Mar. 
22, 2010) [hereinafter Solvency I]. 
5 See JOHN A. COOKE & HAROLD D. SKIPPER, DEP’T OF RISK MGMT. & INS., 
AN EVALUATION OF U.S. INSURANCE REGULATION IN A COMPETITIVE WORLD 
INSURANCE MARKET 3 (2008), available at 
http://www.rmi.gsu.edu/insurance_regulation/rel_papers/CookeSkipper_Regulatio
nInternational.pdf [hereinafter World Insurance Market Evaluation]. 
6 See Bank for Int’l Settlements, Basel II Framework, 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2010); see generally 
website of the Bank for International Settlements for information as concerns Basel 
II, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2010) [hereinafter 
BIS Website]. 
2010] MODERNIZATION OF PRUDENTIAL REGULATION 359 
  
II. OBJECTIVES OF SOLVENCY II 
 
A. PROTECTION OF POLICYHOLDERS AND BENEFICIARIES 
 
As stated by the European Parliament and Council in the 
introduction to the Framework Directive, the overriding objective of 
insurance regulation and supervision, as a general matter, is to adequately 
protect policyholders and beneficiaries.7  In this regard, Solvency II is 
designed to ensure, among other things, the financial soundness of 
insurance undertakings and reduce the probability of consumer loss or 
market disruption, thereby reinforcing confidence in the stability of the 
European insurance sector. 
 
B.   FACILITATE A SINGLE MARKET IN INSURANCE 
 
Another main objective of Solvency II is to deepen integration of 
the European insurance market by facilitating a single market as concerns 
insurance throughout the EU,8 “limiting the room for national discretion 
and national options”,9 making it easier for firms to do business across the 
EU.10  More specifically, Solvency II seeks to remedy the current situation 
whereby the provisions of the current insurance regulatory regime have 
been unevenly applied by Member States, resulting in varying regulatory 
requirements across the EU, undermining the internal market and hindering 
the activities of insurance undertakings.  In this regard, the Framework 
                                                                                                                 
7 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, recital ¶ 16, at 3; art. 27, at 28. 
8 See Memorandum from the European Commission, ‘Solvency II’: Frequently 
Asked Questions (FAQs) 1 (Jul. 10, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
internal_market/insurance/docs/solvency/solvency2/faq_en.pdf [hereinafter 
FAQs]. 
9 Thomas Steffen, Chairman, Comm. of European Ins. & Occupational 
Pension Supervisors, Official Presentation of the Solvency II Directive in 
Strasbourg (Jul. 10, 2007), available at http://www.ceiops.eu/media/files/ 
speechesarticles/ThomasSteffen-KeyMessages10juli07.pdf [hereinafter Steffen 
Presentation]. 
10 As is presently the case, and as a general matter, an undertaking which is 
established and authorized in one Member State may carry out, pursuant to what is 
commonly referred to as a “passport”, its activities in another Member State (a host 
Member State) on a cross-border and / or freedom of establishment basis (e.g. via a 
branch office) without authorization from the host Member State being required.  
See, e.g., Council Directive 92/49, 1992 O.J. (L 228) 1  (EC), available at ://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31992L0049:EN:NOT. 
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Directive will recast and consolidate fourteen existing directives applicable 
to the regulation of the insurance market into a single risk-sensitive EU-
wide framework.11 
It is worth briefly pointing out here that, as a general matter and by 
way of comparison, in the U.S., the individual states, rather than the federal 
government, are the principle regulators of insurance activities.12  In this 
regard, truly uniform insurance regulations do not apply across the U.S., 
resulting in rather important regulatory variations among states (a 
discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Article).13  In response to 
the lack of harmonization in this area, among other actual and proposed 
measures,14 the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), 
a voluntary organization of state insurance commissioners, has 
promulgated various model laws, regulations and standards which have 
been adopted, to varying degrees, among states.15  In particular, the NAIC 
has initiated a financial regulation standards and voluntary accreditation 
program for state regulators in an effort to help establish regulatory 
cohesiveness on a national level.16 
 
C. IMPROVE COMPETITIVENESS 
 
Another key objective of Solvency II is to improve competitiveness 
of the insurance industry across Europe, fostering product innovation and 
                                                                                                                 
11 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, recital ¶ 1, at 1. 
12 See, e.g., 1 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 
2:2 (3d ed. 2009); Joseph F. Zimmerman, Dual Insurance Regulation: Is It 
Desirable?, 27 J. INS. REG. 3 (2008); Elizabeth F. Brown, The Development of 
International Norms For Insurance Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 953 (2009) 
[hereinafter Development of International Norms]. 
13 See Development of International Norms, supra note 12, at 981-82. See 
generally World Insurance Market Evaluation, supra note 5. 
14 See, e.g., THE DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED 
REGULATORY STRUCTURE 126-28 (2008), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf.  See e.g., Press Release, 
The Dep’t of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Treasury Releases Blueprint for a Stronger 
Regulatory Structure (Mar. 31, 2008), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Fact_Sheet_03.31.08.pdf. 
15 See BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED REGULATORY STRUCTURE, supra at 9-
13.  
16 See NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMM’RS, FINANCIAL REGULATION STANDARDS 
AND ACCREDITATION PROGRAM (2009), available at  
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_f_FRSA_pamphlet.pdf. 
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helping to put downward pressure on prices.17  In this regard, and as 
discussed elsewhere herein, Solvency II aims to reflect a “principle of 
proportionality” as concerns, for example, the impact of related 
requirements on small and medium-sized undertakings, as well as the 
exercise of supervisory powers.18 
 
D.  PROMOTE BETTER REGULATION 
 
Mindful of lessons learned from the financial crisis, as discussed 
further below, Solvency II continues to be developed as a tool to promote 
better regulation of the insurance industry throughout Europe by applying 
modern risk management and governance standards as well as 
implementing an early warning system for market supervisors, all as 
discussed in more detail below.19 
 
III.   SCOPE OF APPLICABILITY OF SOLVENCY II 
 
Solvency II markedly expands the scope of undertakings covered 
beyond those currently subject to the provisions of Solvency I.  In this 
regard, the new framework is to apply to most EU insurers and those non-
EU insurers with activities in the EU.20  Only those undertakings which 
meet certain limited conditions, including having ! 5,000,000 or less in 
annual gross written premium income, would be exempt from the 
                                                                                                                 
17  See FAQs, supra note 8, at 2. 
18 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, recital ¶ 19, at 3; art. 29, at 28. 
19 Id. art. 29, at 28.  See COMM. OF EUROPEAN INS, & OCCUPATIONAL 
PENSIONS SUPERVISORS, LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE CRISEIS (SOLVENCY II AND 
BEYOND), CIELOPS-SEC-107/08 (2009), available at 
http://www.cielops.eu/media/files/publications/reports/CIELOPS-SEC-107-08-
Lessons-learned-from-the-crisis-SII-and-beyond.pdf.  
20 As concerns non-life insurance, the Framework Directive shall apply to 
those activities described on part A of Annex I to the Framework Directive (see 
Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 2(2), at 18, and those non-life operations 
which are exempt from the scope of the Framework Directive are set forth in 
Article 5.  Id. Art. 5, at 19. 
Those life insurance operations subject to the Framework Directive are set 
forth in Article 2 (3).  Id. at 18. 
The Framework Directive will not apply, for example, to reinsurance 
undertakings which by December 10, 2007 have ceased doing new business and 
are in run-off.  Id. art. 12, at 21. 
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provisions of Solvency II.21  However, such excluded undertakings may 
nevertheless elect to opt-in to the provisions of Solvency II.22 
By way of exclusion, Solvency II will not apply to insurance 
guarantee schemes, pension funds covered by Directive 2003/41/EEC, 
credit institutions or financial conglomerates.23 
 
IV. LEGISLATIVE STRUCTURE OF SOLVENCY II 
 
It is important to briefly understand the legislative Process which is 
applicable to Solvency II.  The regime is being adopted in accordance with 
the Lamfalussy process, a framework designed to facilitate consistent 
harmonization, often employed in the area of legislation applicable to the 
financial services sector.24 
A significant characteristic of the Lamfalussy process is the 
involvement of a committee of supervisors who work in consultation with 
businesses, consumers and other stakeholders.25  As applies to Solvency II, 
this is the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Supervisors  (“CEIOPS”), a group composed of high level representatives 
from each of the Member States’ insurance and occupational pensions 
supervisory authorities, as well as authorities of the Member States.26 
As a brief overview, the Lamfalussy process is comprised of the 
following four distinct levels:27 
Level 1: Level 1 includes the European legislative 
instrument, in the form of the proposed Framework Directive, 
which sets forth the various principles.  The Framework Directive 
was proposed by the European Parliament and the Council 
                                                                                                                 
21 Id. art. 4(1), at 19. 
22 Id. art 4(5), at 19.  
23 See FAQs, supra note 8, at 2. 
24 See European Commission, Lamfalussy Process, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/insurance/solvency/lamfalussy_en.htm (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2010). 
25 See id. 
26 See Commission Decision 2004/6, arts. 1-3, 2004 O.J. (L 3) 30, 30  (EC), 
repealed by, Commission Decision 2009/79, recital 1, 2009 O.J. (L 25) 28, 28 
(EC) (establishing The Committee of European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS)). 
27 See Comm. of European Ins. & Occupational Pensions Supervisors, 
CEIOPS Comments to the Lamfalussy Review, at 6, CEIOPS Doc. 20/07 (Nov. 1, 
2007), available at http://www.ceiops.eu/media/docman/public_files/publications/ 
lettersofcomments/CEIOPSCommentstotheLamfalussyReview.pdf. 
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pursuant to Article 251 (2) of the European Community Treaty, 
which provides for a co-decision process, and, as discussed above, 
the Framework Directive has now been formally adopted.28 
The Framework Directive is not directly applicable within the 
domestic legal orders of Member States and only provides 
objectives and goals that each Member State must implement 
through laws and / or regulations at a national level.29  Therefore, 
Directives prove to be somewhat of a flexible instrument.  In this 
regard, they leave room for interpretation and adaptation by each 
Member State, and can create uncertainty as to the speed, extent 
and consistency of their implementation within each Member 
State.30  Such concerns are addressed, in part, by directly 
applicable Level 2 measures under the Lamfalussy process. 
Level 2: Level 2, which is the current focus of the European 
Commission, includes various measures to supplement, and render 
operational, the Framework Directive.31  Such measures will 
include further directives, and in addition, it is expected that 
certain implementing measures will be taken in the form of 
regulations which are directly applicable, meaning that they create 
law which takes immediate effect in the same manner as a national 
instrument, without additional steps being required on the part of 
the national authorities.32  As a result, such Level 2 implementing 
measures should facilitate a convergence of implementation across 
the EU. 
CEIOPS is also involved in Level 2 activities, in particular, in 
advising the European Commission on the drafting of specific 
                                                                                                                 
28 Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 2007 O.J. (C 224) 1 [hereinafter 
EU Treaty]; [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573, 689 (incorporating changes made by EC 
Treaty); [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719; see Framework Directive, supra note 3; European 
Commission, CO-DECISION or the “ordinary legislative procedure”, 
http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2010). 
29 See EUR-Lex, Process and Players, § 1.3.3, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/droit_communautaire/droit_communautaire.htm#1.3.3 (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Process and Players]. 
30 See id.  
31 See Comm. of European Ins. & Occupational Pensions Supervisors, List of 
Policy Issues and Options for the Level 2 Impact Assessment of Solvency II, (Nov. 
2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/insurance/docs/ 
solvency/solvency2/list_of_policy_issues_ia_ver3_en.pdf [hereinafter CEIOPS 
Policy Issues and Options]. 
32 See Process and Players, supra note 29, § 1.3.2. 
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implementation measures in consultation with undertakings, 
market participants and other stakeholders.33  The European 
Commission has committed to introducing such Level 2 
implementing measures before October 2011, at least 12 months 
before the new system will apply to insurance undertakings.34 
Level 3: Level 2 implementing measures will be further 
supplemented by non-binding Level 3 standards and guidance.  In 
this regard, CEIOPS will provide technical advice to the European 
Commission and issue supervisory standards and tools.  In 
addition, CEIOPS will provide recommendations and guidelines in 
connection with the application of regulations and facilitate 
convergent application across Member States and cooperation 
among national supervisors.35 
Level 4: Level 4 consists of enforcement actions (e.g., legal 
actions) to be taken by the European Commission in respect of 
matters related to compliance by Member States with the various 
related legislative measures. 
 
V. TIMING 
 
The Framework Directive, and those Level 2 Directives which are 
eventually adopted, are to be transposed by each Member State into its 
national law by October 31, 2012.36  In addition, directly applicable Level 2 
regulations are to come into force on the same date.37 
It is worth noting that certain Member States such as the United 
Kingdom,38 Denmark,39 and Germany,40 for example, have already taken 
                                                                                                                 
33 See Comm. of European Ins. & Occupational Pensions Supervisors, About 
CEIOPS, http://www.ceiops.eu//content/view/2/2 (last visited Mar. 23, 2010) 
[hereinafter About CEIOPS]. 
34 See FAQs, supra note 8, at 12. 
35 See About CEIOPS, supra note 33. 
36 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 309, at 115. 
37 See id. 
38 See, e.g., Financial Services Authority, www.fsa.gov.uk/ (last visited Mar. 
24, 2010) (concerning the UK’s Individual Capital Advisory Standards (ICAS) 
regime (a risk-based capital standard implemented by the FSA in 2004). 
39 See, e.g., Danish FSA, http://finanstilsynet.dk/en/Tenaer/Solvens.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2010).  
40 See Aufsichtsrechtliche mindestanforderungen an das risikomanagement 
[Regulatory minimum requirements for risk management], BAFIN, Jan. 22, 2009, 
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steps to implement regulatory requirements in their respective jurisdictions 
which are founded on the same principles that underpin Solvency II. 
 
VI. THREE PILLARS OF SOLVENCY II 
 
One of the most significant developments of Solvency II is the 
introduction of a more modern economic risk sensitive-based system, based 
on a so-called “total balance sheet” approach where an array of risks and 
their interactions are taken into account.41  In this way, Solvency II marks a 
distinct departure from the often criticized formula-based solvency margin 
approach of the current Solvency I regime.42  In this regard, Solvency II not 
only takes into consideration the actual risks faced by an undertaking, but 
also the measures that are in place to monitor, manage and mitigate such 
risks.  This multi-pronged approach can be divided into the following three 
so-called “pillars,” drawing comparisons to the similarly structured Basel 
framework applicable to the financial sector,43 each of which is described 
in further detail below: 
 
Pillar I: Quantitative Requirements, 
Pillar II: Governance & Risk Management Requirements, 
Pillar III: Market Discipline and Transparency.44 
A. PILLAR I: QUANTITATIVE REQUIREMENTS.  
   
  Solvency II introduces more sophisticated solvency requirements 
for insurance undertakings.  While solvency requirements under the current 
Solvency I regime only apply in respect of insurance underwriting risks, 
Solvency II will also require undertakings to hold capital against market 
risk (e.g., risks related to the fluctuation in the level and market price of 
assets), credit risk (e.g., risks related to fluctuations in the credit standing of 
securities issuers, counterparties and / or debtors) and operational risk (e.g., 
                                                                                                                 
available at 
http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Service/Rundschreiben/2009/ 
rs__0903__mariskva,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/rs_0903_m
ariskva.pdf. 
41 See FAQs, supra note 8, at 1. 
42 See Solvency I, supra note 4. 
43 The Basel II rules on capital requirements for banks and investment firms 
are implemented through the Capital Adequacy Directive. See generally Council 
Directive 2006/49, On the Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms and Credit 
Institutions (Recast), 2006 O.J. (L 177) 201  (EU).  
44 Pillars II and III are often collectively referred to as “Pillar V.” 
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risks related to a failure in internal processes).45  In this regard, the 
solvency provisions of the Framework Directive have been developed with 
a view to reflecting current and proposed international solvency guidelines 
from the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).46 
More specifically, the main requirements of Pillar I can be broken 
down as follows: (i) technical provisions; and (ii) capital requirements 
which include the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) and the Minimum 
Capital Requirement (MCR). 
 
1. Technical Provisions.   
 
As is the case under the current EU regulatory regime, 
undertakings will continue to be required to apply technical provisions 
(“reserves”) against all insurance obligations towards policyholders and 
applicable beneficiaries.47 
The calculation of technical provisions is to be consistent with the 
valuation of assets and liabilities (as described in more detail below) as 
well as with international developments in accounting and supervision.48  
More specifically, these reserves are based on curren market transfer value 
(the amount an insurer would expect to pay in respect of the transfer of its 
insurance rights and obligations).49  As a general matter, these provisions 
are to be calculated as the sum of a best estimate50 plus a margin of risk.51  
In this regard and to promote harmonization across the EU,, the European 
Commission will be adopting implementing measures in respect of the 
various methodologies and standards to be adhered to in respect of the 
calculation of technical provisions.52 
                                                                                                                 
45 See, e.g., Framework Directive, supra note 3, recital 26, at 3; art. 100, at  51.  
46 See FAQs, supra note 8, at 3. 
47 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, arts. 76-86, at 45-48.  
48 See id. recital 54, at 6; arts. 77-78, at  45-46.  
49 See id. art. 77, at 45-46.  
50 The “best estimate” is based on a probability-weighted average of future 
cash flows, with regard to certain specified considerations as set forth in Article 77 
of the Framework Directive. See id. 
51 “The risk margin shall be such as to ensure that the value of the technical 
provisions is equivalent to the amount that insurance and reinsurance undertakings 
would be expected to require in order to take over and meet the insurance and 
reinsurance obligations.” See id. at 46. 
52 See id. art. 86, at 47-48.  By way of example, certain of the high level issues 
identified by CEIOPS and Commission Services for review in respect of technical 
provisions relate to risk margin-related calibration issues and the determination of 
2010] MODERNIZATION OF PRUDENTIAL REGULATION 367 
  
It is important to point out that, in a significant departure from 
Solvency I and as concerns insurance risks located in the EU, Member 
States may not require that the assets held to cover the technical provisions 
related to those risks be located in the EU or in any particular Member 
State.53 
 
2. Capital Requirements: Solvency Capital Requirement    
(SCR) and Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR).   
 
Pillar I of the Framework Directive introduces two distinct, yet 
interconnected, capital requirements -- the Solvency Capital Requirement 
(SCR) and the Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR).  These separate 
solvency requirements were created, in large part, to facilitate monitoring 
of insurance undertakings and to create a ladder of supervisory 
intervention, identifying ailing insurance undertakings before the interests 
of policyholders and beneficiaries are jeopardized.54  Such intervention and 
each of the SCR and MCR are described in detail below. 
 
a. Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR).   
  
Undertakings are required to hold eligible own funds (as discussed 
further below) covering the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR).55  The 
SCR is designed to reflect a level of eligible own funds that enables 
undertakings to absorb significant losses and, as a result, provide 
reasonable assurances to policyholders and beneficiaries.56  As such, the 
SCR is a risk-based calculation which takes into consideration various 
risks, including non-life, life and health underwriting risk (e.g., as 
applicable, premium, reserve, catastrophe), market risk, credit risk and 
operational risk (e.g., legal risk) which will impose on undertakings stricter 
standards as to regulatory capital.57  The SCR will need to be calculated by 
undertakings at least once a year, and the results of such calculation will 
need to be reported to the applicable supervisors.58 
                                                                                                                 
the risk-free interest rate term structure. See also CEIOPS Policy Issues and 
Options, supra note 31, at 6, 16. 
53 See id. art. 134, at 61-62. 
54 See, e.g., id. recital 60, at 6; arts. 100-127, at 51-59. 
55 See id. art. 100, at 51. 
56 See id. recital 62, at 7. 
57 See id. art. 101, at 51. 
58 See id. art. 102, at 51-52. 
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Pursuant to the Framework Directive, an undertaking may calculate 
the SCR either pursuant to a new “standard” formula or using a full or 
partial internal model, both as discussed below.59 
 
 i. “Standard” formula. 
 
The Framework Directive provides for a “standard” formula for the 
calculation of the SCR,60 taking into consideration various specified 
“modules” of risk (e.g., non-life / life / health underwriting risk, market 
risk, counterparty default risk).61  In this way, the standard formula is 
calculated on a “modular” basis, such that exposure to each category is 
evaluated as an initial step and then subsequently aggregated.62  In this 
regard and pursuant to this standard formula, each of the aforementioned 
risk modules is to be calculated using a Value-at-Risk63 measure such that 
an undertaking must operate with a confidence level of 99.5 % over a one-
year period.64 
                                                                                                                 
59 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art 100.. 
60 See id. arts. 103-108, at 52-54.  In accordance with the standard formula, the 
SCR is calculated as the sum of the Basic Solvency Capital Requirement (as 
described in Article 104 of the Framework Directive), the capital requirement for 
operation risk (as described in Article 107 of the Framework Directive) and the 
adjustment for the loss-absorbing capacity of technical provisions and deferred 
taxes (as described in Article 108 of the Framework Directive). Id.  
61 See id. art. 104(1), at 52. 
62 See id. recital  ¶ 65, at 7. 
63  Value-at-Risk (VaR) is a measure used to assess risk associated with a 
portfolio of assets and liabilities.  Specifically, Value-at-Risk provides a measure 
of the “worst expected loss under normal conditions over a specific time interval at 
a given confidence level.” See FAQs, supra note 8, at 4. 
64 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 101(4), at 51. 
[T]he Solvency Capital Requirement should be determined as the 
economic capital to be held by insurance and reinsurance 
undertakings in order to ensure that ruin occurs no more often 
than once in every 200 cases or, alternatively, that those 
undertakings will still be in a position, with a probability of at 
least 99.5 %, to meet their obligations to policyholders and 
beneficiaries over the following 12 months.  That economic 
capital should be calculated on the basis of the true risk profile of 
those undertakings, taking account of the impact of possible risk 
mitigation techniques, as well as diversification effects. 
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As indicated above, Solvency II will introduce the requirement that 
undertakings hold capital against market risk, that is to say investment-
related risk.65  Such a requirement is designed to mitigate possible pro-
cyclical effects of the financial markets and the negative effects suffered by 
an undertaking as a result thereof.66  Therefore, as concerns the market risk 
module, undertakings will necessarily need to evaluate the appropriateness 
and risks inherent in any particular investment strategy.67 
One of the principle ways in which the design and potential impact 
of the standard model, among other factors (e.g., own funds, valuation of 
assets / liabilities), continues to be tested is through quantitative impact 
studies (QIS).68  Such studies consist of simulations conducted by 
undertakings on a voluntary basis, with the next study (QIS 5) scheduled 
for 2010.69 
 
 ii.  Full or Partial Internal Model.  
 
As an innovative and forward-looking alternative -- one that is 
generally applicable across undertakings and insurance products --
 Solvency II provides that any insurance undertaking may decide whether 
to calculate SCR using full or partial internal modeling.70  Such models are 
subject to the prior approval of the applicable supervisory authorities.71  In 
any application for approval,72 undertakings must, among other things, 
demonstrate that any internal model is widely used in and plays a 
significant role in the undertaking’s internal risk management and decision-
making processes (“use test”).73  An undertaking’s management is 
responsible on an on-going basis for ensuring that any particular internal 
model continues to operate appropriately.74  In addition, such partial 
                                                                                                                 
See id. at 7.  Provisions specific to the calculation of the standard solvency 
requirement are set forth in the Framework Directive at art. 105. See id. recital ¶ 
64, at 7.  See id. art. 105, at 52-53. 
65 See, e.g., id. art. 100, at 51. 
66 See id. recital ¶ 61, at 6-7. 
67 See FAQs, supra note 8, at 6. 
68 See, e.g., Comm. of European Ins. & Occupational Pensions Supervisors, 
Consultations, http://www.ceiops.eu/content/view/3/3/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2010). 
69 See id. 
70 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 112-27, at 56-59. 
71 See id. art. 113, at 56. 
72 Id. Art. 112(3), at 56. 
73 See id. Art. 120, at 57. 
74 See id. Art. 116, at 57. 
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internal modeling may be applied to the insurance business as a whole or to 
one or more specific business units.75 
 
b.  Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR).   
 
Pursuant to the Framework Directive, Member States must require 
that insurance undertakings hold eligible basic funds (as discussed further 
below) to cover the Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR).76  The MCR 
represents a minimum solvency floor below which policyholders and 
beneficiaries are exposed to an unacceptable level of risk if undertakings 
were allowed to continue operating.77  A breach of the MCR exposes the 
applicable undertaking to serious supervisory actions, as discussed further 
below. 
The MCR is calculated as a linear function of various variables (net 
of reinsurance), including technical provisions, written premiums, capital-
at-risk, deferred tax and administrative expenses.78 
The MCR is based on an 85% “confidence level” over the 
subsequent one-year period.79  Furthermore, the Framework Directive 
provides that the MCR shall not fall below 25%, nor exceed 45%, of the 
undertaking’s SCR.80  In addition, the MCR shall be subject to an absolute 
floor.  For example, subject to limited exceptions, an absolute capital floor 
of ! 2,200,000 applies to non-life insurance undertakings.81 
Undertakings are required to calculate the MCR on a quarterly 
basis, at a minimum, and report related results to the applicable 
authorities.82  Further details in respect of the calculation of both the MCR 
and SCR (including as concerns internal modeling) will be the subject of 
implementing measures to be adopted by the European Commission.83 
 
                                                                                                                 
75 See id. Art. 112(2), at 56. 
76 Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 129(4), at 60. 
77 See id. Art. 129(5), at 60. 
78 See id. art. 129(2), at 60. 
79 See id. art. 129(1), at 59-60. 
80 See id. art. 129(3), at 60. 
81 See id. art. 129(1), at 59-60. 
82 Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 129(4), at 59-60.  
83 See id. art. 129(1), at 59-60.  
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3.   U.S. System Applicable to Capital Controls; Risk-
based Capital (RBC) System 
 
In the U.S., undertakings are subject to a Risk-based Capital (RBC) 
system, a capital adequacy standard model designed by the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).84  An individual factor-
based RBC model exists for each primary insurance type (life, 
property/casualty, health), and each generic formula focuses on certain 
risks that are common to the particular insurance type, rather than all risks 
to which a particular undertaking is exposed.85  This capital adequacy 
measure is supplemented by various additional state specific capital-related 
requirements, including minimum capital requirements which vary among 
states.86 
Unlike the SCR and MCR under Solvency II which, among other 
things, are based on overall confidence/target levels discussed above, RBC 
is based on the principle that each particular risk faced by an undertaking is 
to be assigned an equity capital.87  Unlike the Solvency II regime as 
discussed above, operational and catastrophic risk are not explicitly taken 
into consideration as part of U.S. RBC standards.88  Moreover, U.S. RBC 
standards do not apply to reinsurers, which are subject to various state-
based requirements, while as a general matter, reinsurers fall within the 
scope of Solvency II.89  U.S. RBC standards employ a covariance formula 
in respect of determining capital requirements,90 a basis which does not 
reflect the approach adopted by Solvency II to account for the interaction 
of such factors such as assets and liabilities and risk mitigation and 
diversification.91 
One of the most significant differences between Solvency II and 
the current U.S. RBC system is the approach taken to internal models.  
                                                                                                                 
84 NAIC, Risk-based Capital General Overview, July 15, 2009, available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_caped_RBCoverview.pdf [hereinafter 
Risk-based Capital General Overview]; Martin Eling & Ines Holzmüller, An Overview 
and Comparison of Risk-based Capital Standards 2 (June 2008) (unpublished working 
paper, on file with the University of St. Gallen Institute of Insurance Economics). 
85 Eling & Holzmüller, supra note 84, at 4-5. 
86 Id. at 3. 
87 Id. at 4. 
88 Id. at 15. 
89 Id. at 20-21. 
90 Risk-based Capital General Overview, supra note 84, at 2; Eling & 
Holzmüller, supra note 84, at 20-21. 
91 Eling & Holzmüller, supra note 84, at 20-21. 
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Contrary to the approach as discussed above under Solvency II which 
introduces the option of internal models across the collective insurance 
industry, the use of internal modeling in the U.S. remains relatively 
limited.92  Partial internal modeling is applied in the U.S., on an 
incremental basis, in respect of certain products, subject to various 
safeguards.93  In this regard, for example, while certain undertakings may 
calculate required capital and reserves using internal models, such 
undertakings are nevertheless required to also calculate such items pursuant 
to a standard formula prescribed by the regulators, effectively providing for 
an explicit floor in respect of reserves and required capital.94 
In addition, as described above, the use of internal models under 
the Solvency II system is subject to the prior review and approval of the 
applicable supervisors.  In contrast, rather than conducting their own 
review and approval of internal models, U.S. supervisors tend to rely on the 
analysis conducted by the particular undertaking’s actuaries in respect of a 
model’s appropriateness and results.95 
In 2008, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
announced a Solvency Modernization Initiative (SMI), which examines 
international developments (e.g., Solvency II) and their potential 
applicability to U.S. regulation.96  An important focus of SMI concerns the 
review of the use of internal models, including the application of internal 
models to a wider range of insurance products.97  By way of specific 
example, consideration is being given to the possible use of full internal 
modeling by an undertaking, subject to certain safeguards (e.g., prior 
approval) as a replacement for RBC.98 
 
                                                                                                                 
92 Therese M. Vaughan, The Implications of Solvency II for U.S. Insurance 
Regulation, Networks Financial Institute at Indiana State University, Feb. 2009, at 
11, available at http://www.insurance.naic.org/Releases/2009_docs/090305_ 
vaughan_presentation.pdf [hereinafter Implications of Solvency II for U.S. 
Insurance Regulation]. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 8, 11. 
95 Id. at 11. 
96 See Ramon M. Calderon, Dir., NAIC Ctr. For Ins. Policy & Research, 
Presentation at the NAIC Casualty Actuarial Society Annual Meeting (Nov. 16, 
2009),.  See NAIC, NAIC Solvency Modernization Initiative, available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_ex_isftf_smi_overview.pdf 
[hereinafter SMI]. 
97 See id. 
98 See id. 
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4.  Compliance with the SCR / MCR: Enforcement 
Actions 
 
Pursuant to the Framework Directive, insurance undertakings must 
have procedures in place to identify an undertaking’s deteriorating financial 
condition and in the event of such deterioration, undertakings must 
“immediately” notify the applicable supervisors.99  As discussed below, the 
level of supervisory intervention and the specific mechanisms employed by 
regulators will progressively intensify with the degree of erosion of the 
undertaking’s financial health.100 
As specifically concerns the SCR, within two months from an 
undertaking observing non-compliance with this capital requirement, the 
undertaking must submit a “realistic recovery plan” to the applicable 
supervisors for approval.101  Within six months from the observation of 
such non-compliance, the undertaking must re-establish the level of its 
eligible own funds to cover the SCR or reduce the undertaking’s risk 
profile to ensure compliance with the SCR.102  Supervisors may, “if 
appropriate,” extend this period by an additional three months.103  
Moreover, the applicable supervisor may grant yet another extension in the 
event of an exceptional deterioration in the financial markets (the specific 
factors to be considered by supervisors in granting this addition extension 
are to be set forth in implementing measures adopted by the European 
Commission).104  If the applicable supervisor should determine that the 
financial situation of an undertaking will continue to deteriorate, such 
supervisors may, under exceptional circumstances, restrict such 
undertaking’s ability to dispose of its assets.105 
                                                                                                                 
99 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art 136, at 62. 
100 Id. arts. 136-39, at 62-63. 
101 See id. art. 138(2), at 62.  Such recovery plan must address certain specific 
matters as set forth in the Framework Directive (e.g., estimates of management 
expenses, income and expenditures).  See id.art. 142, at 63. 
102 See id.art. 138(2),  at 62. 
103 Id.  
104 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 138(4), at 62-64; art. 143, at 
64.  By way of example, one of the high level issues identified by CEIOPS and 
Commission Services for review in respect of Pillar II measures includes the 
determination of the maximum period of time which supervisory authorities can 
extend to undertakings in the event of exception market falls.  See CEIOPS Policy 
Issues and Options, supra note 31. 
105 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 138(5), at 63.  In this regard, 
Member States are to take the steps required to restrict the free disposal of assets 
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Non-compliance by an undertaking with the MCR is subject to 
separate remedial provisions under the Framework Directive.106  Within 
one month from the observation by an undertaking of non-compliance with 
the MCR, such undertaking must provide to the applicable supervisors a 
“realistic financial scheme.”  Such plan is designed to restore, within a 
period of three months from the observation of non-compliance, the 
eligible basic own funds to at least the level of the MCR or to reduce its 
risk profile accordingly.107  As is the case with the SCR, the applicable 
supervisors may place restrictions on an undertaking’s ability to dispose of 
its assets in light of continuing financial difficulties.108  Importantly, the 
applicable supervisor shall withdraw the authorization granted to an 
undertaking to engage in insurance business in the event that an 
undertaking fails to comply with the MCR and the supervisors determine 
that the submitted finance scheme is “manifestly inadequate” or the 
undertaking fails to comply with such scheme within the applicable 
period.109 
In addition to those measures described above, the supervisory 
authorities shall have the power, subject to a principle of proportionality, to 
take “all measures necessary” to safeguard the interests of policyholders.110 
 
5.   Own Funds 
 
As concerns an undertaking’s capital resources, the SCR and MCR 
must be covered by eligible “own funds” (e.g., regulatory capital) which 
are divided between “basic own funds” and “ancillary own funds.”111  In 
this regard, basic own funds include subordinated liabilities and the excess 
of assets over liabilities,112 and ancillary own funds include other items 
which may be called on to absorb losses (e.g., letters of credit, guarantees, 
other “legally binding commitments”, unpaid share capital).113  
                                                                                                                 
located in their territory at the request of the applicable undertaking’s home 
Member State which shall specify what assets are concerned.  Id. 
106 See id. arts. 139-42, at 63. 
107 See id. art. 139(2), at 62.   Such finance scheme must address certain 
specific matters as set forth in the Framework Directive (e.g., estimates of 
management expenses, income and expenditures).  See id. art. 142, at 63.  
108 See id. art. 139(3), at 63.  
109 See Framework Directive, supra note 3,art. 144(1),  at 64. 
110 See id. art. 141,  at 63. 
111 See id.art. 87-90,  at 48. 
112 See id. art. 88, at 48.  
113 See id. art. 89, at 48.  
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Furthermore, ancillary own funds are subject to approval by the applicable 
supervisors, for example, as concerns either the specific monetary value to 
be ascribed to such item or the method to be applied in determining such 
value.114 
Pursuant to the Framework Directive, own funds are classified in 
accordance with a three tier system, based in part on an item’s degree of 
liquidity, permanence and loss-absorbing capacity.115  Furthermore, the 
Framework Directive prescribes the specific amount of an undertaking’s 
own funds which may fall within each of the prescribed tiers.116  By way of 
example, the proportion of Tier 1 items (high quality capital) must be 
greater than 1/3 of the total amount of an undertaking’s eligible own funds 
covering the SCR.117 
As compared with other provisions of the Framework Directive, 
the provisions relating to eligible own funds are relatively broad and high 
level, and the related requirements are subject to clarification and 
development through additional implementing measures.118 
By way of comparison concerning the quality of capital resources, 
for example, U.S. RBS standards do not follow this tiered approach to 
available capital, but instead provide for a single overall amount of 
available capital.119  Furthermore, rather than taking into consideration 
account off-balance-sheet items (e.g., letters of credit) in the calculation of 
an undertaking’s available capital, such items are instead taken into 
consideration in the calculation of an undertaking’s required capital under 
the U.S. RBS standards.120 
 
                                                                                                                 
114 See id. art. 90, at 48. 
115 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 93, at 49. 
116 See id.art. 98, at 50. 
117 Id. 
118 See id. Art. 97, at 50.  
119 See Risk-based Capital General Overview, supra note 84, at 3-4. The 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners appears to be moving in the 
general direction of a tiered approach, at least as concerns the amout of collateral 
security that will be required of reinsurers, see NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMM’RS, 
REINSURANCE REGULATORY MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2009, available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_reinsurance_090915_reins_ref_mo
dernization_act.pdf. 
120 Id. 
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6.  Valuation of Assets / Liabilities 
 
For supervisory purposes and to limit the administrative burden on 
undertakings, under the Framework Directive, valuation standards are to be 
compatible, to the extent possible, with international accounting 
developments.121  More specifically, the Framework Directive provides that 
assets and liabilities shall be valued consistent with an amount determined 
on an arm’s length basis.122  Particular methods and assumptions to be used 
in the valuation of assets and liabilities will be set forth in future 
implementing measures from the European Commission.123 
By way of quick comparison, no single valuation methodology 
applies across the U.S., as states apply varying approaches to valuation 
including, for example, book value, market value, and amortized costs.124 
7.  Permitted Investments 
 
As concerns investments, undertakings will enjoy increased 
flexibility as concerns the scope of their investment decisions under the 
Solvency II regime, provided that investments are made in compliance with 
the so-called “prudent person principle” as set forth in the Framework 
Directive.125  Pursuant to this principle, undertakings will only be permitted 
to invest in assets and instruments which the undertaking may, for example, 
properly identify, measure, control and monitor and take into account in the 
undertaking’s assessment of its overall solvency requirements.126  
Furthermore, assets are to be invested by undertakings such as to ensure the 
“security, quality, liquidity and profitability of the portfolio as a whole.”127 
In this regard, Member States will not be able to require that 
undertakings invest in any particular category of asset or subject 
                                                                                                                 
121 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, recital ¶ 46, at 5.  
122 See id. art. 75, at 45;  the main principles applicable to the valuations of 
assets are consistent, as a general matter, with the definition of fair value under 
IFRS.  See CEIOPS’ Advice for Level 2 Implementing Measures on Solvency II: 
Valuation of Assets and “Other Liabilities,” at 3, October 2009, CEIOPS-DOC-
31/09. [hereinafter CEIOPS Level 2 Advice: Valuation of Assets and “Other 
Liabilities”]. 
123 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 74, at 45;  see also CEIOPS 
Level 2 Advice: Valuation of Assets and “Other Liabilities,” supra note 122. 
124 See e.g., Risk-Based Capital Standards, supra note 84. 
125 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 132, at 60. 
126 See id. art. 132(2), at 61. 
127 See id. 
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investment decisions to notification or approval requirements.128  However, 
for example, in order to ensure the uniform application of applicable 
provisions of Solvency II, the European Commission may adopt 
implementing measures providing for qualitative requirements (e.g., 
monitoring, managing and reporting of risks) in respect of certain 
investments.129 
By way of comparison, U.S. rules applicable to permitted 
investments vary from state to state and tend to be based on a combination 
of the prudent person principle and a rules-based approach.130 
 
B. PILLAR II: GOVERNANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
REQUIREMENTS.   
 
As succinctly observed by Thomas Steffan, Chairman of CEIOPS 
in his presentation of the Framework Directive, “… Solvency II is not just 
about capital.  It is a change of behavior – for the sake of enhanced 
consumer protection, financial stability and efficiency of insurance 
markets.”131  
One of the ways in which this change in behavior will be brought 
about, and heading lessons learned from the financial crisis, is through the 
provisions of the Framework Directive applicable to enhanced governance 
and risk management.132  In this way, governance requirements are able to 
address certain risks which are not properly dealt with through the 
quantitative requirements as set forth in Pillar I as discussed above.133  In 
this regard, the Framework Directive requires insurance undertakings to 
implement effective risk management systems, allowing undertakings to 
identify, measure, manage and report risks.134  Such systems must provide 
for the “sound and prudent management of the business” and, among other 
                                                                                                                 
128 See id. art. 133, at 61. 
129 See id. art. 135, at 62. 
130 See Implications of Solvency II for U.S. Insurance Regulation, supra note 
92, at 12.  The State of New York announced an intent to move toward a 
principles-based system in respect of regulating reinsurers, see e.g., 
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/press/2007/p0710181.htm.  
131 See Steffen Presentation, supra note 9. 
132 Studies concerning actual and near failures of undertakings as conducted by 
CEIPOS indicate that the “primary causes of failures were poor management and 
inappropriate risk decisions rather than inadequate capitalisation per se.”  See 
FAQs, supra note 8, at 5. 
133 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, recital ¶ 29, at 4. 
134 See id. art. 44, at 34. 
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things, include an adequate transparent organizational structure, be subject 
to written policies and regular internal review.135  As concerns the scope of 
such risk management systems, they must cover such matters as the risks 
included in the prescribed SCR calculation, underwriting and reserving, 
asset / liability management, investments and liquidity and concentration 
risk management.136  Furthermore, such systems are required to be well 
integrated into the particular organizational structure as well as the decision 
making processes of the undertaking.137 
Importantly, the Framework Directive places ultimate 
responsibility with an undertaking’s management or administration as 
concerns the undertaking’s compliance with the various measures adopted 
in respect of the Framework Directive, including the implementation of the 
required risk management system.138  Moreover, the Framework Directive 
sets forth requirements as concerns those persons who may run the 
undertaking or have other key functions.139  In this regard, such individuals 
must be of “good repute and integrity” and have adequate professional 
qualifications, knowledge and experience as concerns the effective 
management of the undertaking.140 
As part of its overall risk management framework, each 
undertaking will be required to implement an internal control system, 
including the establishing of risk-related “functions” or specific areas of 
expertise and responsibility.141  Such functions include a compliance 
function that serves to advise management on applicable compliance 
matters, including in respect of the identification and assessment of 
compliance risk,142 an internal audit function (e.g., responsibilities include 
the evaluation of the adequacy and effectiveness of the internal control and 
governance system)143 and an actuarial function (e.g., undertaking the 
coordination of the calculation of technical provisions, ensuring the 
appropriateness of the methodologies and models used by the undertaking, 
                                                                                                                 
135 See id. art. 41, at 33. 
136 See id. art. 44, at 34. 
137 See id. 
138 See id. art. 40, at 33.  
139 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 42, at 33. Matters related to 
proof of good repute, and the recognition of same by Member States, are addressed 
in Article 43 of the proposed Framework Directive, supra note 3. 
140 See id. 
141 See id. art. 46, at 35. 
142 See id. 
143 See id. art. 47, at 35.  
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expressing an opinion as to the overall underwriting policy and adequacy of 
reinsurance arrangements).144 
As a general matter, an undertaking may outsource the foregoing 
functions, among others.  However, the outsourcing of critical or important 
operational functions or activities145 is subject to certain enumerated 
conditions.  For example, such outsourcing may not materially impair the 
quality of the undertaking’s governance system or unduly increase 
operational risk.146  In order to ensure effective supervision of outsourced 
functions or activities, supervisors are to have access to relevant data held 
by the outsourcing provider as well as have the right to perform on-site 
inspections.147  In any event, Member States are to ensure that in the event 
that an undertaking chooses to outsource particular functions or activities, 
such undertakings are to remain fully responsible for discharging their 
obligations under the Framework Directive.148 
 
1. Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA) 
 
As a critical part of an undertaking’s risk management system, 
each undertaking will be required to regularly undertake a so-called “own 
risk and solvency assessment (ORSA).”149  In this regard, an undertaking 
must assess the short and long term risks which it may face, or be 
                                                                                                                 
144 See id. art. 48, at 36.  The requirement as to an actuarial function is 
controversial considering that this requirement is not provided for in Solvency I 
and will apply to both non-life and life undertakings.  As an example regarding the 
on-going consultations with CEIOP in respect of the contemplated actuarial 
function, the actuarial trade association Group Consultatif Actuariel Européen has 
proposed various specific technical and public interests standards to be applicable 
in this area (e.g., public interest standards should encompass actuarial, ethical, 
governance and communications standards).  See Groupe Consultatif Actuarial 
Européen, Professional Standards for the Actuarial Function under Solvency II 
(Sept. 29, 2009), available at http://www.gcactuaries.org/documents. 
145 The functions included within the governance system are considered to be 
“key functions and consequently also important and critical functions.” See 
Framework Directive, supra note 3, recital ¶ 33, at 4. 
146 See id. art. 49, at 36. 
147 See id. recital ¶ 37, at 4, art. 38, at 32. 
148 See id. art. 49, at 36. 
149 See id. art. 45, at 34.  In this regard, CEIOPS interprets “regularly” to mean 
at least annually.  See CEIOPS, Issues Paper: Own Risk and Solvency Assessment 
(ORSA) ¶ 49, at 12 (May 27, 2008), available at 
http://www.ceiops.eu/media/docman/public_files/consultations/IssuesPaperORSA.
pdf [hereinafter CEIOPS: ORSA Issues Paper].  
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anticipated to face, and determine the own funds necessary to meet the 
undertaking’s solvency needs on an on-going basis.150  In this way, 
Solvency II aims to integrate risk and capital management, necessarily 
promoting and implicating effective and forward-looking risk management 
as a principal consideration throughout the governance and decision 
making process of an undertaking.151 
The ORSA does not require the development of a specific internal 
model or the calculation of capital requirements in addition to the SCR and 
MCR.152  The choice as to the particular ORSA process adopted is left to 
the discretion of the particular undertaking, however, the process must 
meet prescribed guidelines.153  The results and information concerning the 
particular process undertaken in respect of the ORSA must be reported by 
an undertaking to the applicable supervisory authorities, thereby providing 
supervisors with the means for evaluating the risk profiles of 
undertakings.154 
While the Framework Directive addresses the principal 
requirements and matters to be addressed in the ORSA, certain 
undertakings have argued that the Framework Directive does not provide 
sufficient detail regarding the specific results which are to be achieved.  As 
a result, there is some uncertainty in the market, particularly on the part of 
smaller undertakings worried that the requirements under the ORSA may 
be overly complex and burdensome.155  Although the ORSA will likely be 
subject to Level 3 guidance from CEIOPS, it is not expected that there will 
be Level 2 implementing measures in respect of the ORSA.156  Therefore, 
in an effort to address the calls of the market for guidance in this area, 
CEIOPS has launched discussions regarding the scope and goals of the 
ORSA and has offered preliminary guidance in this regard.157  By way of 
example, CEIPOS has enumerated various principles which undertakings 
should observe in conducting the ORSA (e.g., the ORSA should be 
regularly reviewed and approved by the undertaking’s administrative or 
                                                                                                                 
150 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 45, at 35; see CEIOPS: ORSA 
Issues Paper, supra note 149, ¶ 9, at 5. 
151 See e.g., Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 45, at 35. 
152 See id. recital ¶ 36, at 4. 
153 See id. art. 45, at 34-35. 
154 See id. 
155 See CEIOPS: ORSA Issues Paper, supra note 149, ¶¶ 2-3, at 4. 
156 See id. ¶ 5, at 4-5. 
157 See id. ¶ 6, at 5. 
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management body; the ORSA process and results should be appropriately 
evidenced, internally documented and independently assessed).158 
This approach to enterprise risk management under Solvency II 
marks one of the most significant differences from the current U.S. system.  
In the U.S., such evaluation is not part of the RBC system, and 
undertakings are not otherwise required to implement risk management 
systems such as that provided under the ORSA.159  In this regard, while 
undertakings in the U.S. are required to analyze the risks that they face by 
virtue the U.S. regulatory regime (e.g., risk-based capital requirements),160 
there is no requirement for these undertakings to prepare specific internal 
risk assessment-related documentation and then provide such materials to 
the applicable supervisors.161  It should be noted that the introduction of 
enterprise risk management requirements are being considered as part of 
the NAIC’s Solvency Modernization Initiative.162 
 
2. Group Supervision 
 
Under the Framework Directive, Member States will be required to 
provide for group-level supervision of insurance undertakings.163  
Significantly, Solvency II streamlines the group supervision process by 
providing that group insurance undertakings are to be supervised through a 
single “group supervisor” in the group’s home Member State, the duties of 
whom would necessarily be exercised in cooperation with the relevant 
                                                                                                                 
158 See CEIOPS: ORSA Issues Paper, supra note 149, ¶ 55, at 13. 
159 See SMI, supra note 96. 
160 See Solvency Modernization Initiative (EX) Task Force, Issues for 
Consideration in the Solvency Modernization Initiative 3 (June 14, 2009), available 
at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_ex_isftf_090615_04_solvency_ 
issues.pdf. 
161   See Letter from Mike Moriart, Chair, Risk Assessment Working Group (E), 
Risk-Focused Examination Approach (Jan. 18, 2007) (on file with NAIC, available 
at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_examover_fehtg_letter__risk_focus
ed_exams.pdf). 
162 See SMI, supra note 96.  An enhanced risk-focused examination approach 
will be required to be applied by U.S. regulators in 2010, and the NAIC expects 
that similar information to that provided by the ORSA will be collected by this 
revised risk-focused examination approach. See Implications of Solvency II for 
U.S. Insurance Regulation, supra note 92, at 9. 
163 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, arts. 212-266, at 81-102. 
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national supervisors.164  Such group supervisor will have primary 
responsibility for the group’s supervision and chair a college of supervisors 
made up of representatives from Member States where the group has 
operations.165  This model marks a break from the existing system, argued 
to be overly burdensome on larger group undertakings, which provides for 
supervision on the group and sub-group level and which fails to define with 
sufficient clarity the roles and duties of the various supervisory authorities 
in this regard.166 
These revised regulations as to group supervision will allow 
insurance groups to operate more efficiently and result in a reduction of 
related costs.  In addition, the new group supervision rules are designed to 
foster cooperation among supervisory authorities as well as improve 
assessments of the overall financial situation of group undertakings.167  
Moreover, under Solvency II, insurance groups will be able to avail 
themselves of group-wide models and take advantage of certain group 
diversification benefits.168 
It is important to point out that the Framework Directive does not 
contain the “group support” language as proposed in earlier drafts of the 
Framework Directive (Title III).169  As a result, under the contemplated 
regime, a particular insurance undertaking will not be permitted to use 
capital held elsewhere in the group in order to calculate the undertaking’s 
SCR, regardless of the group’s capital as a whole.170  However, the 
European Commission has indicated that it may revisit the issue of group 
                                                                                                                 
164 See id. arts. 247-251, at 95-98. 
165 See id. art. 248, at 97. 
166 See Council Directive 98/78, 1998 O.J. (L 330) 1-12 (EC), available at 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1998:330:0001:0012:EN:PDF. 
167 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, arts. 247-251, at 95-98; FAQs, 
supra note 8, at 10. 
168 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, arts. 212-266, at 81-102; CEIOPS, 
CEIOPS’ Advice for Level 2 Implementing Measures on Solvency II: Assessment of 
Group Solvency (OCT. 2009), available at http://www.ceiops.eu/media/files/consultations/ 
consultationpapers/CP60/CEIOPS-L2-Final-Advice-Group-solvency-assessment.pdf. 
169 See FAQs, supra note 8, at 11. 
170 Press Release, European Commission, “Solvency II”: European Parliament 
Approval of Proposed Directive Brings Modern Insurance Regulation Nearer, 
(Apr. 22, 2009) (available at  http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? 
reference=IP/09/621&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.) 
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support once progress has been made in other various identified areas 
related to insurance regulation.171 
 
C. PILLAR III: TRANSPARENCY AND MARKET DISCIPLINE. 
 
1.  Reporting. 
 
The Framework Directive calls for consistent supervisory reporting 
and disclosure across the EU, strengthening transparency and overall 
market discipline.172 
Specific details concerning the reporting requirements, which go 
beyond those currently required to be disclosed under the current 
regulatory regime, are to be developed through future implementing 
measures (e.g., as to content, form, modalities).173  However, the 
Framework Directive does provide certain high level guidance as concerns 
reporting.174  For example, undertakings will be required to publicly 
disclose a report, on an annual basis, concerning their solvency and 
financial condition.   This report is to include, for example, a description of 
the system of governance and an assessment of its adequacy, a description 
of the capital management including references to the structure and amount 
of own funds and their quality, the amounts of the SCR and MCR and the 
underlying assumptions, and any non-compliance with the foregoing.175  
An undertaking may, on a voluntary basis, supplement the basic disclosure 
with additional information concerning the undertaking’s solvency or 
financial condition.176  As a practical matter, such Pillar III reporting will 
likely draw upon information gathered in respect of Pillar I and the ORSA 
of Pillar II.177  While certainly presenting challenges in seeking a balance 
between proprietary and public information, such public disclosure is seen 
as essential in strengthening market disciple by improving the 
                                                                                                                 
171 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, recital ¶ 141, at 13. 
172 See id. art. 51, at 36. 
173 See id. art. 56, at 38.  By way of example, certain high level issues 
identified by CEIOPS and Commission Services as being of particular importance 
for review in respect of public disclosure concern the compatibility with other 
reporting rules and the introduction of proportionate requirements for small 
undertakings.  See also CEIOPS Policy Issues and Options, supra note 31. 
174 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 51, at 36. 
175 See id. art. 51(1), at 37. 
176 See id. art. 54(2), at 38. 
177 See id. arts. 35, at 30; art. 45, at 34-35. 
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accountability of undertakings and providing increased information to 
policyholders and beneficiaries. 
 
2.   Supervision: Generally.   
 
In addition to the points already discussed herein as concerns 
supervision, a few additional points specific to the general principles of 
supervision should be made here.178 
Under Solvency II, Member States are to ensure that supervisors 
are provided with the required “means, and have the relevant expertise and 
capacity, and mandate” to carry out the principal objective of supervision 
which is the protection of policyholders and beneficiaries.179  Furthermore, 
taking into account the information available, supervisors are to give 
appropriate consideration to the potential impact of their decisions as 
concerns the stability of the larger EU financial systems.180  In addition, the 
Framework Directive stresses that supervisors are to respect a principle of 
proportionality, as indicated above, in respect of the application of their 
powers.181 
Supervision is to be based on a prospective risk-based basis, 
including on-going verification, and a mix of on-site inspections and off-
site activities.182  In addition, supervisors are to carry out their duties in a 
“transparent and accountable” manner, with consideration to protecting 
confidential information.183  Moreover, the Framework Directive provides 
for measures to facilitate the supervisory convergence and the flow of 
information among the various EU supervisory authorities.184 
It is important to point out that the financial supervision of 
insurance undertakings, including the business conducted by their branches 
or through the freedom to provide services, shall be the “sole” 
                                                                                                                 
178 See Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Supervisors, CEIOPS’ Advice for Level 2 Implementing Measures on Solvency II: 
Supervisory Reporting and Public Disclosure Requirements, (October 2009) 
(available at http://www.solvencyii.ie/documents/CEIOPS-L2-Final-Advice-Own-
funds-Criteria-supervisory-approval-of-AOF.pdf). 
179 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 27, at 28. 
180 See id. art. 28, at 28.  
181 See id. art. 34(6), at 30. 
182 See id. art. 29, at 28. 
183 See id. art. 31, at 29. 
184 See id. art. 64, at 41. 
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responsibility of a particular undertaking’s home Member State.185  In the 
event that the supervisors of a host Member State where an insurance risk 
is located have reason to consider that an undertaking’s activities may 
impact its financial soundness, then such supervisors are to so inform the 
supervisors of such undertaking’s home Member State.186 
 
3.   Supervisory Review Process.   
 
Another requirement introduced pursuant to the Framework 
Directive is the Supervisory Review Process (SRP), a specific process 
designed to improve the assessment of the ability of undertakings to 
withstand adverse changes in economic conditions.187  As part of this 
overall process, Member States are required to ensure that applicable 
supervisors review and evaluate the “strategies, processes and reporting 
procedures” implemented by undertakings as part of their compliance 
efforts.188  Specifically, supervisors are to review and evaluate compliance 
with such items as the system of governance (including the ORSA), and the 
technical provisions, capital requirements, investment rules, the quality and 
quantity of own funds, and requirements in respect of internal models, all 
as set forth in the Framework Directive.189  Importantly, the Framework 
Directive provides that supervisors are to conduct such review and 
evaluations on a regular basis and that they should have the powers 
necessary to remedy identified weaknesses or deficiencies.190 
 
4.   Capital Add-on.   
 
As part of the supervisory review / enforcement process, the 
applicable supervisory authorities may in “exceptional”191 circumstances 
                                                                                                                 
185 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 30(1), at 28.  Where an 
insurance undertaking authorized in another Member State conducts business in a 
host Member State through a branch office, then the supervisors of the 
undertaking’s home Member State may conduct on-site verifications of the branch, 
provided that such supervisors have first notified the supervisors of the host 
Member State thereof. See id. art. 33, at 29. 
186 See id. art. 30(3), at 29. 
187 See id. art. 36, at 30. 
188 See id. art. 36(1), at 30-31. 
189 See id. art. 36(2), at 31. 
190 See Framework Directive, supra note 3,art. 36(4-6), at 31. 
191 “The imposition of a capital add-on is exception in the sense that it should 
only be used as a last resort measure, when other supervisory measures are 
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require, with justification, undertakings to set aside additional capital.192  
Such an add-on, which may be applied in respect of a particular 
undertaking or its group, will require the undertaking to maintain additional 
capital in excess of the SCR.193  This capital add-on may be imposed when 
the applicable supervisory authority identifies, for example, a significant 
deviation from the applicable SCR or system of governance provided for 
pursuant to the Framework Directive.194  The capital add-on should be 
maintained for such time as the circumstances under which it was imposed 
are not remedied.195  Further implementing measures will be adopted by the 
European Commission in respect of the specific situations in which the 
capital add-on may be imposed by applicable supervisors, in addition to the 
particular methodologies to be employed in the calculation thereof.196 
 
VII. COLLATERAL REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO 
REINSURERS 
 
One of the most significant and continuing points of contention 
between U.S. and EU reinsurers and regulators is the application of 
collateral requirements to foreign reinsurers covering business in their 
jurisdiction.  The primary concern behind such requirements is that such 
foreign reinsurers are not subject to the same local regulatory and judicial 
enforcement regime and, therefore, such undertakings present a heightened 
risk, and therefore should be required to pledge assets as a safeguard 
measure.197 
In this regard and as a general matter, U.S. regulators require 
foreign (e.g., EU) reinsurers which are not licensed or accredited in a U.S. 
state, and subject to various conditions, to post collateral in respect of their 
operations in the U.S.198  In the EU, and as introduced through provisions 
of the EU Reinsurance Directive, Member States are prohibited from 
imposing collateral requirements on reinsurers from other Member 
                                                                                                                 
ineffective or inappropriate”.  See id., recital ¶ 27, at 4; art. 37, at 31. See also id. 
art. 282, at 89 (regarding the group capital add-on). 
192 See id. art. 37, at 31. 
193 See id. 
194 See Framework Directive, supra note 3,art. 37(1), at 31. 
195 See id. recital ¶ 28, at 4. 
196 See id. art. 37(6), at 32. 
197 See Gregory S. Arnold, The Doubtful Impact of an Optional Federal 
Charter on the Reinsurance Collateral Debate, 44 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 79 
[hereinafter Doubtful Impact of Optional Federal Charter]. 
198 See id. at 82. See supra notes 119, 130. 
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States.199  However, Member States may choose to apply collateral 
requirements to non-EU reinsurers which provide reinsurance to 
undertakings regulated in Member States.200  By way of example, France 
allows for the imposition of such requirements in respect of non-EEA 
reinsurers.201 
As a move, in part, to assuage U.S. regulators, the Framework 
Directive contains language regarding the application of so so-called 
collateral requirements to non-EU reinsurers.  Specifically, the Framework 
Directive prohibits EU Member States from requiring that a reinsurer 
pledge assets to cover unearned premiums and outstanding claims 
provisions if such reinsurer is an undertaking with its head office in a third 
county whose solvency regime is deemed to be “equivalent” pursuant to the 
Framework Directive.202  The meaning of “equivalent” has yet to be 
defined or clarified, and more specifically, guidance has not been provided 
as to whether the U.S. solvency regimes would be deemed to be equivalent 
in this regard. 
Many undertakings, insurance groups and regulators in both the 
U.S. and the EU continue to call for a reform of collateral requirements, 
arguing that such requirements are essentially outdated, discriminatory and 
anticompetitive.  With moves like Solvency II, and particularly the 
collateral-related provisions discussed above, there may be reason for a 
certain degree of measured optimism that compromises might eventually be 
reached between EU and U.S. regulators in this regard.203 
 
                                                                                                                 
199 Council Directive 2005/68, 2005 O.J. (L323) 16 (on reinsurance and 
amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 92/49/EEC as well as Directives 
98/78/EC and 2002/83/EC, art. 32).  As mentioned above in respect of the 
Framework Directive, it is important to point out that this Directive also has 
relevance to the larger European Economic Area, supra note 3. 
200 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 172, at 72. 
201 See Code des Assurances, C. Assur., art. R. 332-3-3 (French Insurance 
Code). 
202 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 172, at 72.  Furthermore, as 
concerns recoverables from reinsurance contracts against undertakings having their 
head office in a non-EEA country whose solvency system is deemed to be 
“equivalent” pursuant to the Framework Directive, Member States will be 
prohibited from requiring that assets representing such recoverables be located in 
the European Community,  id. art. 134, at 61. 
203 See, e.g., Doubtful Impact of Optional Federal Charter, supra note 197, at 
106as concerns proposed reforms to collateral requirements from New York 
regulators. 
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VIII. ADDITIONAL MATTERS 
 
As indicated in the introduction to this Article, the review herein is 
intended to provide, among other things, a survey of some of the principle 
regulatory changes introduced through Solvency II.  However, it is 
important to briefly point out that the Framework Directive also recasts 
existing directives as indicated above, and as a result, addresses such other 
significant matters such as requirements concerning the taking-up, pursuit 
and prior authorization of undertakings wishing to engage in insurance 
activities,204 provisions in respect of the exchange of information among 
supervisory authorities and the promotion of supervisory convergence,205 
duties of statutory auditors,206 and provisions specific to individual types of 
coverage207 and to the reorganization and winding-up of insurance 
undertakings.208 
 
IX. KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE BASEL FRAMEWORK 
AND SOLVENCY II / ADDRESSING COMMON CONCERNS 
WITH SOLVENCY II BASED ON COMPARISONS                   
TO BASEL II 
  
As indicated above, Solvency II adopts the general three pillar 
approach of Basel II, the regulatory standard for financial institutions.209  
However, it is important to understand the various significant differences 
between the two regimes, as well as bear in mind the key differences 
between the financial and insurance industries.  Unfortunately, 
commentators are often far too quick to apply the banking experience into 
insurance.  In this regard, the similarities between the Basel framework and 
Solvency II are frequently overstated, leading critics of Solvency II to 
argue that this initiative suffers from the same shortcomings of Basel II. 
 
                                                                                                                 
204 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 14, at 24. 
205 See id. art. 64, at 41. 
206 See id. art. 72, at 43. 
207 See e.g., id. art. 206, at 79 (health insurance). 
208 See id. art. 269, at 103. 
209 See BIS Website, supra note 6. 
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A. KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE BASEL FRAMEWORK AND 
SOLVENCY II 
  
Before addressing some of the most frequent concerns with 
Solvency II in this regard, it is important as an initial matter to address 
some of the key differences between the Basel framework and Solvency II. 
 
1. Range of Risks Covered.   
 
The range of risks included under Pillar I of Basel II is focused on 
operational risk, credit risk and market risk as concerns a financial 
institution’s trading operations.210  As described above, Solvency II aims to 
cover all quantifiable key risk areas.  In this regard, Solvency II covers the 
same categories as Basel II, but also includes an expanded array of risks, 
including, by way of example, insurance risk, liquidity risk (an area of the 
Basel framework which is subject to continuing attention) as well as 
broader view of market risk across the entirety of an undertaking.211 
 
2. Capital Requirements / Ladder of Supervisory 
Intervention. 
 
Basel II provides for a single capital requirement.212  As described 
above, Solvency II provides for broader Pillar I provisions.  In this regard, 
Solvency II provides for both a Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) and a 
Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR).  Once the SCR of an undertaking 
is breached, the intervention of supervisors is triggered in order to remedy 
the situation, and if the MCR is breached, increased supervisory measures 
are triggered, all as described above.213  In this way, Solvency II provides 
for a gradated approach to supervisory intervention, a nuanced system 
which is not mirrored by Basel II’s approach to capital adequacy. 
 
3.  Internal Modeling. 
 
The approach to internal modeling under Basel II is limited to 
certain specific risk categories and specified applications (e.g., IRB 
framework for credit risks, AMA framework for operational risk).  In 
                                                                                                                 
210 See BIS Website, supra note 6, Pillar I. 
211 See infra discussion of Pillar I provisions of Solvency II. 
212 See BIS Website, supra note 6, Pillar I. 
213 See supra discussion of Pillar I provisions of Solvency II. 
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respect of credit risk, for example, companies are only permitted to use 
internal modeling to determine certain specific risk components.214  In 
contrast, as described above, Solvency II provides that any undertaking 
subject to Solvency II may elect to use partial or full modeling, across 
categories, as an alternative to using the standard formula for calculating 
the SCR.215   
 
4.   Diversification. 
 
Under Basel II, diversification is addressed through a general 
assumption as to standard diversification which is then incorporated into 
the general calculation.  As such, any company-specific diversification is 
particularly limited.216  Solvency II, however, aims to make diversification 
specific to a particular undertaking and flexible enough to allow for group 
level matters. 
 
5.  Stakeholder Participation in the Initiative’s 
Development.   
 
The level of stakeholder participation in the development of each 
of Basel II and Solvency II is markedly different.  Basel II was developed 
by a central committee (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), with 
relatively limited stakeholder participation.217  In contrast, as described 
above, Solvency II continues to be developed with the active involvement 
of the various stakeholders through such means as Quantitative Impact 
Studies (QIS). 
 
B. COMMON CONCERNS WITH SOLVENCY II BASED ON 
COMPARISONS TO BASEL II 
 
Against this background we can now address in brief a few 
common concerns with Solvency II based on comparisons to Basel II.  In 
this regard, the author consulted with Mr. Karel van Hulle, Head of the 
Insurance and Pensions Unit of the European Commission responsible for 
                                                                                                                 
214 See BIS Website, supra note 6, Pillar I. 
215 See infra discussion of Pillar I provisions of Solvency II. 
216 See BIS Website, supra note 6, Pillar I. 
217 See David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, In International 
Administration, 5 Chi. J. Int’l L. 547, 555-61 (2005). 
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Solvency II (“Mr. van Hulle”), and his specific feedback is included 
herein.218 
 
1. Misinterpretation of the Objective of Solvency II–
Capital Standards.   
 
Frequently, commentators argue that Basel II effectively seeks to 
lower minimum capital requirements applicable to financial institutions.  
Therefore, in light of the financial crisis that has exposed many financial 
institutions as being undercapitalized, commentators question the 
advisability of implementing a system such as Solvency II which likewise 
seeks to relax capital standards in respect of insurance undertakings. 
Such an argument is based on an inaccurate understanding of the 
objective of Solvency II.  As emphasized by Mr. van Hulle, the objective of 
Solvency II is not to lower the capital requirements applicable to 
undertakings, but rather to express these capital requirements as part of a 
balanced and comprehensive reflection of the risks faced by any particular 
undertaking.219  That being said, under the risk-based structure of Solvency 
II, lower capital requirements may indeed result for these undertakings 
which understand and manage their risks well.  However, certain 
undertakings may face higher capital requirements under Solvency II since 
their capital may not have been risk-based, particularly affecting those 
undertakings which have managed their risks less adequately or have 
inadequate capital considering the amount of risk underwritten. 
Furthermore, as concerns adjusting capital requirements and 
mindful of concerns as to the health of undertakings, Mr. van Hulle stresses 
that since there is no evidence that the EU insurance industry is 
undercapitalized, there would appear to be no reason for a general increase 
in requirements at this time.220 
 
2.  Use of Internal Modeling by Small and Medium 
Undertakings.  
 
Under Solvency II, the use of internal modeling is available to be 
applied by any applicable insurance undertaking.  Because of this, concerns 
have been raised as to whether small and medium undertakings will have, 
                                                                                                                 
218 Interview with Karel van Hulle, Head of Unit, Ins. & Pensions Unit of the 
Eur. Comm’n, in PLACE (Jan. 12, 2010). 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
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in reality, the competence to conduct such modeling.  In this regard, 
comparisons are drawn to the Basel II system, which as applied in the U.S., 
only permits internal modeling to be applied by a limited number of the 
largest financial institutions. 
While a standard formula is limited in providing only an 
approximation, Mr. van Hulle stresses that as a general matter, a well-
designed internal model strengthens a particular undertaking’s focus on risk 
management and provides a more attuned alignment of such undertaking’s 
specific capital and risk requirements.221  While internal modeling is 
complex, it is expected that undertakings, regardless of their relative size, 
will be in a position to calculate the SCR on the basis of partial or full 
modeling.222  In this regard, Mr. van Hulle points out that smaller 
undertakings often provide specialized and niche services who understand 
their particular risks very well, often even better than larger more 
diversified undertakings.  Moreover, certain national supervisors are 
already actively working with undertakings, of varying sizes, in respect of 
the development of internal models, in anticipation of Solvency II coming 
into force in 2012.  By way of example, the UK’s Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) has created a dedicated Internal Model Approval Process 
(IMAP) team and continues to distribute various guidance in respect of 
internal modelling under Solvency II.  In addition, the FSA has initiated a 
pilot program whereby four undertakings (of varying types and sizes) have 
been chosen to test the design of the IMAP.  Furthermore, the FSA has 
launched plans to start a pre-application process in respect of internal 
models this year.223 
 
3.   Development of Internal Models.  
 
In light of the financial crisis, concerns have been expressed as to 
whether internal modeling under Solvency II will be subject to the same 
shortcomings as seen as applies to financial institutions under Basel II.  
Specifically, will Solvency II ensure that internal models are actually used 
by undertakings to understand their risks, as opposed to such models being 
developed simply as a tool to be used by regulators? 
                                                                                                                 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 See Solvency 2 - IMAP Update Helping You Prepare, Financial Services 
Authority Release (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ 
international/imap_update_oct.pdf. 
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In this regard and as an initial matter, Mr. van Hulle stresses that it 
is important to understand the differences between internal modelling as 
between financial institutions and insurance undertakings.  Internal 
modelling in respect of financial institutions must necessarily take into 
account various factors which are difficult to predict (e.g., interest rates).  
On the other hand, Mr. van Hulle points out that factors in respect of 
internal modelling for insurance undertakings are often more discretely 
defined and relatively stable (e.g., longevity).  As concerns underwriting 
risk, Mr. van Hulle remarks that internal modelling in insurance looks into 
the past and projects into the future.224  In this regard, he notes that as 
concerns underwriting risk, which is the principal insurance risk, 
undertakings may have a long history from which to assess applicable risk 
(e.g., longevity as applicable to life insurance).225 
Insurers will elect to use internal modelling, as opposed to the 
standard model, when internal models help to lower the particular 
undertaking’s SCR.   However, as discussed above, an undertaking which 
decides to use partial or full internal modeling in respect of calculating 
SCR may only do so once such model has been reviewed and approved by 
the applicable supervisor, meeting various statistical, calibration, validation 
and documentation standards.226  In this regard, any internal model must 
also meet the so-called “use test” under Solvency II, a test which is 
described above and which provides for more developed standards than 
found under Basel II.227  Pursuant to this test, as discussed above, an 
undertaking must demonstrate that the particular model is widely used in 
and plays a significant role in the undertaking’s actual internal risk 
management and decision-making processes.  In other words, the 
undertaking must demonstrate that the model is not being used simply to 
minimize capital requirements or for the benefit of regulators, but rather 
that the model is actually being used as the basis upon which the business 
of the undertaking is being run.228 
 
                                                                                                                 
224 See Interview with Karel van Hulle, supra note 220. 
225 Id. 
226 See supra p. 13. 
227 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 120, at 57. 
228 See supra p. 13. 
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4.   Regulator Competence To Evaluate and Supervise 
Internal Models.   
 
Another area of concern in respect of Solvency II is whether 
insurance supervisors will be adequately equipped to supervise internal 
models.  In this regard, critics of the use of internal models often point to 
how the financial crisis has raised serious questions regarding the 
competence of financial supervisors to evaluate and monitor the 
proliferation of different internal models. 
Unquestionably, internal modeling represents one of the most 
significant single challenges for insurance supervisors.  Among other 
things, supervisors will need to possess the required technical knowledge, 
as well as understand how the various risks facing undertakings are 
modelled in order to evaluate the adequacy of any internal model.  In this 
regard and to help facilitate uniformity across jurisdictions, the European 
Commission is currently developing uniform criteria which supervisors are 
to apply in respect of the approval of any internal model.229  In addition, 
extensive training sessions for national supervisors are being organized at 
the EU level as concerns internal modeling and related issues and risks.230 
 
5.   Addressing the Financial Crisis.   
 
In light of the global financial crisis and the criticisms made in 
respect of Basel II (such criticisms frequently failing to take into account 
the differed implementation of Basel II), concerns have been raised as to 
whether, as a general matter, Solvency II adequately addresses the various 
challenges and issues presented by this crisis. 
In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that Solvency II is not 
simply a reaction to the financial crisis, but rather represents an initiative 
which has been (and continues to be) an evolving revision of the prudential 
regulation of insurers.  That having been said, many of the features of 
Solvency II position the initiative as a fundamental tool and platform for 
addressing many of the specific issues raised by the financial crisis.  
Perhaps one of the most significant ways in which Solvency II helps to 
address such issues is through the very nature of the initiative – a dynamic 
                                                                                                                 
229 See Comm. of Eur. Ins. & Occupational Pension Supervisors [CEIOPS], 
CEIOPS’ Advice for Level 2 Implementing Measures on Solvency II on: The 
Procedure to be Followed for the Approval of an Internal Model, CEIOPS-Doc-
28/09 (Oct. 2009). 
230 See Interview with Karel van Hulle, supra note 220. 
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risk-based capital system based on enhanced governance and risk 
management.  In this way, Mr. van Hulle stresses that Solvency II is able to 
address such matters as the serious shortcomings in risk management 
practices which have been exposed by the financial crisis.  Furthermore, 
Solvency II (Pillar III) promotes greater transparency and accountability, 
another area of particular concern amplified by the financial crisis. 
Moreover, and as discussed further herein, Solvency II aims to 
address the problem of pro-cyclicality, an area of notable concern with 
Basel II.  In this regard and as discussed herein, the ladder of intervention 
approach adopted by Solvency II (the multi-tiered approach ranging from 
the SCR to the MCR) works to address possible pro-cyclical effects by 
providing for a gradated231 and flexible approach232 to supervisory 
intervention.  In this way, Solvency II seeks to provide a dampener against 
the situation where the impact of regulation increases the severity on the 
overall economic, financial or insurance cycle.233 
Various elements of Solvency II have been or are being considered 
for amendment as a direct result of the financial crisis.  In this regard, Mr. 
van Hulle points to the possibility of attaching a greater importance to 
financial stability issues, strengthening Tier I capital requirements, and 
further addressing possible pro-cyclical effects as concerns supervisory 
actions, as well as specific risks, such as concentration risk or liquidity 
risk.234 
Moreover, Mr. van Hulle identifies group supervision as an area of 
particular focus of the European Commission in light of the financial crisis, 
an area of supervision which has traditionally been treated as 
                                                                                                                 
231 See supra p. 18-19.. 
232 See Framework Directive, supra note 3, recital ¶ 61, at 6-7; art. 138(4), at 
62-63. Solvency II provides that in the event of exceptional deterioration in the 
financial markets, supervisors may grant an undertaking additional time in order to 
re-establish the level of its own eligible funds to cover the SCR or reduce the 
undertaking’s risk profile to ensure compliance with the SCR. Id. 
233 See Comm. of Eur. Ins. & Occupational Pension Supervisors [CEIOPS], 
Consultation Paper no. 64, Draft CEIOPS’ Advice for Level 2 Implementing 
Measures on Solvency II: Extension of the Recovery Period, CEIOPS–CP–64/09 
(Nov. 2, 2009). 
234 See Interview with Karel van Hulle, supra note 220; see also Basel Comm. 
on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Enhancements to the Basel II 
Framework (July 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm 
(promulgating amendments designed to enhance the Basel II framework by 
strengthening minimum capital requirements and disclosure requirements). 
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supplementary to solo supervision throughout the EU (and the U.S.).235  
Solvency II aims to prioritize group supervision along with solo 
supervision.  In this regard, and as described herein, group supervision will 
be strengthened under Solvency II through such significant measures as the 
appointment by each group of a group supervisor.236 
As an additional matter, the Value-at-Risk (VaR) approach adopted 
by Basel II, in part, has been criticized for failing to account for so-called 
“fat tail” events such as the financial crisis.  In this regard, similar concerns 
have been raised as concerns Solvency II which also contemplates the use 
of VaR.  Tail VaR is not currently contemplated to be included as part of 
the standard formula under Solvency II out of concerns that doing so would 
render the formula too complex.237 However, under Solvency II, 
undertakings are provided with the opportunity to specifically account for 
tail factors through the use of internal modelling.  As discussed above, the 
use of internal models is particularly restricted under Basel II, whereas 
internal modelling is actively encouraged to be applied by any undertaking 
subject to Solvency II and across the spectrum or risks categories. 
It is important to bear in mind that while capital requirements are 
key to any regulatory program, Solvency II takes a holistic approach to risk 
management, combining capital requirements with qualitative requirements 
(Pillar II) and market transparency measures (Pillar III).  Therefore, the 
various risk-based measures of Solvency II, taken together on a regime-
wide basis and as discussed in detail herein, are designed to help account 
for stress events. 
While no economically viable regulatory regime can provide an 
absolute guarantee against failure, Solvency II is designed with the goal of 
striking the necessary balances.  That being said, and as discussed above, 
Solvency II seeks to provide aggressive assurances as to the health of the 
insurance industry, in providing, for example, what is generally agreed to 
be a high confidence level of 99.5 % Value at Risk over a one-year period 
or one failure in two hundred years. 
 
X.   CONCLUSION 
 
Solvency II is a fundamental review of the prudential regulation of 
the European insurance industry, providing for a reinforced EU-wide, 
forward-looking, risk-sensitive regulatory structure, as applicable to such 
                                                                                                                 
235 See Interview with Karel van Hulle, supra note 220. 
236 See supra p. 12. 
237 See Interview with Karel van Hulle, supra note 220. 
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areas as capital adequacy, governance and risk management, as well as 
market discipline and transparency.  Through a total balance sheet 
approach, undertakings will be required under Solvency II not only to 
assess the actual risks faced by an undertaking, but also to implement such 
measures required to monitor, manage and mitigate such risks.  
Representing a further level of sophistication, Solvency II builds on the 
general architecture of Basel II, addressing the specificities of the insurance 
sector.  Heading lessons from the financial crisis and the Basel framework, 
Solvency II, as a whole, is designed to play a key role in helping to provide 
an early warning system to reduce the likelihood of the collapse of 
insurance undertakings and losses being suffered by policyholders and 
beneficiaries. 
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CONGRESS’ SELF-INFLICTED SISYPHEAN TASK: 
THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY’S FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
EXEMPTION AND THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
COMPETITION ACTS OF 2007 AND 2009  
 
Anthony J. Alt†* 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
[T]he law of insurance antitrust is not a subject for the faint of 
heart.1 
     ~Robert H. Jerry, II 
  
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, many people had ideas on 
how to lessen the impact of any such future catastrophe.  One of those ideas 
concerned the insurance industry.  Some people interpreted various actions 
of major insurance companies as attempts to avoid paying property-owner 
damage claims caused by Hurricane Katrina.2  The simultaneous record-
breaking profits of property-casualty companies in 20053 made several 
Congressmen skeptical of the efficacy of state insurance regulation,4 and 
                                                                                                                 
* Juris Doctor, summa cum laude, Ave Maria School of Law.  An earlier 
version of this Article was selected by Jones Day as the winning article in the 2009 
William E. Swope Antitrust Writing Competition.  This version has been modified 
to reflect the pending legislation of the Insurance Industry Competition Act of 
2009.  I especially thank Richard Myers for his feedback and example of 
dedication, and Nell O’Leary Alt for her timeliness in asking the question, 
“Really?” 
1 Robert H. Jerry, II, The Antitrust Implications of Collaborative Standard 
Setting by Insurers Regarding the Use of Genetic Information in Life Insurance 
Underwriting, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 397, 398 (2002–2003). 
2 See, e.g., Rep. Gene Taylor, Federal Insurance Reform After Katrina, 77 
MISS. L.J. 783, 783–87 (2008) (describing the efforts of insurance companies to 
deny claims caused by wind damage); John K. Warren, Note, Restoring 
Responsibility and Accountability in Disaster Relief, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 893, 901 (2007) (purporting that some insurance companies delayed 
payments in order to force claimants into settling for lesser amounts). 
3 AMERICANS FOR INSURANCE REFORM, THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY’S 
TROUBLING RESPONSE TO KATRINA 18 (2006) (noting that despite the hurricanes 
and claims losses, 2005 was the property-casualty industry’s third greatest profit 
year in history). 
4 See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 2, at 789 (stating that the antitrust exemption for 
the insurance industry should be repealed).  
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they decided it was time to revisit a favorite whipping horse: the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act’s (“MFA”) federal antitrust exemption for the 
insurance industry.5  Their consternation with the MFA recently took the 
form of two bills in Congress under the name of the Insurance Industry 
Competition Act of 2007, in an effort to repeal the MFA’s federal antitrust 
exemption for the insurance industry.6  The present Congress has 
reintroduced an identical bill under the name of the Insurance Industry 
Competition Act of 2009.7   
The MFA provides that “[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to 
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the 
purpose of regulating the business of insurance.”8  Further, the Sherman 
Act,9 Clayton Act,10 and Federal Trade Commission Act11 are only 
“applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is 
not regulated by State law.”12  The Sherman Act, however, is applicable to 
                                                                                                                 
5 McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2006).  The term 
“antitrust” appears to be limited to the United States.  Brian Dean Abramson, Let 
Them Eat Smoke: The Case for Exempting the Tobacco Industry from Antitrust, 6 
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 345, 353 n.44 (2008).  Other countries use 
such terms as “competition” or “anti-monopoly” laws.  Id. 
6 S. 618, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1081, 110th Cong. (2007). 
7 H.R. 1583, 111th Cong. (2009). 
8 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).  
9 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006).  Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
contains a “restraint of trade” provision and states that “[e]very contract, 
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is . . . illegal.”  Id.§ 1.  Section 2 contains a 
monopoly provision and states that “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or 
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to 
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.” Id.§ 2. 
10 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2006).  The Clayton Act was passed in an 
effort to address specific activities such as mergers and interlocking directorates of 
competing companies that have substantially anticompetitive effects on the market.  
15 U.S.C. §§ 18–19.   
11 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006).  The Act 
prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).  The 
Act established the Federal Trade Commission to prevent persons or entities from 
engaging in any unfair or deceptive acts.  Id. §§ 41, 45. 
12 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). 
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any agreement or act involving boycott, coercion, or intimidation 
regardless of state law.13   
Questioning of the MFA federal antitrust exemption for the 
insurance industry is nothing new.  Various groups have looked askance at 
the exemption for decades, and proposals have on occasion been introduced 
in an effort to repeal it or limit its scope.  For example, the U.S. 
Department of Justice issued a report in 1977 concluding that the insurance 
industry did not need exemption from federal antitrust laws, and that 
regulation without the MFA exemption would be desirable.14  That same 
year, Congress considered an optional federal charter for insurance 
companies and greater application of federal antitrust laws with the Federal 
Insurance Act of 1977, but ultimately rejected the idea.15  In 1979, the 
National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures 
stated in a report that the insurance antitrust exemption in the MFA should 
be repealed.16  In 1987, a flurry of activity in the Senate was aimed at 
repealing or modifying the MFA antitrust exemption, none of which was 
successful.17  The Insurance Competition Improvement Act was proposed 
in 1989 to modify the exemption by providing a list of activities that would 
be exempt, making the federal antitrust laws applicable to all other 
activities.18  In 1993, the charge to repeal the exemption took the form of 
the Insurance Competitive Pricing Act of 1993—an effort to prohibit 
insurers from price fixing, allocating regions among competitors, engaging 
                                                                                                                 
13 Id. § 1013(b).  
14 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE PRICING AND MARKETING OF INSURANCE: 
REPORT OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO THE TASK GROUP ON ANTITRUST 
IMMUNITIES 30–31 (1977). 
15 Federal Insurance Act of 1977, S. 1710, 95th Cong. (1977). 
16 U.S. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND 
PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES 
225 (1979). 
17 See S. 80, 100th Cong. (1987) (introduced by Sen. Metzenbaum to repeal 
MFA; in introducing the bill, he indicated that the “McCarran-Ferguson Act has 
long outlived whatever legitimate purpose it served,” 133 CONG. REC. 542 (1987)); 
S. 804, 100th  Cong. (1987) (introduced to modify the antitrust exemption section 
of MFA); S. 1299, 100th Cong. (1987).  
18 Insurance Competition Improvement Act of 1989, S. 719, 101st Cong. 
(1989). 
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in tying arrangements, and monopolizing any part of the insurance 
industry.19   
Ten years later, a similar bill was introduced under the same name, 
with the only difference being the year: the Insurance Competitive Pricing 
Act of 2003.20  That same year, the Medical Malpractice Insurance 
Antitrust Act of 2003 was introduced in Congress as an attempt to narrowly 
modify MFA by addressing price-fixing, bid-rigging, and market 
allocations with respect to medical malpractice insurance.21  Two years 
later, the Insurance Competitive Pricing Act of 2005 was introduced in the 
House of Representatives in an effort to repeal the exemption while 
providing safe harbors for certain activities.22   
Recently, the Antitrust Modernization Commission released a 
report questioning the MFA exemption.23  The report strongly 
recommended that the insurance industry should not be singled out in order 
to avoid federal antitrust compliance and litigation costs.24  It also stated 
that arguments attempting to justify the MFA exemption based on the claim 
that it is necessary in order to provide stable prices and ensure insurer 
solvency are unpersuasive since “[t]he costs of price ‘stability’ typically 
flow to consumers and result in inflexibility that undermines economic 
growth.”25  The Commission viewed the insurance antitrust exemption as 
unnecessary and recommended that all insurance activity should instead be 
subject to a rule of reason analysis that weighs pro-competitive benefits 
with any anticompetitive elements.26  Ultimately, the Commission placed 
the onus on the insurance industry to justify its federal antitrust exemption 
and to prove why it is still necessary.27   
Therefore, the Insurance Industry Competition Act of 2007 was, on 
the one hand, like a phoenix risen yet again from the ashes—it was nothing 
                                                                                                                 
19 Insurance Competitive Pricing Act of 1993, H.R. 9, 103d Cong. (1993); 
Insurance Competitive Pricing Act, S. 84, 103d Cong. (1993).  
20 Insurance Competitive Pricing Act of 2003, H.R. 448, 108th Cong. (2003). 
21 Medical Malpractice Insurance Antitrust Act of 2003, S. 352, 108th Cong. 
(2003). 
22 Insurance Competitive Pricing Act of 2005, H.R. 2401, 109th Cong. (2005). 
23 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
350 (2007). 
24 Id. at 351. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 354.  The Commission also noted that other countries require ongoing 
proof and justification for any exemption, which must be analyzed in present 
market conditions to see if it should be abolished.  Id. at 385 n.123.  
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new.  On the other hand, it is perplexing that the MFA federal antitrust 
exemption remains intact when it has been repeatedly questioned for 
decades.  After so many groups have called for the repeal or modification 
of the exemption, and given feasible alternatives that can be applied in 
modern market conditions, now is an appropriate time to reassess the 
purpose and necessity of the MFA exemption along with the needs of the 
insurance industry and consumers.  This Article suggests that the current 
understanding and application of the MFA exemption differ from 
Congress’s original intent, that proponents of the MFA exemption have not 
sufficiently demonstrated a continued need for it, and that the exemption is 
not the most effective way to protect the best interests of consumers.  
Accordingly, the ideas contained in this latest legislation—the Insurance 
Industry Competition Act of 2007, and recently reintroduced in Congress 
as the Insurance Industry Competition Act of 2009—should not be 
dismissed as yet another Sisyphean attempt by Congress.  Rather, the ideas 
from the bill should be seriously considered, though adapted in a new form 
of legislation, in order to modify MFA’s antitrust exemption for the 
insurance industry.  Other commentators have suggested how the MFA 
exemption could be modified, but there is a noticeable absence of literature 
from the legal community on the approach embodied in the Insurance 
Industry Competition Act of 2007 and 2009.  This Article analyzes the 
underpinnings of the Acts and shows why they are different from other 
ways to modify the MFA exemption that have been suggested. 
In order to understand why the Insurance Industry Competition Act 
of 2007 should have been considered and why the Insurance Industry 
Competition Act of 2009 should be seriously considered, or more broadly, 
why the MFA antitrust exemption should be modified, it is necessary to 
understand the evolution of insurance regulation in the United States 
leading up to the MFA.  Part I of this Article, therefore, provides the 
historical backdrop to the MFA and its antitrust exemption for the 
insurance industry.  Part II discusses the passing of the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act, the purpose and intent behind it, along with the developing 
understanding of the exemption, and provides an analysis of its current 
meaning and effectiveness.  Part III argues that the federal antitrust 
exemption for the insurance industry in its present form has strayed from 
Congress’s original purpose and intent, is not the most effective way to 
protect the best interests of consumers, is unnecessary in modern market 
conditions, and should be modified.  It concludes by advocating the 
implementation of legislation similar to the Insurance Industry Competition 
Act of 2007 and the Insurance Industry Competition Act of 2009, though in 
a modified form by providing advisory and regulatory authority to the 
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Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, along with 
express safe harbor activities for insurance companies in order for them to 
operate efficiently while protecting the best interests of consumers and 
maintaining a balance between state regulation and federal oversight. 
 
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKDROP TO THE MCCARRAN-
FERGUSON ACT 
 
The relationship between federal antitrust policy and state 
economic regulation is driven . . . by attitudes toward 
regulation.28 
     ~Herbert Hovenkamp 
 
A.  THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1700S–
1868 
 
The insurance industry and the development of insurance 
regulation have a colorful history in the United States, largely woven by the 
threads of a uniquely competitive entrepreneurial drive.29  The first form of 
insurance introduced in the United States was marine insurance for the 
shipping industry.30  Fire insurance soon became prevalent, with Benjamin 
Franklin and others organizing the first fire insurance company, the 
Philadelphia Contributionship for the Insuring of Houses from Loss by 
Fire, in 1752.31  Nevertheless, only a limited number of entities engaged in 
the insurance business before 1776, due in part to restrictive British 
legislation that prohibited non-English stock insurance companies from 
being established in the United States.32   
Subsequent to the Revolutionary War and the end of British rule, 
however, insurance companies in the United States were no longer limited 
                                                                                                                 
28 Herbert Hovenkamp, Federalism and Antitrust Reform, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 
627, 630 (2006).  
29 It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the history of insurance 
outside of the United States.  For a comprehensive overview of the origins and 
development of insurance in ancient times, see generally W.R. Vance, The Early 
History of Insurance Law, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1908). 
30 Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance: Before and 
After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 J. CORP. L. 723, 726 (2000). 
31 See id. 
32 Laurence M. Hamric, The McCarran-Ferguson Act: A Time for 
Procompetitive Reform, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1271, 1272 & n.5 (1976). 
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to organizing themselves as mutual companies or voluntary associations.33  
In 1787, the horizons broadened for the industry when the Baltimore Fire 
Insurance Company became the first stock insurance company in the 
United States.34  The primary method of organizing an insurance company 
during the late 1700s and early 1800s was through state legislatures 
granting special charters for insurance companies, beginning in 1794 in 
Pennsylvania with the incorporation of the Insurance Company of North 
America.35  At that time, insurance companies were relatively easy to start 
and they could charge whatever premium they wanted.36  The relative ease 
in starting an insurance company, combined with no regulatory oversight in 
the setting of premiums, was both a blessing and a curse. 
Insurance companies’ disparate approaches to the charging of 
premiums in efforts to oust competition unsurprisingly resulted in 
significant problems.  For instance, with respect to the fire insurance 
industry alone, the period from 1791 to 1850 resulted in a net loss for 
companies.37  Only 1000 of the fire insurance companies out of the 4000 
that had been started prior to 1877 survived.38  Nevertheless, some 
insurance companies made efforts as early as 1806 to increase profitability 
and lessen price competition by making informal agreements to fix 
premium rates.39  The number of rate-making agreements expanded for the 
next thirteen years, resulting in the establishment of local associations that 
companies would join, with member companies binding themselves to only 
charge rates that had been agreed upon.40  These early efforts by fire 
insurance companies and property-casualty companies at establishing some 
sort of standardized rates,41 however, were somewhat thwarted by 
                                                                                                                 
33 See JOHN G. DAY, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF INSURANCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 3 (1970) (noting that the first forms of entities providing insurance prior to 
the Revolutionary War were individual underwriters, voluntary associations, and 
mutual companies). 
34 MARY ELIZABETH RUWELL, EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CAPITALISM: THE 
FORMATION OF AMERICAN MARINE INSURANCE COMPANIES 44 (1993). 
35 Hamric, supra note 32, at 1272–73.   
36 Spencer L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance 
Rate Regulation: The McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective, 56 MICH. 
L. REV. 545, 547 (1958). 
37 Id. at 548. 
38 Id. at 547-48.   
39 Id. at 548.  
40 Id. 
41 See Hamric, supra note 32, at 1273. 
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companies that charged such low rates that they did not even cover 
contractual obligations when they came due.42   
The highly competitive nature that was present during the early 
1800s in the insurance industry resulted in a need for regulation imposed 
from outside of the industry.43  Insurance companies in the United States 
were largely unhindered by governmental control and regulation during 
that time.  Insurance regulation was done on the state level, and consisted 
of restrictions built into insurance company charters which contained 
financial reporting requirements, loss-claim reserve provisions, restrictions 
on investments, and minimum capitalization requirements.44  These 
restrictions and requirements, however, did not regulate rates, and were 
largely ineffective since the states had a conflict of interest in enforcing 
them.45  The penalty for insurance companies violating their charter 
provisions was for the state to prevent the companies from conducting 
business within its boundaries—a course of action states were disinclined 
to follow since it would have reduced jobs for its citizens and decreased 
taxes revenues.46  After 1837, state regulation of insurance through 
restrictions built into company charters became even more ineffective due 
to states abandoning such charters; instead, states began adopting general 
incorporation requirements for new companies.47   
Some states, however, did try to adopt a more active regulatory 
stance toward the industry, though they directed their efforts primarily at 
foreign insurance companies rather than domestic ones.  For instance, in 
1824, New York imposed reporting requirements on foreign companies,48 
and in 1827, Massachusetts mandated that foreign companies file a copy of 
their charters with the state along with information concerning their stock, 
                                                                                                                 
42 Irwin M. Stelzer, The Insurance Industry and the Antitrust Laws: A Decade 
of Experience, 1955 INS. L.J. 137, 141 (1955). 
43 Hamric, supra note 32, at 1273.  See also Stelzer, supra note 42, at 141 
(describing the industry between 1835 through the Civil War as being 
characterized by “keen competition”).  
44 Katherine M. Jones, Law, Politics, and the Political Safeguards of 
Federalism: The Case of Insurance Regulation and the Commerce Clause, 1938–
1948, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 345, 356 & n.53 (2004–2005).  
45 Id. at 356. 
46 Id.  
47 See Peter R. Nehemkis, Jr., Paul v. Virginia: The Need for Re-Examination, 
27 GEO. L.J. 519, 523 n.17 (1939) (indicating that after 1837, the primary way of 
incorporation an insurance company shifted from the granting of special charters to 
general incorporation laws). 
48 Id. at 523. 
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debts, and investments.49  Other states imposed restrictions and penalties on 
foreign insurance companies in addition to levying taxes and requiring 
companies to pay fees in connection with forced loans, required deposits, 
licenses, and advertising, much to the chagrin of the companies.50  These 
regulations and restrictions, however, were not uniform from state to 
state.51       
With the advent of the 1850s came the creation of a few regulatory 
state agencies, while the federal government remained uninvolved with the 
industry.52  The appointment of the first state insurance commissioner 
occurred in 1850.53  In 1855, Massachusetts created a board of insurance 
commissioners, and New York established the position of the 
Superintendent of Insurance in 1859.54  The growth in state regulation 
became an increasing irritation for insurance companies, who regarded the 
increased oversight and various restrictions and taxes on foreign companies 
as unconstitutional and unjust.55 
In spite of burgeoning state regulation, the insurance industry 
experienced an enormous growth in the number of companies during the 
1860s.56  Accompanying this rapid growth, however, were questionable 
practices aimed at squeezing out competitors, including misleading 
advertising, false information about stocks and capital,57 and the continued 
practice of charging unprofitable premium rates.58  After the end of the 
Civil War, two noteworthy events occurred with respect to the industry’s 
two primary concerns—state regulation and competition.  First, the 
insurance industry sought to rid itself of state regulation by lobbying 
Congress for a national bureau of insurance59 in order to obtain one 
uniform set of governmental regulations.60  In addition, the first attempt at 
setting uniform rates on a national basis was made when the fire insurance 
                                                                                                                 
49 Id. at 523-24. 
50 Nehemkis, supra note 47, at 524 & n.26. 
51 See DAY, supra note 33, at 20–23.  
52 See Michael D. Rose, State Regulation of Property and Casualty Insurance 
Rates, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 669, 677 (1967). 
53 Id.  
54 Nehemkis, supra note 47, at 524. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 520. 
57 Id. at 520–21. 
58 Stelzer, supra note 42, at 141. 
59 Rose, supra note 52, at 673. 
60 Nehemkis, supra note 47, at 525. 
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industry created the National Board of Fire Underwriters,61 simultaneous to 
the creation of regional rate associations.62  These events signified a 
common perspective and approach within the industry that would influence 
its actions for the next seventy-five years: they established the precedent of 
insurance companies seeking national regulation and collaboration. 
The industry’s attempts to have Congress create a national bureau 
of insurance were prompted in part by the National Banking Act of 1864—
insurance companies wanted to be federal institutions like national banks 
and rid themselves of state legislation, which they viewed as excessive and 
oppressive to foreign companies.63  Although the insurance industry was 
able to get two bills introduced into Congress, neither of them were 
successful.64  The industry remained undeterred and sought a different 
venue for ridding itself of state regulation: the courts.  The National Board 
of Fire Underwriters partnered with the Underwriters’ Agency of New 
York in order to support a case in court challenging the constitutionality of 
state regulation of insurance.65  This effort resulted in the case Samuel B. 
Paul v. Commonwealth of Virginia.66 
 
B.  1868: SAMUEL B. PAUL V. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
Virginia had passed a statute in 1866 that required foreign 
insurance companies to deposit a bond ranging between $30,000 and 
$50,000 with the state prior to receiving a license in order to conduct 
business within Virginia.67  A related statute required that no person could 
act as an agent for a foreign insurance company in Virginia without a 
license.68  Paul was an agent for several insurance companies incorporated 
in New York, and applied for a license as their agent, but he and the 
                                                                                                                 
61 Stelzer, supra note 42, at 141. 
62 Jones, supra note 44, at 357.  These regional and national efforts of 
companies to set uniform rates went on without regulatory supervision despite their 
anticompetitive nature.  Id.  
63 Nehemkis, supra note 47, at 524–25. 
64 S. 299, 40th Cong., (2d Sess. 1868); H.R. 738, 39th Cong., (1st Sess. 1866).  
The proposed National Bureau of Insurance would have included a National 
Insurance Commissioner appointed by the President, and a section of the Treasury 
Department which would have handled all regulatory transactions involving 
money.  Nehemkis, supra note 47, at 525. 
65 Nehemkis, supra note 47, at 526–27. 
66 75 U.S. 168 (1868). 
67 Id. at 168. 
68 Id. at 169.  
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companies refused to post the required bond.69  Although the State of 
Virginia refused to grant him a license as an agent to conduct insurance 
business within the state, Paul issued a policy to a Virginia citizen in 
violation of the state’s statutes, and was subsequently indicted.70  The 
National Board of Fire Underwriters provided and funded two highly 
prominent attorneys (one of them a former Justice of the U.S. Supreme 
Court) to represent Paul and the interests of the insurance industry.71   
Paul and the insurance industry challenged the statutes under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause72 by claiming that the foreign insurance 
companies were citizens and should not be subject to discriminatory state 
legislation that was not applicable to domestic companies.73  They also 
argued that the statute was unconstitutional by claiming that insurance was 
interstate commerce, exclusively subject to the regulation of Congress 
based on the Commerce Clause,74 and therefore the states lacked authority 
to regulate the activity.75  The Court rejected the arguments and declared 
the statute constitutional by holding that the insurance companies were not 
“citizens” under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and that “[i]ssuing a 
policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce” or an interstate 
transaction for purposes of the Commerce Clause, thereby leaving 
Congress without authority to regulate the industry.76  As a result, Paul 
temporarily ensured continued state regulatory authority over the insurance 
industry to the exclusion of federal oversight. 
   
C.  INSURANCE REGULATION: 1869 TO 1944 
 
Despite the decision in Paul, the insurance industry continued its 
challenges of the constitutionality of state regulation of insurance.  There 
                                                                                                                 
69 Id.  One commentator has suggested that Paul’s refusal to post the bond 
when applying for his license was due to instructions from the four insurance 
companies he represented, presumably in connection with the Underwriters 
Agency of New York and the National Board of Fire Underwriters.  Nehemkis, 
supra note 47, at 526–27.    
70 Paul, 75 U.S. at 169. 
71 Nehemkis, supra note 47, at 527–28. 
72 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.  
73 Paul, 75 U.S. at 170–71. 
74 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (“Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes”). 
75 Paul, 75 U.S. at 170, 172. 
76 Id. at 177, 183. 
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were ten different Supreme Court cases between 1869 and 1927 that 
challenged state regulation or taxation, but the Court consistently held that 
insurance activities were not interstate commerce.77  In addition, repeated 
legislative attempts were made in Congress to create a national bureau of 
insurance and classify insurance activities as interstate commerce, but none 
were successful.78  Committees in Congress also considered, but rejected, 
various resolutions advocating a constitutional amendment that would have 
allowed Congress to exercise regulatory authority over insurance.79  The 
industry’s incessant drive for federal regulation, whether right or wrong, 
was likely because it “considered it more advantageous to be regulated by a 
toothless, laissez-farish mastiff like the Federal Government than by those 
smaller but possibly more harassing watch dogs, the individual states.”80 
Because Paul and its progeny held that issuing an insurance policy 
was not interstate commerce, when Congress passed the Sherman Act in 
1890 based on authority from the Commerce Clause declaring any 
agreement, contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or 
interstate commerce as illegal,81 the insurance industry did not think that a 
federal antitrust law such as the Sherman Act was applicable to insurance.82  
This view was reinforced in 1913 by the Supreme Court espousing mutual 
exclusivity between state and federal regulation (dual federalism83) in New 
                                                                                                                 
77 See Bothwell v. Buckbee,  Mears Co., 275 U.S. 274, 276–77 (1927); Nw. 
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U.S. 132, 137–38 (1918); N. Y. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1913); Nutting v. Massachusetts, 
183 U.S. 553, 556–58 (1902); N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389, 401 
(1900); Noble v. Mitchell, 164 U.S. 367, 370–71 (1896); Hooper v. California, 155 
U.S. 648, 655–56 (1895); Phila. Fire Ass’n v. New York, 119 U.S. 110, 118 
(1886); Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 77 U.S. 566, 573, 576 (1870); Ducat 
v. Chicago, 77 U.S. 410, 415 (1870).  
78 U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 576 & n.8 (1944) 
(Stone, C.J., dissenting)(listing several bills introduced between 1899 and 1906 in 
the House and Senate). 
79 Id. at 579 & n.13. 
80 Sigmund Timberg, Insurance and Interstate Commerce, 50 YALE L.J. 959, 
969 n.42 (1941). 
81 Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 
(2006)). 
82 Larry D. Carlson, The Insurance Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 57 
TEX. L. REV. 1127, 1130 (1979). 
83 Dual federalism is “a system for dividing functions between the state and 
national government that left each considerable autonomy within its own areas of 
jurisdiction.”  David R. Beam et al., Federalism: The Challenge of Conflicting 
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York Life Insurance Company v. Deer Lodge County when it stated that “if 
insurance is commerce and becomes interstate commerce whenever it is 
between citizens of different States, then all control over it is taken from 
the States, and the legislative regulations which this court has heretofore 
sustained must be declared invalid.”84   
Accordingly, the industry’s view of itself as exempt from federal 
antitrust law presumably did not change in 1914 with the passing of the 
Clayton Act85 and Federal Trade Commission Act.86   Therefore, the 
various insurance companies that exchanged actuarial data and engaged in 
price fixing and boycotting of companies not part of member association 
groups continued in their ways.87  To justify their activities, the insurance 
industry claimed that unrestricted competition without some collaboration 
among companies would create a plethora of undesirable results such as 
unsustainable premium rate competitions and inadequate reserves for the 
payment of claims.88  Although some states tried to enforce legislation 
against the sharing of actuarial information and collaborative rate setting, 
their efforts were largely ineffective.89  Instead of trying to make rate 
setting illegal, they began passing legislation to regulate rates, often 
accompanied by antimonopoly prohibitions.90  State regulation of rates, 
however, was intended primarily to guard against insurance companies 
from becoming insolvent by charging unsustainably low premiums, not to 
cap excessive rates.91               
In 1915, however, an unusual twist to the exclusivity of state 
regulation of insurance occurred.  The Supreme Court in Thames & Mersey 
Marine Insurance Company, Ltd. v. United States invalidated the federal 
                                                                                                                 
Theories and Contemporary Practice, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE 
DISCIPLINE 247, 248 (Ada W. Finifter ed., 1983). 
84 N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495, 509 (1913). 
85 Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–
27 (2006)). 
86 Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006)). 
87 See Carlson, supra note 82, at 1130 (describing the companies as 
“confident” that their activities remained immune from federal antitrust laws). 
88 DAY, supra note 33, at 20–21.  
89 Id. at 19.  Cf. Jones, supra note 44, at 359 (indicating that nearly all state 
insurance commissions were inadequately funded). 
90 See Rose, supra note 52, at 681–82 (describing the states’ approach to 
collaborative efforts among insurance companies, and indicating that by 1944, 
thirty-three states had provisions to regulate rates). 
91 Jones, supra note 44, at 359. 
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stamp tax on ocean marine insurance policies since it viewed “insurance 
during the voyage” as an “integral part of the exportation” due to “the 
demands of commerce.”92  Marine insurance companies worried that the 
decision could be interpreted as making federal antitrust laws applicable to 
insurance under the Commerce Clause.93  The companies, therefore, 
lobbied Congress to expressly exempt the marine insurance industry from 
federal antitrust laws.94  Congress considered the marine insurance industry 
unique given its international implications, and in a pragmatic and 
precedential move exempted the marine insurance industry from all federal 
antitrust laws in the Merchant Marine Act of 1920,95 primarily for 
reinsurance and international underwriting purposes.96  The collaborative 
efforts among the insurance companies continued largely unhindered,97 and 
the precedent for a statutory exemption from federal antitrust laws was 
established for the insurance industry. 
The events of the 1930s opened the door slightly to the possibility 
of change to government regulation of the industry.  The Great Depression 
prompted Congress to pass new economic regulations, and the Supreme 
Court began lifting its restrictive view of Congress’s ability to regulate 
economic issues.98  In 1938, President Roosevelt initiated an in-depth 
antimonopoly investigation, and the Temporary National Economic 
Committee analyzed the state of competition in the insurance industry.99  
The Committee made several findings.  Notably, it found that states were 
                                                                                                                 
92 Thames & Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U.S. 19, 26 (1915). 
93 See Rose, supra note 82, at 675. 
94 Id. 
95 Merchant Marine Act, ch. 250, § 29, 41 Stat. 988, 1000 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 38 (2006)).  
96 Rose, supra note 82, at 675–76.  Over four decades later, the Senate 
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly reexamined the exemption for marine 
insurance and expressed great concern about a virtual monopoly in hull insurance 
and agreements that severely limited entry into the market and discouraged price 
competition.  Id. at 676. 
97 See Hamric, supra note 32, at 1275 (indicating that state enforcement and 
regulation left the insurance “compact system” intact). 
98 See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 
37–38 (1937) (holding that Congressional authority to regulate commerce is 
plenary and extends to intrastate activities if “they have such a close and 
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or 
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions”); Jones, 
supra note 44, at 365. 
99 Jones, supra note 44, at 370–71. 
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struggling to regulate the insurance industry because of the concentration 
of business in only a handful of companies and the interstate activities of 
the companies.100  Five life insurance companies accounted for more than 
50% of the industry’s resources; 87% of all life insurance assets were 
owned by the twenty-five largest life insurance companies.101  To remedy 
the high level of concentration in the industry among the largest 
companies, the Committee proposed greater enforcement of antitrust 
provisions for prosecuting anti-competitive behavior while retaining state 
regulation of the industry in general.102   
Little changed, however, until Thurman Arnold was put in charge 
of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department.103  Arnold initiated an 
effort to address insurance abuses at the national level.104  In 1942, the 
Justice Department filed suit against South-Eastern Underwriters 
Association, a regional group made up of approximately 200 fire insurance 
companies, for violating sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by controlling 
90% of the fire insurance market in six states through conspiracies to fix 
premiums and boycott non-member companies.105  The district court 
dismissed the case based on the precedent from Paul v. Virginia, which 
held that insurance was not interstate commerce or trade.106  On appeal, the 
Supreme Court continued its broadened approach from Wickard v. Filburn 
in interpreting the Commerce Clause107 and maintained its view from 
Parker v. Brown that state and national authority can be exercised 
concurrently.108  The Court effectively overruled Paul v. Virginia by 
holding that insurance is interstate commerce and is subject to the 
                                                                                                                 
100 Id. at 371, 373. 
101 Id. at 371. 
102 See id. at 373 (noting that the Committee’s final report stated that federal 
power should be utilized and antitrust prosecution should be “pursued more 
vigorously”). 
103 Id. at 360. 
104 Id.  
105 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 51 F. Supp. 712, 713 
(N.D. Ga. 1943), rev’d, 322 U.S. 533, 534–35 (1944). 
106 Id. at 714–15. 
107 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (holding that 
Congress’s power to regulate commerce extends to growing home-consumed 
wheat and any other activities that have a “substantial influence on price and 
market conditions”). 
108 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 368 (1943). 
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legislative powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause, including the 
Sherman Act, which forbids premium rate-fixing agreements.109   
As a result of the Court’s decision, the insurance industry’s long-
desired hope for federal regulation turned into fear.  The industry presumed 
that as a result of the decision in South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 
the federal government would pass legislation requiring greater 
competition and apply federal antitrust laws, resulting in the bankruptcy of 
a large number of companies.110  Some insurance companies tried to use the 
decision to their advantage by refusing to follow state regulation or pay 
state taxes by claiming that such restraints on interstate commerce now 
violated the Constitution.111      
 
II. THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT AND THE INSURANCE 
INDUSTRY ANTITRUST EXEMPTION: WHAT IT MEANT 
THEN AND WHAT IT MEANS NOW 
 
The continued state regulation of insurance throughout the 
twentieth century is an historical anomaly.112  
    ~Katherine M. Jones 
 
A.  THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT OF 1945 
 
 
Before the Supreme Court had decided South-Eastern 
Underwriters Association, Representative Walter introduced the Walter-
Hancock bill in Congress in order to expressly ensure continued state 
regulation of insurance and entirely exempt insurance from federal antitrust 
regulation.113  The House of Representatives passed the bill, but it did not 
pass in the Senate.114  An important reason the bill did not pass was that it 
                                                                                                                 
109 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 560-61 
(1944). 
110 Jones, supra note 44, at 381.  
111 S. REP. NO. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2 (1945); H.R. REP. NO. 143, 79th 
Cong., 1st Sess., at 2 (1945); 91 CONG. REC. 478–79 (1945).  See also Charles D. 
Weller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act’s Antitrust Exemption for Insurance: 
Language, History and Policy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 587, 591 (1978) (indicating that 
there were protests in thirty-one states).  
112 Jones, supra note 44, at 355. 
113 H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., (1st Sess 1943).   
114 90 CONG. REC. 8054 (1944).    
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enjoyed little support from the insurance industry.115  In fact, the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) opposed the notion of 
completely exempting the insurance industry from federal antitrust laws.116   
After the bill did not pass, the NAIC released a report emphasizing 
the need for continued state regulation of insurance, but asked for only a 
partial exemption from federal antitrust laws for certain activities.117  
NAIC’s primary concern was to preserve state regulation and taxation of 
insurance.118  NAIC made a proposal to the Senate to avoid unrestricted 
competition, and to allow for collaborative practices within the industry 
that were proclaimed to be in the public interest.119   
Section 2(a) of the NAIC’s proposal provided for the retention of 
state regulation and taxation of insurance.120  Section 2(b) prevented all 
federal law from invalidating, impairing, or superseding any state laws 
regulating insurance.121  Section 3 called for an exemption from the Federal 
Trade Commission Act and Robinson-Patman Act.122  Section 4(a) 
provided a moratorium during which the Sherman Act and Clayton Act 
would not apply, though Section 4(c) made the Sherman Act applicable 
during the moratorium to acts of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.123  
Section 4(b) proposed exempting seven activities: (1) any agreement or 
concerted or cooperative action which prescribed the use of rates; (2) the 
use of those rates; (3) any cooperative or joint service, adjustment, 
investigation, or inspection agreement relating to insurance; (4) any 
agreement or concerted or cooperative action among two or more insurers 
to insure, reinsure, or otherwise apportion the risks; (5) any agreement or 
concerted action with respect to the payment of insurance agents or 
brokers; (6) any agreement or concerted action with respect to the 
collection and use of statistics; and (7) any agreement or concerted action 
providing for the cooperative making of insurance rates, rules, or plans.124               
                                                                                                                 
115 Weller, supra note 111, at 592 n.34. 
116 Id.  The NAIC is comprised of state insurance commissioners.  As such, it 
is notable that the NAIC was initially not a proponent of a broad exemption from 
federal antitrust laws. 
117 Id. at 594. 
118 Id. at 598. 
119 Id. at 594. 
120 Id. 
121 Weller, supra note 111, at 594. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id.  
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The result of the NAIC’s proposal was, like many proposals for 
legislation, a catalyst for compromise.  There was great debate between 
those who had previously supported the approach of total exemption from 
federal antitrust laws embodied in the Walter-Hancock bill, and those who 
supported the NAIC’s approach of providing limited exemptions based on 
the seven express safe harbor activities.125  Senators Ferguson and 
McCarran supported the NAIC’s approach; they modified and proposed it 
under the form of S. 340 by deleting the exempted activities specified in 
section 4(b) of the NAIC’s proposal, and by specifying that the Sherman 
and Clayton Acts cannot invalidate, impair, or supersede state laws.126   
The Senate made several amendments to the bill which the House 
of Representatives did not include in its approved version of the bill, and 
the result was a major modification of the bill in the joint conference 
committee.127  The committee removed the exemption from the Federal 
Trade Commission Act and the Robinson-Patman Act, provided that there 
would be a moratorium during which the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal 
Trade Commission Acts would not apply, but after which they would apply 
“to the extent that such business is not regulated by state law.”128  The 
House voted in support of the modified version of the bill without debate, 
and the Senate adopted it less than a week later.129  President Roosevelt 
signed the modified version of S. 340 into law on March 9, 1945,130 which 
has become known as the McCarran-Ferguson Act.  The final version made 
into law indicates that the primary purpose of the Act was to preserve state 
regulation of insurance: 
 
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and 
taxation by the several States of the business of insurance 
is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the 
Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to 
the regulation or taxation of such business by the several 
States.131 
 
                                                                                                                 
125 Id. at 595. 
126 Id. at 595–96. 
127 Alan M. Anderson, Insurance and Antitrust Law: The McCarran-Ferguson 
Act and Beyond, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 81, 87 (1983). 
128 91 CONG. REC. 1396 (1945). 
129 Id. at 1396, 1442–44, 1477–89. 
130 Id. at 1992. 
131 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2006) (emphasis added). 
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The MFA further expressly subjects insurance to the continued 
oversight of state regulation by providing that: 
 
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged 
therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States 
which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business. 
 
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, 
impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the 
purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which 
imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act 
specifically relates to the business of insurance.132   
 
These sections of the MFA were intended to alleviate conflicts 
between state regulation and taxation of the insurance industry and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause.133  Congress, however, retained the ability to 
preempt state law if it passes legislation indicating that it specifically 
applied to the business of insurance.134  The passing of the MFA is 
explained in part because it came on the heels of Roosevelt’s New Deal, at 
a time when there was a push from certain Congressmen to protect states’ 
rights and regulatory authority in an effort to limit the mushrooming of 
federal oversight.135           
 The final part of § 1012(b) of the MFA contains the insurance 
industry’s controversial limited exemption from federal antitrust law: 
 
That after June 30, 1948 . . . the Sherman Act, . . . the 
Clayton Act, and . . . the Federal Trade Commission Act, 
as amended, shall be applicable to the business of 
                                                                                                                 
132 Id. § 1012(a)–(b). 
133 Jones, supra note 44, at 387.  The Dormant Commerce Clause is the 
principle that states cannot “unjustifiably . . . discriminate against or burden the 
interstate flow of articles of commerce. . . . ‘[D]iscrimination’ simply means 
differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits 
the former and burdens the latter.”  Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 
511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994). 
134 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). 
135 See Jones, supra note 44, at 396–97 (describing the influence of southern 
Congressmen with Congressmen from northeastern states—where the majority of 
insurance companies were located—banding together to pass the MFA in order to 
protect state regulatory authority). 
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insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated 
by State law.136 
 
The Act goes on to specify that the Sherman Act is always 
applicable to “any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of 
boycott, coercion, or intimidation.”137  The purpose of the MFA federal 
antitrust exemption was to allow for cooperative rate-making efforts among 
insurance companies so that they could “underwrite risks in an informed 
and responsible way”138 given the “unique difficulty of accurately pricing 
the insurance product.”139  Although the federal antitrust exemption was 
only a “secondary purpose” of the MFA,140 it created significant 
controversy as to its precise meaning and scope.     
 
B.  THE MEANING AND SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
EXEMPTION OF THE MFA 
 
The MFA’s exemption of “the business of insurance” from federal 
antitrust statutes to the extent that such business is regulated by state law 
and is not an act or agreement to boycott, intimidate or coerce is essentially 
a reverse preemption by Congress; that is, Congress preempted itself from 
regulating insurance unless it expressly states otherwise in legislation.  As 
such, it is unusually deferential towards state regulation.141  By including 
the federal antitrust exemption in the MFA, Congress sought to bolster 
state regulation and increase state efforts to prevent exploitative practices 
in the industry, while reserving some federal antitrust enforcement with 
respect to acts involving boycotts, intimidation, coercion, and when states 
did not exercise regulatory authority over activities in the industry.142   
As a result of the MFA, Congress gave the opportunity to states to 
preempt federal antitrust laws by regulating antitrust in the business of 
                                                                                                                 
136 See 15 U.S.C. §1012(b) (emphasis added).   
137 Id. § 1013(b). 
138 Group Life & Health Ins. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 221 (1979). 
139 Mark F. Horning, Antitrust Immunity for the Insurance Industry: Repeal, 
Safe Harbors, or Status Quo?, 8 ANTITRUST 14, 14 (1994). 
140 Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 219 n.18. 
141 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 
1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role In Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
13, 20 (1993).  
142 Joel B. Dirlam & Irwin M. Stelzer, The Insurance Industry: A Case Study 
in the Workability of Regulated Competition, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 199, 213–14 
(1958). 
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insurance themselves if they were not doing so already.  Thus, there was a 
push to get states to seize the opportunity to pass legislation during the 
three-year moratorium following the enactment of the MFA during which 
the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts did not apply 
to insurance companies.143  The NAIC produced model laws that states 
could adopt, including laws for the regulation of rates, an Unfair Trade 
Practices bill, and “Little Clayton” acts in an effort for states to adopt 
legislation that would regulate every part of insurance, and thereby preempt 
the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts.144  While 
groups such as the NAIC attempted to help states take advantage of the 
MFA federal antitrust exemption, the exemption’s applicability in certain 
situations was still uncertain. The complication was (and still is) that the 
MFA did not provide a definition of what constitutes the “business of 
insurance,” nor specify what it means for something to be regulated by 
state law, nor provide guidance on what amounted to a boycott.  This 
resulted in a need for courts to interpret the statutory exemption.  A survey 
of court decisions reveals the inexpedient nature of the exemption’s 
ambiguity. 
 
1. Understanding the “Business of Insurance” 
 
After Congress passed the MFA, courts struggled to determine the 
contours of the federal statutory exemption.  The threshold question in any 
situation is whether something qualifies as the “business of insurance.”  
The initial trend among lower courts was to interpret this phrase broadly to 
include nearly every activity of an insurance company.145  Eventually, 
however, this broad interpretation was narrowed when the Supreme Court 
made a distinction between general activities of insurance companies and 
activities that relate directly to “the business of insurance.”146  The former 
are subject to federal law notwithstanding the exemption since the MFA 
“did not purport to make the States supreme in regulating all activities of 
insurance companies.”147  That is, not all activities of insurance companies 
automatically fall within the exemption.  Application of the phrase is thus 
                                                                                                                 
143 Carlson, supra note 82, at 1137. 
144 Id.  
145 See, e.g., Transnational Ins. Co. v. Rosenlund, 261 F. Supp. 12, 28 (D. Or. 
1966) (indicating that the court had a duty to “liberally construe” the meaning of 
the business of insurance so that state regulation would fall under the MFA 
exemption). 
146 SEC. v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459–60 (1969). 
147 Id. 
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more concerned with the nature of the activity rather than the fact that it is 
an insurance company that is engaged in the activity.148           
Beginning in 1979, the Supreme Court adopted a more restrictive 
approach to the MFA antitrust exemption, which has continued to the 
present day.  In Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., the 
Court construed the meaning of “business of insurance” narrowly when it 
looked for three elements to determine if something qualifies as the 
business of insurance: (1) whether or not the activity involves the spreading 
and underwriting of a policyholder’s risk; (2) whether the activity is 
connected to the contractual relationship between the company and the 
insured; and (3) whether the activity is limited to entities within the 
insurance industry.149   
Three years later in Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno, the 
Court refined and formalized these elements from Royal Drug into a 
tripartite test to determine if an activity should be considered as part of the 
business of insurance: “[F]irst, whether the practice has the effect of 
transferring or spreading a policyholder’s risk; second, whether the practice 
is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the 
insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the 
industry.”150  Each of the factors is relevant, though none of them is 
determinative.151  Some courts have held, however, that the first factor—
transferring or spreading risk—is the primary characteristic of the business 
of insurance,152 and allow more flexibility in classifying an activity as 
constituting the business of insurance if this factor is present.153   
Under the first prong of the test—transferring or spreading of a 
policyholder’s risk—the Court has made a distinction between the 
spreading of risk and the reduction of risk.154  Actions that do not involve 
an insurer assuming risk and distributing it among a group of similarly 
situated people fail to qualify as part of the business of insurance.155  Thus, 
                                                                                                                 
148 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 781 (1993). 
149 Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 214–15 (1979).  Part of the Court’s reasoning for 
limiting the meaning of “business of insurance” was its recognition that 
“exemptions from the antitrust laws are to be narrowly construed.”  Id. at 231.  
150 Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982). 
151 Id. 
152 See Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 212–15.  
153 See, e.g., Feinstein v. Nettleship Co. of Los Angeles, 714 F.2d 928, 931 
(9th Cir. 1983); Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass’n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 
F.2d 1276, 1285–87 (9th Cir. 1983). 
154 Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 211–15.   
155 Jerry, supra note 1, at 422. 
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activities connected with products with no insurance risk, such as the 
searches and examinations involved with title insurance, do not qualify as 
constituting the business of insurance since title insurers assume little if any 
risk and such activities are often done by entities other than the insurance 
companies.156  This factor, however, is not always easily discernible, and 
cannot be applied with extreme rigidity.  For example, although 
reinsurance and retrocessional insurance agreements involve reducing the 
amount of risk and liability of insurance companies and perhaps would not 
qualify under the Pireno test, they are considered as part of the business of 
insurance.157  Thus, one of the problems with the first factor is that it is 
subject to various interpretations and exceptions, and does not provide clear 
guidance on what should constitute the business of insurance.158  
Under the second prong of the test, the activity must be an integral 
part of the contractual relation between the insurer and insured in order to 
qualify as constituting the business of insurance.  Activities that are not part 
of the insurer-insured contract, and which have only an indirect effect on it, 
are not part of the business of insurance.159  Although this sounds 
straightforward, the involvement of agents and brokers with policyholders 
and insurers prevents definitive boundaries from being drawn.160 
The third prong of the test requires that the activity be limited to 
entities within the insurance industry.  This prong, too, suffers from 
ambiguity.  For instance, enactment of state law permitting insurance 
companies to enter into certain agreements with third party providers does 
not necessarily mean that the third prong of the test will be met.161  
Insurance companies, therefore, must not only determine if the state 
                                                                                                                 
156 See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 998 F.2d 1129, 1133–34 (3d Cir. 1993). 
157 In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 927 (9th Cir. 1991), aff’d in part 
and rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 
509 U.S. 764, 784 (1993). 
158 Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308, 321 (D.C. Cir. 
1982). 
159 Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129–32 (1982). 
160 While lower courts have occasionally applied the exemption to agents 
making market decisions and soliciting policyholders, Arroyo-Melecio v. Puerto 
Rican Am. Ins. Co., 398 F.3d 56, 68 (1st Cir. 2005), the Supreme Court has not 
decided on certain issues, such as the fixing of agent commissions.  Group Life & 
Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 224 n.32 (1979). 
161 Michael A. Haskel, Should Antitrust Principles Be Used to Assess 
Insurance Residual Market Mechanisms, Such As New York’s Medical Malpractice 
Insurance Plan?, 71 ALB. L. REV. 229, 290 (2008). 
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regulates the activity, but must ensure that it falls under the MFA 
exemption.162     
Thus, while the Supreme Court has identified three factors that 
should be considered when determining if an activity constitutes the 
business of insurance, the effectiveness of the Pireno test is questionable 
given the uncertainty that courts have in applying it.  The factors when 
viewed separately can lead to contradictory conclusions, and it is unclear as 
to which factor should be given more weight when they conflict.163  This 
muddies the understanding of when the MFA exemption should apply.  In 
addition, application of the test does not always exempt activities that 
Congress intended to be exempt.  For instance, activities such as 
cooperative-rate making and pooling of loss data were intended by 
Congress to fall within the MFA exemption, but would fail the Pireno test 
since they do not directly affect the insurer-policyholder relationship 
required by the second prong.164  Thus, certain activities, even though they 
would fail the test, qualify as part of the business of insurance as 
exceptions due to Congressional intent.165  The necessity of making such 
exceptions points to the inherently flawed structure of the test.  Thus, while 
the Pireno test keeps the scope of the MFA exemption somewhat limited 
and provides some guidance on how to interpret the exemption, its 
effectiveness is plagued by ambiguity.166   
                                                                                                                 
162 Id. 
163 Macey & Miller, supra  note 141. 
164 See 91 CONG. REC. 1087-88 (1945) (statements of Reps. Hancock and 
Celler).  Unfortunately the committee reports do not provide much guidance on 
what precisely the phrase “business of insurance” means.  See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 79-
20 (1945); H.R. REP. NO. 79-143.  What is clear, however, is that “[i]t [was] not the 
intention of Congress in the enactment of [the MFA] to clothe the States with any 
power to regulate or tax the business of insurance beyond that which they had been 
held to possess prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the 
Southeastern Underwriters Association case.”  H.R. REP. NO. 79-143, at 3 (1945). 
Prior to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533 
(1944), it was within the states’ authority to regulate the fixing of rates and sharing 
of data among insurers, which suggests that states were intended to continue 
regulating those activities.  See Day, supra note 33. 
165 See, e.g., 91 CONG. REC. 1481 (statement of Sen. Ferguson).    
166 See Francis Achampong, The McCarran-Ferguson Act and the Limited 
Insurance Antitrust Exemption: An Indefensible Aberration?, 15 SETON HALL 
LEGIS. J. 141, 152 (1991).  Although what activities constitute the “business of 
insurance” is not always clear, the Court has indicated that when a federal statute 
makes explicit reference to “insurance,” federal law does in fact preempt state law 
and state law is not protected under the MFA’s reverse preemption provision.  See 
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2. Deciphering the Meaning of “to the Extent that such 
Business Is Not Regulated by State Law” 
 
After it is determined whether an activity qualifies as constituting 
the “business of insurance,” the second requirement for an activity to fall 
under the MFA exemption is that it must be regulated by state law.  The 
Supreme Court, however, has never defined what “to the extent that” 
means with respect to state regulation and what amount of state regulation 
is required before the exemption applies.167  Even if there is state regulation 
in a certain area of insurance, it does not necessarily preclude application of 
federal antitrust laws.168   
The general rule that lower courts have adopted in determining 
whether sufficient state regulation exists is that a state is considered to 
regulate “the business of insurance within the meaning of [Section 2(b) of 
the MFA] when a State statute generally proscribes or permits or authorizes 
certain conduct on the part of the insurance companies.”169  Therefore, the 
second requirement under the MFA is not difficult to meet.  As long as the 
state has the ability to regulate a particular activity, that ability suffices 
even if the state does not actively exercise its regulatory authority.170  For 
instance, the Eighth Circuit has held that the mere existence of a state 
statute granting authority to the state insurance commissioner to investigate 
trade practices was sufficient to invoke immunity under the MFA antitrust 
exemption even though the state merely retained “inchoate” regulation.171  
Further, the exemption applies even if the state regulation is inadequate or 
ineffective.172  The Supreme Court, however, has noted that if state 
                                                                                                                 
Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 26 (1996) (holding that a 1916 federal statute 
that permitted national banks to sell insurance in small towns preempted a Florida 
law that prohibited such banks from selling most types of insurance, largely 
because the federal statute made an explicit reference to “insurance”).   
167 Anderson, supra note 127. 
168 Id. at 98. 
169 Cal. League of Indep. Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 175 F. 
Supp. 857, 860 (N.D. Cal. 1959). 
170 Hovenkamp, supra note 28, at 637. 
171 In re Workers’ Comp. Ins. Antitrust Litig., 867 F.2d 1552, 1558–60 (8th 
Cir. 1989). 
172 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-1036, at 27 (1992) (stating that “[a] substantial 
number of decisions have addressed the sufficiency of State insurance regulation, 
and not one court appears to have held State regulation, in any form, insufficient to 
trigger the antitrust exemption”).   
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insurance regulations are a “mere pretense,” they may not be sufficient to 
qualify under the MFA antitrust exemption.173   
This low standard on what constitutes sufficient state regulation, 
although it remains the current standard, is contrary to Congressional 
intent, which was that federal antitrust laws would apply where states were 
not adequately regulating an activity.174  The original intention and 
understanding behind the MFA exemption was that states must actively and 
affirmatively regulate the same areas covered by federal antitrust laws 
otherwise federal antitrust laws would be fully applicable.175  Further, it 
was intended that state law must be “explicit” concerning the actions it was 
meant to regulate, and should be of a prohibitive nature rather than 
permitting a certain practice.176  Thus, modern understanding and 
application of this part of the exemption restricts the applicability of federal 
antitrust laws much more than Congress intended.                
 
3. The Meaning of Boycott, Coercion, or Intimidation 
from § 1013(b) 
 
Lastly, in order for an activity to qualify under the MFA 
exemption, not only must it be within the “business of insurance” and 
regulated by state law, it also cannot constitute a boycott, coercion, or 
intimidation.  The breadth of the boycott exception of the MFA as codified 
in 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) is not evident from the wording.  Courts that have 
considered the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) have usually had to address 
boycotts, though the principles used in considering boycotts can be applied 
to coercion and intimidation as well.177  
The Supreme Court first examined the meaning and scope of the 
boycott exception in § 1013(b) in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. 
Barry.178  While the Court considered various meanings of the term 
“boycott,” it did not settle upon a precise definition.179  The Court did, 
however, hold that the language of the boycott exception is “broad and 
unqualified” and is not limited to actions against competing insurance 
                                                                                                                 
173 FTC v. Nat’l Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560, 564 (1958). 
174 See 91 CONG. REC. 1444 (1945) (Senator Ferguson stating that federal 
“antitrust laws would still apply where states’ regulation was inadequate”). 
175 91 CONG. REC. 1444 (1945) (statement of Sen. Murdock). 
176 Id. at 1481 (statement of Sen. Ferguson).  
177 A.B.A. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, INSURANCE ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 
28 n.119 (2d ed. 2006). 
178 438 U.S. 531 (1978). 
179 Id. at 541–43. 
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companies or agents.180  Thus, insurance companies can be subject to the 
Sherman Act not merely for boycotts against competitors, but also for 
boycotts against policyholders or other non-competitive third parties.181   
In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, the Court highlighted 
the primary feature of a boycott when it stated that essentially a boycott 
consists of a concerted refusal to agree in one transaction in order get 
someone to accept the terms of an entirely different transaction.182  That is, 
“unrelated transactions are used as leverage to achieve the terms 
desired.”183  Therefore, under Hartford Fire, there must be two separate 
transactions, one in which there is a refusal to deal in order to obtain 
acceptance in a second, different transaction.  As such, price fixing is not 
necessarily a boycott under the MFA exception if it is merely a refusal to 
deal with another party based solely on the terms of a single transaction.184  
In general, the application of the Sherman Act under the boycott exception 
of § 1013(b) should be interpreted broadly, consistent with Congressional 
intent.185  Even with this approach, however, “[e]xactly what types of 
activity fall within the forbidden category is . . . far from certain.”186  
 
                                                                                                                 
180 Id. at 550. 
181 Id. at 552. 
182 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 806 (1993). 
183 Id. at 803. 
184 See id. at 802; Thomsen v. Sun Co., Inc., 498 F. Supp. 1109, 1111–12 
(E.D. Pa. 1980). 
185 See Senator Mahoney’s statement that “every effective combination or 
agreement to carry out a program against the public interest…would be prohibited 
by [§ 1013(b)].”  91 CONG. REC. 1486 (1945). 
186 Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationers & Printing Co., 472 
U.S. 284, 294 (1985).  It is beyond the scope of this Article to comprehensively 
discuss each insurance activity and how courts have analyzed them under the MFA 
exemption.  For a broad discussion of various insurance activities and their legality 
under the MFA exemption, see generally INSURANCE ANTITRUST HANDBOOK, 
supra note 177. 
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III. PUTTING THE SISYPHEAN TASK TO REST: A HYBRID 
APPROACH 
 
So the point is, is there something that needs to be fixed? 187 
     ~Michael McRaith 
 
The MFA, though perhaps less than a model of clarity, is 
significant legislation for a variety of reasons.  One major reason is the 
importance of the subject matter it regulates: the insurance industry.  
Insurance plays an integral role in modern American society by protecting 
families, businesses, and individuals from unexpected economic burdens.  
In addition, the American economy relies to a great extent on the insurance 
industry.  In 2002, there were over 5000 insurance companies which had 
combined revenues of $1.2 trillion in the United States.188  More current 
figures indicate that the premium dollars of insurance companies comprise 
approximately 10% of the American economy.189  An average American 
family easily spends over $7000 each year to meet all of its insurance 
needs, including auto, home, life, and health insurance.190  Insurance, 
however, is currently the last major industry in the United States that is 
regulated by the states.191  In fact, all other major industrialized nations 
regulate insurance on the national level.192   It is beyond the scope of this 
Article, however, to discuss the arguments for or against continued state 
                                                                                                                 
187 Hearing on Statutory Immunities and Exemptions: The McCarran-
Ferguson Act Before the Antitrust Modernization Commission 53 (Oct. 18, 2006) 
[hereinafter Hearing on Statutory Immunities and Exemptions], available at 
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-exemc/pdf/main-
exemptions/mccarran/10.18.06.pdf (statement of Michael McRaith, Chairman of 
the Broker Activities Task Force of the NAIC). 
188 State Regulation of Insurance Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 8 (June 20, 2006) [hereinafter 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary], available at 
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-exemc/main-
exemptions/mccarran-ferguson.shtml (testimony of Michael McRaith, Chairman of 
the Broker Activities Task Force of the NAIC). 
189 Id. (testimony of Elinor Hoffmann, Assistant Attorney General of New 
York). 
190 Hearing on Statutory Immunities and Exemptions, supra note 187, 
available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-exemc/main-
exemptions/mccarran-ferguson.shtml (written testimony of Michael McRaith, 
Chairman of the Broker Activities Task Force of the NAIC). 
191 Jones, supra note 44, at 346. 
192 Id. 
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regulation and taxation of the insurance industry in general.193  It is limited 
to an analysis of the interplay between federal antitrust laws and state 
regulation as currently embodied within the MFA antitrust exemption.   
The repeated questioning of the MFA antitrust exemption, and in 
particular with the Insurance Industry Competition Act of 2007 and 2009, 
brings further reason to pause and consider what should be done 
concerning the MFA exemption, whether to leave it in place without any 
change, repeal it entirely, or modify it.  Groups have answered these 
questions in various ways since the enactment of the MFA.  It is generally 
agreed that the purpose of antitrust laws is to promote the welfare and best 
interests of consumers.194  It is also widely held that entirely unregulated 
competition in the insurance industry is not an alternative.195  Thus, the 
disagreement is over what exactly the best interests of consumers are, who 
should ensure that they are protected, and how that is best accomplished. 
 
A.  NO CHANGE: THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE 
 
Of course, the easiest approach to the MFA antitrust exemption is 
to leave it entirely intact with no modifications.  Proponents of leaving the 
MFA antitrust exemption in place try to justify it on several grounds.  First, 
proponents of preserving the MFA exemption argue that the exemption is 
necessary because insurance is a unique product in that it is essentially a 
promise to pay a future obligation upon the occurrence of a contingent 
future event.196  Because these costs are purportedly far more unpredictable 
                                                                                                                 
193 See National Insurance Act of 2006, S. 2509, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (for a 
proposal to allow insurance companies to opt out of state regulation, apply for a 
federal charter, and be subject to federal regulation). 
194 See, e.g., Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 188, at 
4 (testimony of Elinor Hoffman); Hearing on Statutory Immunities and 
Exemptions, supra note 187, at 8 (written testimony of Michael McRaith) 
(indicating that the main priority “is to protect consumers”). 
195 E.g., Dirlam & Stelzer, supra note 142, at 214. The MFA is, of course, 
based not just on the conclusion that continued regulation of insurance by the states 
is in the best interests of consumers, but also on the assumption that regulation of 
insurance in general is necessary.  Various reasons have been given on why 
government regulation is necessary: (1) to ensure that insurance companies remain 
solvent; (2) to ensure reasonable rates; and (3) to monitor the fairness of policy 
terms.  Carlson, supra note 82, at 1138–39.   
196 Hearing on Statutory Immunities and Exemptions, supra note 187, at 17 
(statement of Julie Gackenbach, Representative, National Association of the 
Mutual Insurance Companies). 
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than other products and services,197 in order for insurers to set accurate 
premiums and remain solvent they must accurately estimate future costs, 
which requires accumulating a large amount of claims data—something 
few companies would be able to develop because of cost.198     
Proponents of the exemption argue that repealing it would prevent 
certain pro-competitive activities such as loss-data sharing and rate-making 
from continuing,199 which could threaten the solvency of companies.200  
The claim is that certain collaborative activities allow companies to offer 
more affordable products by reducing costs connected to calculating 
adequate rates.201  This has the further alleged benefit of helping to protect 
all companies from mispriced products and ultimately from insolvency.202  
In addition, reducing costs connected with determining adequate prices is 
alleged to help smaller companies compete.203  As a result, consumers have 
more companies from which to buy insurance and are protected from 
companies becoming insolvent based on the prevention of rates that are too 
low.     
This argument, however, is misleading.  The reporting of historic 
data on past losses by insurance companies and the pooling of such 
information by rating associations has long been recognized to have pro-
competitive benefits and would withstand Sherman Act scrutiny even in the 
absence of the MFA exemption.204  Proponents of the exemption are 
accurate in claiming that other elements of rate-making would be per se 
illegal under the Sherman Act, or at the very least would be questionable 
under a rule of reason analysis.  For instance, projections of future trends in 
pricing or costs (“trending”); the development of “end rates” that would be 
                                                                                                                 
197 Horning, supra note 139, at 14. 
198Id.; see also Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 188, 
at 152 (testimony of Kevin Thompson, Senior Vice President, Insurance Services 
Office) (indicating that in 2005 it cost over $11 million for the Insurance Services 
Office to provide advisory prospective loss costs for one type of insurance 
product). 
199 Achampong, supra note 166, at 155.  It is not possible to consider all of the 
alleged pro-competitive activities in this Article; discussion, therefore, has been 
limited to the activity of elements of rate-making. 
200 Hearing on Statutory Immunities and Exemptions, supra note 187, at 37 
(statement of Michael McRaith). 
201 See Achampong, supra note 166, at 155. 
202 Hearing on Statutory Immunities and Exemptions, supra note 187, at 37 
(statement of Michael McRaith). 
203 Id. at 15–16 (statement of Julie Gackenbach). 
204 Horning, supra note 139, at 16–17. 
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sufficient to cover all prospective loss costs, expenses in underwriting the 
risk, and factoring in sufficient profit; and the collaborative creation of 
“loss development” information that estimates ultimate costs of reported 
but claims not yet paid would not likely be permitted without the MFA 
exemption.205   
Nevertheless, the necessity of end rates that factor in an expense 
and profit component that is not connected to an individual company’s 
particular expenses profits is dubious in the first place.  Finalization of 
pricing would ideally be determined by particular insurance companies in 
order to avoid exaggerated expenses or profits because there is virtually an 
unlimited amount of discretion in determining how many years of data 
should be considered, how to average such data, and how much weight 
should be given to different averages.206  In addition, prospective loss costs, 
trending, and loss development could be supplied by independent actuarial 
companies rather than rating associations.  This would not necessarily 
result in higher premiums for consumers.  For instance, the State of 
California repealed its antitrust exemption for collective rate-making 
activities with respect to automobile insurance.207  In the ten-year period 
following the repeal of the state antitrust exemption, rates lowered 
significantly, dropping California from the third costliest state in the nation 
for automobile insurance to the twentieth.208  Further, the solvency of 
companies is not a significant factor as evidenced by the fact that since 
1950, only 0.66 of 1% of insurers have become insolvent.209   
Second, proponents of retaining the exemption as it currently exists 
argue that it has worked well since its enactment by ensuring a competitive 
market, and that state monitoring of anticompetitive, unfair, and deceptive 
trade practices has been effective.210  This position, however, is 
questionable.  Although all fifty states plus the District of Columbia have 
some type of state antitrust statute,211 there are a number of states that have 
exemptions for insurance activities, which means that even if an antitrust 
                                                                                                                 
205 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST, supra note 177, at 47–50. 
206 Hearing on Statutory Immunities and Exemptions, supra note 187, at 50 
(statement of Jay Angoff). 
207 Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, note 188, at 23 (statement 
of Bob Hunter, Insurance Director, Consumer Federation of America). 
208 Id. 
209 Hearing on Statutory Immunities and Exemptions, supra note 187, at 9 
(statement of Michael McRaith).    
210 Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 188, at 10-11 
(statement of Michael McRaith). 
211 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST, supra note 177, at 35. 
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violation occurred, many of these states would not bring an action against 
the companies.212  In states that do not have broad exemptions, the antitrust 
penalties are not as severe as federal antitrust penalties, making them less 
of a deterrent for illegal behavior.213  Further, there is no private right of 
action in most states for unfair insurance trade practices.214 Even in a 
situation such as the State of New York’s recent investigation of various 
companies for bid-rigging and customer allocation that resulted in over $3 
billion in settlements for restitution and penalties,215 the settlements did not 
cover activities that were applicable on a nation-wide basis; they were 
limited to only the few states that joined in the investigation.216  Therefore, 
state antitrust regulation does not appear to be as effective as proponents of 
the exemption claim.   
Of course, for purposes of the MFA exemption, the question is not 
merely whether increased federal antitrust enforcement would be more 
effective in deterring or punishing anticompetitive behavior.  Even certain 
state officials have recognized that increased enforcement of federal 
antitrust laws would be more effective at protecting the best interests of 
consumers.217  This alone argues for modification of the exemption.  But 
for those who insist on continued near-exclusive state enforcement of 
antitrust regulation, the question is also whether the current understanding 
and application of the MFA exemption correlate to the original intention of 
Congress in crafting it.  The original understanding and intention of the 
exemption is that there would be active state regulation, and without such 
regulation, the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts 
would be applicable.218  Unfortunately, the current understanding and 
application of the MFA exemption require only a minimal showing of state 
oversight (the mere ability to exercise authority) in order to preempt federal 
                                                                                                                 
212 Donald C. Klawiter, Chair, Section of Antitrust Law for the American Bar 
Association, Letter to the Honorable Arlen Specter, Chairman, Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, July 27, 2006 (on file with ABA, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/antitrust/060728letter_1-wa_2604707_2.pdf).  
213 Id.  
214 Hearing on Statutory Immunities and Exemptions, supra note 187, at 71 
(statement of Jay Angoff). 
215 Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 188 (testimony 
of Elinor Hoffman). 
216 Id. 
217Id. 
218 See 91 Cong. Rec. 1481 (1945) (statement of Sen. Murdock). 
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antitrust laws,219 thereby granting a level of latitude to the industry it was 
not meant to have.      
Proponents of retaining the exemption also argue that repeal would 
result in uncertainty and frequent, costly litigation, subjecting the industry 
to varying interpretations by a large number of judges.220  While this 
argument raises a valid point, there is no indication that litigation as a result 
of increased application of federal antitrust statutes would be substantially 
more than the number of lawsuits that have been needed and continue to be 
needed to determine the meaning of the MFA exemption in particular 
circumstances.   
Therefore, while proponents of retaining the status quo try to meet 
the Antitrust Modernization Commission’s call to justify the insurance 
industry’s exemption under the MFA,221 they have not satisfied their 
burden of explaining its continued necessity.       
   
B.  MODIFYING THE EXEMPTION: OPENING THE DOOR OF 
POSSIBILITY 
 
Those who argue for repeal of the MFA antitrust exemption for the 
insurance industry do so based on a number of reasons.  The current trend 
is to question and remove regulatory immunities.222  Further, some claim 
that the exemption immunizes activities that have significant anti-
competitive effects, while not immunizing others that are only questionably 
anticompetitive.  For example, one scholar has pointed out the irony that 
certain anticompetitive horizontal restraints such as price-fixing agreements 
are immunized, but certain vertical agreements in which insurers engage in 
peer review of providers of prescription drugs are held to be outside the 
                                                                                                                 
219 See supra Part II.B.ii. 
220 See, e.g., Hearing on Statutory Immunities and Exemptions, supra note 
187, at 53, 78–79 (statements of Michael McRaith). 
221 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
222 See J. David Cummins, Property-Liability Insurance Price Deregulation: 
The Last Bastion? 1, in DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE: 
RESTORING COMPETITION AND INCREASING MARKET EFFICIENCY (J. David 
Cummins ed., 2002) (noting that in the last two decades, various industries, such as 
airlines, trucking, railroads, telecommunications, and banking, have experienced 
deregulation with regard to prices and entry and exit restrictions); Hovenkamp, 
supra note 28, at 630–31 (stating that antitrust laws are now applicable to 
industries such as telecommunications which previously had enjoyed significant 
“regulatory immunity”). 
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“business of insurance.”223  Another argument is that repealing the 
exemption would result in increased competition,224 and would collectively 
save insurance consumers an estimated $45 billion per year.225  It has also 
been asserted that repealing the exemption would make antitrust 
enforcement uniform, which would benefit consumers and insurance 
companies by removing inefficient multiple proceedings under disparate 
laws, and thereby limiting the possibility of inconsistent results.226     
Proponents of repealing the exemption further argue that the 
exemption is unnecessary in light of alternatives that can better protect the 
best interests of consumers.  One alternative is to repeal the exemption, but 
allow certain insurance activities to still be exempt from federal antitrust 
laws under the state action doctrine.227  The state action doctrine, which 
originated in Parker v. Brown, provides immunity to private parties if their 
conduct is authorized and regulated by the state.228  In order for the state 
action doctrine to apply, however, there must be a clear articulation in 
state policy concerning the activity, and the state must actively supervise 
the policy.229  This is a higher standard of regulation than that required by 
the current interpretation of the MFA exemption, and seems more in line 
with the original Congressional intent in passing the MFA.  In fact, § 
1012(b) of the MFA (“to the extent that such business is not regulated by 
state law”) is arguably a codification of the state action doctrine from 
Parker.230  President Roosevelt espoused this position when he wrote to 
Senator Radcliffe that “there is no valid reason for giving any special 
exemption from the antitrust laws to the business of insurance. . . . The 
antitrust laws do not conflict with affirmative regulation of insurance by the 
States.”231   
The state action doctrine clearly contains a higher standard of 
supervision by the state than the MFA does and is arguably more in line 
with the original intention and understanding behind the MFA exemption.  
This approach would leave intact the federalist purpose behind the MFA, 
                                                                                                                 
223 See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 28, at 636–37. 
224 Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 188 (statement 
of Donald Klawiter) (expressing the position of the American Bar Association). 
225 Id. (statement of J. Robert Hunter). 
226 Id. (statement of Elinor R. Hoffman). 
227 Hovenkamp, supra note 28, at 638–39. 
228 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
229 FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 633 (1992); Ca. Retail Liquor 
Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). 
230 Weller, supra note 111, at 615. 
231 91 CONG. REC. 482 (1945). 
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and alleviate fears that encroaching on state regulation of antitrust in 
insurance is a step towards federal regulation of insurance in general.232  
Relying on the state action doctrine alone, however, might result in 
insurance companies demanding that state insurance codes be changed in 
order to clearly meet the requirements of state action analysis, and it would 
also result in a need for litigation in order to determine the scope of the 
doctrine since it is largely undeveloped in the insurance context due to the 
current application and understanding of the MFA exemption.  Further, 
many states have already chosen not to assume an active and affirmative 
stance to antitrust regulation in the insurance industry.233  Thus, repeal of 
the exemption and reliance on the state action doctrine alone would result 
in a continued disparate approach to antitrust enforcement.  Full repeal of 
the exemption and relying on the state action doctrine alone, therefore, 
seems unwise in light of the uncertainty and lack of uniformity that would 
result.  Nevertheless, reliance on the state action doctrine in addition to 
exempt safe harbors would help remedy any drawbacks to relying on the 
state action doctrine alone. 
Thus, in addition to the state action doctrine, proponents of 
repealing the MFA exemption have also proffered safe harbors as another 
alternative to the MFA exemption.  It is significant that the NAIC prior to 
the enactment of the MFA proposed a list of seven safe harbor activities 
that it viewed as sufficient for the insurance industry; it never asked for a 
blanket exemption from federal antitrust laws.234  Proponents of repeal 
argue that express safe harbors would prevent or at least lessen litigation to 
determine what activities would be acceptable in the aftermath of full 
repeal of the exemption since they would be expressly permitted or not, and 
they would permit recognized pro-competitive activities beneficial to the 
industry and consumers that require a certain amount of collaboration 
among companies.235   
Those who oppose repeal of the MFA exemption, and therefore 
oppose the implementation of safe harbors, argue that safe harbors do not 
                                                                                                                 
232 Macey & Miller, supra note 141, at 63. 
233 See Klawiter, supra note 243 (indicating that nineteen states have express 
antitrust law exemptions for the insurance industry in their laws).  
234 90 CONG. REC. A4406 (1944).  The NAIC’s intent with its proposal to 
Congress prior to the passing of the MFA was to “preserve[e] state regulation and 
at the same time not emasculat[e] the federal anti-trust laws.”  Weller, supra note 
111, at 593 (quoting 1945 NAIC Proc. 156, 159–60). 
235 Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar Association, Comments to the 
Antitrust Modernization Commission Regarding the McCarran-Ferguson Act 2 
(April 2006). 
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provide the clear protection to insurance companies of legitimate 
collaborative, pro-competitive activities, but would still require judicial 
interpretation of the safe harbors if the language is too ambiguous.236  In 
addition, it is argued that it might be difficult to compile a comprehensive 
list of all activities that should be explicitly exempted.237 
The safe harbor approach, however, seems to reach a middle 
ground between those who favor complete repeal of the MFA exemption 
and those who wish to preserve it in its present form.  If formulated 
properly, express safe harbors would protect desirable pro-competitive, 
collaborative activities such as compiling and sharing of historical and 
prospective loss cost data, and standardized policy forms.  This would 
prevent any sort of chilling effect on activities beneficial to the best 
interests of consumers by providing insurance companies with confidence 
in the legality of the activities.  At the same time, it would not permit 
insurance companies to raise illegitimate defenses to challenged activities.  
Ultimately it would help provide clarity to all parties involved, and would 
further uniformity in antitrust enforcement.  Nevertheless, it would require 
significant deliberation on what activities should be expressly exempted 
and how the safe harbor exemptions should be worded.  A reasonable 
approach to the safe harbors would be to adopt the seven activities 
specified by the NAIC during the deliberation of the MFA.      
 
C.  THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY COMPETITION ACTS OF 2007 AND 
2009 
 
The latest proposed alternative to the MFA exemption was the 
Insurance Industry Competition Act of 2007,238 now the Insurance Industry 
Competition Act of 2009.239  The express purpose of the Insurance Industry 
Competition Act of 2009, borrowing from its 2007 predecessor, is “[t]o 
further competition in the insurance industry.”240  It proposes to do this by 
repealing the MFA exemption and making the Sherman, Clayton, and 
Federal Trade Commission Acts applicable to the insurance industry by 
amending the MFA (§ 1012(b)) from: “That after June 30, 1948 . . . the 
                                                                                                                 
236 Hearing on Statutory Immunities and Exemptions, supra note 187, at 78 
(statement of Michael McRaith) (commenting on the ambiguity of the wording of 
the safe harbors put forth by the American Bar Association). 
237 See id. at 60 (statement of Julie Gackenbach). 
238 S. 618, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1081, 110th Cong. (2007). 
239 H.R. 1583,111th Cong. (2009). 
240 Id. 
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Sherman Act, . . . the Clayton Act, and . . . the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, as amended, shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the 
extent that such business is not regulated by State law”241 to:  
 
That after June 30, 1948 . . . the Sherman Act, . . . the 
Clayton Act, and . . . the Federal Trade Commission Act, 
as amended, as it relates to unfair methods of competition, 
shall be applicable to the business of insurance.  The 
Federal Trade Commission Act, as it relates to areas other 
than unfair methods of competition, shall be applicable to 
the business of insurance to the extent that such business is 
not regulated by State law.”242 
 
It also proposes to do away with the boycott exemption in § 1013 
by striking § 1013 altogether.243  Further, it proposes that authority be given 
to the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission to issue 
joint statements concerning their policies on joint activities in the insurance 
industry.244   
The Insurance Industry Competition Act of 2009, therefore, would 
make the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts 
applicable to the insurance industry in virtually full force.  It proposes to do 
so, however, without providing any safe harbors for the insurance industry.  
As such, it is an extreme form of legislation in that it would subject the 
insurance industry to full federal scrutiny of its practices, though tempered 
by possible exceptions that could arise from the state action doctrine.   
The Act’s approach in trying to accomplish its express purpose of 
furthering competition in the insurance industry, therefore, seems to suffer 
from overzealousness.  The Act would subject insurance companies to 
ambiguity with respect to nearly every collaborative practice, although this 
would put them in no worse position than companies in nearly every other 
industry.  This seems harmful to possible pro-competitive practices in that 
insurance companies would be hesitant to engage in them due to their 
unknown legality.  It also seems unnecessary given that such a chilling 
effect could easily be avoided by providing express safe harbors.  As such, 
the Act is inadvisable in its proposed form.  
                                                                                                                 
241 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012(a)–(b) (2006). 
242 Supra note 188 (proposed changes of the bill are in italics). 
243 Id. 
244 Id. 
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Nevertheless, the Act should not be dismissed entirely.  Its 
proposal suggests that the current application and understanding of the 
MFA have strayed from Congress’s original intent and purpose.  In 
addition, it provides an element that is worthy of consideration in any 
discussion of the MFA exemption and how it should be handled, whether 
preserving, repealing, or modifying it in some way.  It suggests a 
heightened role of oversight by the Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission in a concrete way.  The Act would authorize the 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission to issue joint 
statements regarding joint activities in the insurance industry, which is 
reasonable if any sort of accommodation with respect to federal antitrust 
laws is made;245 companies would also likely be able to obtain advisory 
opinions from the Department and the Commission.  If such authorization 
is exercised, it could help provide clarity on what is acceptable under 
federal antitrust law.  Such statements would be helpful in providing 
guidance to the insurance industry on what activities are acceptable, 
regardless of whether the MFA exemption is repealed or left in place.  
Further, the original federalist purpose behind the MFA would be preserved 
to a certain extent.  States that “provide the same exemptions as the federal 
government or follow federal precedent would be able to pursue antitrust 
actions against insurance companies under their state law.”246      
Thus, while the Act is not an ideal form of legislation, it introduces 
an element—statements or advisory opinions from federal agencies—that 
should be seriously considered.  New legislation with similar provisions 
would also further Congress’s original intent of having active antitrust 
regulation.  If express safe harbors are added to the Insurance Industry 
Competition Act of 2009 or to a similar bill, it would essentially preserve 
the same pro-competitive activities currently allowed under the MFA 
exemption, give clarity on which specific activities are legal, and also 
provide a greater deterrent to any activities that are not in the best interests 
of consumers.  
                                                                                                                 
245 See Dirlam & Stelzer, supra note 142, at 215.   
246 Klawiter, supra note 212.  It is possible that greater applicability of federal 
antitrust laws to the insurance industry would also encourage greater private 
antitrust enforcement.  That is, victims of antitrust violations would likely be more 
inclined to bring private antitrust cases due to potentially larger damages under 
federal antitrust law.  This could be a positive result given evidence showing that 
private antitrust enforcement has a greater deterrent effect than enforcement by the 
Department of Justice.  See generally Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits 
from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 
879 (2008).  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This Article has provided a broad overview of the history of 
antitrust regulation of the insurance industry in the United States and a 
snapshot of its present state today.  Since its enactment, the necessity and 
advisability of the MFA federal antitrust exemption has been consistently 
questioned.  This consistent questioning of the exemption places the burden 
on its proponents to justify its relevance and effectiveness in protecting the 
best interests of consumers.  Those who favor fully retaining the exemption 
in its present form provide reasonable concerns about the exemption’s 
repeal or modification.  Such concerns, however, do not provide adequate 
justification for the exemption when any benefit that the exemption 
provides can also be accomplished more effectively by express safe 
harbors, combined with advisory statements from the Department of Justice 
and Federal Trade Commission.  As such, the Insurance Industry 
Competition Act of 2009 should be given serious consideration, though 
modified, in order to provide express safe harbors for pro-competitive 
activities.  If the current bill is modified, or a similar bill proposed and 
adopted, Congress’s self-inflicted Sisyphean task of seeking to protect the 
best interests of consumers would finally come to a desirable end. 
 
 
438 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL         [Vol. 16:2 
 
 
BOOK REVIEW: THE LANGUAGE OF LIVES 
 
Jill C. Anderson! 
 
 
For outsiders, perhaps it is the historian’s relationship to the 
particular that epitomizes the discipline and frames our expectations as 
readers.  To mine boundless archival sources for shards of a story, and to 
fashion those odd individual shapes into a coherent one among many 
possible narratives -- this speaks to an intellectual calm beyond the reach of 
most of us.  Delivering on this expectation, Timothy Alborn’s Regulated 
Lives:  Life Insurance and British Society, 1800-1912 tells a story of a 
little-understood institution’s path into modernity, assembled of well-
chosen detail on a foundation of comprehensive research.!   Importantly, 
Alborn’s excavation of Victorian life insurance fills gaps in business 
history.  But its most surprising feature, one that readers glimpse just a few 
pages into the book, is the sweep of its conceptual departure point:  the 
meaning of life.  And not just one meaning, but four distinct 
conceptualizations of modern life – as he terms them:  the sympathetic, the 
numbered, the medicalized, and the commodified life" -- that Alborn argues 
evolved during the Victorian era and are uniquely merged in the institution 
of life insurance.#   
A preliminary project of Alborn’s book is to name and strain out 
these life-dimensions, in something like the way a prism takes in white 
light and separates it into a spectrum.$  He then shows how those bands 
came to be braided together, each one developing alongside and in tension 
with the others as they shaped Victorian life insurance and in turn were %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
! Visiting Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.  I am 
grateful to the University of Connecticut’s Insurance Law Center and Pat McCoy 
in particular for the opportunity to share perspectives on Regulated Lives with 
Sharon Murphy, Geoff Clark, and Tom Baker, with Peter Kochenburger 
moderating the discussion with his usual expertise and generosity.  I owe much to 
Susan Schmeiser for teaching me how to read more smartly and sensitively.  
Finally, many thanks are due Tim Alborn for giving us this important, lovingly 
crafted book to convene around and celebrate.  
1 TIMOTHY ALBORN, REGULATED LIVES:  LIFE INSURANCE AND BRITISH 
SOCIETY, 1800-1914 (2008). 
2 Id. at 7. 
3 Id. at 7-13.   
4 This metaphor is borrowed from the author, who uses it to depict the 
fragmentary nature of modernity and its resistance to being folded into grand 
narrative without stranding or jettisoning facts that do not follow its plot.  Id. at 
296-97. 
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shaped by that institution as a producer of culture.   As this express project 
of the book unfolds, a parallel, subtler plot of sorts develops at a linguistic 
level.  In breaking out a typology of “lives,” the author calls into service a 
figure of speech that is ubiquitous in life insurance and in insurance in 
general:  metonymy, the non-literal use of a word to represent an associated 
concept.&  “Lives,” in the parlance of insurance, is nearly always shorthand 
for something associated with lives:  e.g., policy holders, policies, bodies, 
medical subjects, breadwinners, health states, predictions of longevity, and, 
of course, deaths.  In Regulated Lives, Alborn’s multiple meanings of “life” 
both complicate and organize the underlying, undifferentiated metonym in 
ways that mirror certain strange and intriguing paradoxes inherent in life 
insurance.   
Among the fourfold typology of “lives,” we encounter first the 
sympathetic life.  Within this meaning, it is one’s contemplation of dying 
and leaving others destitute that is essential to the demand for life 
insurance,' and insurers aimed to generate a “sympathetic exchange” with 
the public.(  The more impersonal numbered life was the province of the 
actuary, who tabulated life expectancies and organized them into mortality 
tables.  This was the relatively easy task, at least as it reflected mortality for 
“healthy males,” but actuarial science was considerably more challenged to 
convert mortality statistics into meaningful risk categories.  While actuaries 
were zooming out from persons to numbers to norms (sometimes very far 
out, as when seeking in vain an ancient “law of mortality” in the early 
nineteenth century),) medical examiners were focusing closely on 
individual bodies.  In a break from therapeutic or investigative applications 
of medicine, they applied the latest science to scrutinize medicalized lives 
for signs of defect that would render them uninsurable.*  And finally, the 
development of these conceptual categories all took place within a 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
5 See MERRIAM-WEBSETER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 782 (11th ed. 2003).  
Examples of metonymy include “the crown” to represent a monarchy or 
“Hollywood” as a stand-in for the American entertainment industry.  See id.   
6 I mean here to refer to the demand for life insurance as an income substitute 
for the breadwinner-insured, as opposed to the class of debtor-insureds for whom 
life insurance was a condition of credit.  See ALBORN, supra note 1, at 136-37. 
7 Id. at 156 (citing ELAINE HADLEY, MELODRAMATIC TACTICS: 
THEATRICALIZED DISSENT IN THE ENGLISH MARKETPLACE, 1800-1885 30-31 
(1995). 
8 ALBORN, supra note 1, at 124.   
9 Id. at 205-51.   
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rationalizing market that equated mortality with money, giving us the 
commodified life.!+     
Anyone who doubts that these categories work beyond 
characterizing British life insurance should consider the recent public 
controversy over guidelines for breast cancer screening through 
mammography.!!  When a federally appointed medical advisory panel 
recommended delaying routine mammograms, citing a low likelihood that 
more aggressive screening would save lives in significant number,!" the 
ensuing public debate echoed the tensions that Alborn has identified, in 
another life-and-death context.  Both might be characterized as sympathy 
meets medicine meets math meets money.!# 
These four conceptualizations of life might appear to be 
interrelated as natural allies or rivals with their tensions following 
predictable plotlines.  Sympathy, for example, stands apart as humanizing 
life insurance, defining certain essential relations that must hold between 
the insurer and the insured (can the policyholder trust the insurer to be a 
surrogate breadwinner?) and between that insured and his dependants (is 
the policyholder sensitive enough to their plight to pay premiums for their 
benefit alone?).  Symbolized in literature by the Victorian deathbed,!$ the 
perspective of sympathy recognizes the policyholder as an individual with 
complex relationships and responsibilities, in contrast to the other three 
more objectifying dimensions.!&  And just as the deathbed motif has given 
way in to its contemporary equivalent, the hospital bed, we might anticipate 
a story of life insurance’s “softer feelings” losing ground to the cold 
rationality of the mortality table or the scrutiny of the medical examination 
table.   
A more complex dynamic emerges in Regulated Lives, however, 
notably in the chapter on the gatekeeping practices, by which insurers 
excluded or charged higher premiums based on risk.  Insurers in the early 
to mid-nineteenth century screened applicants based on interviews, 
referrals, and a proposal form.!'  Early gatekeeping was largely %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
10 Id. at 181.   
11 TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 158-59 (2d. ed. 2008). 
12 Id. 
13 For commentary on the controversy over mammograms see, e.g., Kevin 
Sack, Screening Debate Reveals Culture Clash in Medicine, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 
2009, at A1. 
14 ALBORN, supra note 1, at 149. 
15 See ALBORN, supra note 1, at 156. 
16 Id. at 232. 
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interpersonal, intuitive, and trust-based; in other words, “intimate but 
unreliable.”!(  With a widening market, a burgeoning field of diagnostic 
medicine, and growing mistrust of the truthfulness of applicants, insurers 
by 1900 had come to rely chiefly on medical examinations to police 
adverse selection.!)  A triumph for the medicalized conception of life?  Not 
so fast.  The indignity of the medical exam made it unpopular with 
consumers and sales agents alike.!*  Products that dispensed with the exam 
gained favor in the early 1900s, striking a blow for sympathy as mediated 
through the market.    
Another surprising relationship emerges in the tension between 
numbered and medicalized conceptions of life, two dimensions of science 
that appear from a distance to reinforce each other.  Starting from the 
baseline of confident mortality tables, it seemed to insurers that diagnostic 
medicine could be brought into the service of actuarial science.  Medicine 
held the prospect of refining the sweepingly general mortality statistics by 
introducing meaningful risk categories.  Once having identified the markers 
of mortality, the medical gaze could be trained on the individual body in 
order to screen out or rate up “inferior lives,” or so insurers hoped.   
But bodies do not give up “Fate’s secrets”"+ easily, we learn, either 
individually or in the aggregate.  This was true in two senses.  First, being 
“poked and prodded” made people uneasy enough when undertaken by an 
attending physician for the purpose of treatment; swapping the attendant 
with the “medical police”"! and replacing therapy with evaluation only 
made the scrutiny more objectionable.  Second, many features that were 
deemed abnormal (e.g., a lanky build,"" albumin in the urine,"# etc.) turned 
out to be of little use as predictors of mortality.  It made sense that insurers 
screened for lung problems in a period of rampant tuberculosis, but even 
some of this attention was misplaced, as when insurers took chest 
circumference and breathing capacity as a measure of respiratory health."$  
Much of Victorian gatekeeping of the medicalized life calls to mind the 
saw of “looking for one’s lost keys under the lamppost”:  insurers tended to 
collect information on deviance that was easy to detect (e.g., epilepsy, %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
17 Id. at 241.   
18 Id. at 245. 
19 Id.  
20 Id. at 265. 
21 Id. at 253. 
22 Id. at 263. 
23 Id. at 267. 
24 Id. at 263. 
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insanity, physiognomic judgments), with disappointing results for risk 
classification."&  But in the end – and here is the twist wrought by the 
numbered conception of life – there was always the law of large numbers.  
Medicine might take pains to sniff out pathology in applicants, but as 
numbered lives, those applicants were often normal enough to be 
insurable."'  Doctors had arrived at the actuaries’ starting point:  “the future 
could be predicted only for aggregate populations and never for 
individuals.”"(  This nuanced story of medical thinking, counterposed to 
statistical thinking, showcases Alborn’s typology of “lives” to full effect, 
so much that it is hard to imagine how we have been able to talk about life 
insurance at all without it up until now. 
And how do we talk about life insurance, or insurance more 
generally? Metonym is central to the language of insurance, beginning with 
its key term, risk.  While risk’s literal meaning is the possibility of loss, it is 
just as often used figuratively to signify the insured:  not the actual risk 
itself, but the individual associated with risk.")  Nowhere is this semantic 
slippage more arresting than in life insurance.  Lives in this specialized 
context is a reduction of “life” in the sense we ordinarily intend it, a boiling 
down of the “noble self” of personhood into the “six sheets of paper” that 
interest the insurer."*  Whatever the ordinary meaning of this most 
expansive word, anyone not habituated to the language of insurance would 
likely find the industry’s references to “lives” jarring.  Imagine what an 
individual might consider to be “prerequisites for ‘a model life’” and 
compare it to this 1861 medical advisor’s list:  “absence of scars or 
hoarseness, a capacious and symmetrical chest, and ‘equable’ pulse, and ‘a 
considerable warmth to the skin.’”#+  As one Victorian novelist voiced 
through a character, nothing could be “more likely to destroy natural 
feeling . . . than to sit down with strangers and reduce his life to the 
measure of an insurance table,”#! 
Alborn adopts the industry-wide usage of “lives,” and while he 
does not address this aspect of insurance rhetoric outright, he seems to put %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
25 Id. at 227. 
26 Id. at 312. 
27 Id. at 270. 
28 BAKER,  supra note 11, at 2. 
29 For a colorful quotation comparing life insurance underwriting to boiling 
down beef into broth, see Alborn, supra note 1, at 220. 
30 Id. at 269. 
31 Id. at 147 (citing Edward G. Bulwer-Lytton, My Novel, 72 BLACKWOOD’S 
MAG. 53-54 (1852)). 
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the tension between it and a more ordinary meaning of “life” in play, and 
playfully so, on the book’s cover.  “Regulated Lives,” on its own might 
suggest to a bookstore browser an account of the ways that the activities of 
living are governed.  But quite the opposite of activity is the focus of life 
insurance, which might at least as accurately have been termed “death 
insurance.”#"  Not only does the title put a twist on “life” as we know it, it 
sets up an ambiguity in and on the book’s terms.  We may read these plural 
lives as those belonging to the Victorians themselves,## or as the four 
conceptual categories (the four “lives”) that organize this history and that, 
in a sense, regulate one another.    
Thus the word “life” has many lives in this book, depending on 
which strand of modernity we are tracing.   Sympathetic lives are lives 
entrusted to insurers.  Numbered lives are counted lives and measured 
lives, with longer lives subsidizing shorter lives, or else ominously logged 
in a Registry of Declined Lives.  Medicalized lives are screened lives, 
healthy lives, hazardous lives, or lives “looking sickly and indifferent.”  
And commodified lives are marginal, good, select, under-average, first 
class or doubtful, and lives that sometimes lapse (which of course does not 
entail death; rather, they just fade away and fail to pay premiums).  It 
seems the one thing that lives are not, or at least not with any salience, is 
lived.   
Through its typology of life-senses, Regulated Lives casts 
insurance as a technology that slices up the meaning of “life” and 
recombines the conceptual strands into new forms – a semiotic, nineteenth-
century tranching and bundling of sorts.  There is something 
psychologically odd about life insurance, though, that complexity alone 
does not capture.  In order to insure our lives we must contemplate death . . 
. for the purpose of not having to think about the ramifications of death.  In 
contemplating, we overcome denial of death’s inevitability and 
unpredictability, yet we insure precisely in order to deny death its full 
force, to bring some of death’s aftermath into check.  In the final pages of 
Regulated Lives, Alborn captures the paradox of life insurance in the darkly 
incisive musings of Gregory, the insurance clerk in Julian Barnes’s novel, 
Staring at the Sun:  “[W]hen it came down to it, what people were trying to 
do was get the best deal they could out of being dead . . . Even those who 
admitted that they themselves would not actually get the money could still 
be entranced by the transaction.”#$  Gregory concludes of insureds that %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
32 ALBORN, supra note 1, at 163. 
33 See id. at 7 (“Yet the regulated lives who bought insurance policies . . . .”). 
34 Id. at 311 (citing JULIAN BARNES, STARING AT THE SUN 110-11 (1986)).   
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“when departing, they struck the best deal they could.  How strange.  How 
admirable, he supposed, but how strange.”#& This strangeness is what many 
of us find fascinating about life insurance, and about this book.  Perhaps it 
derives from the fact that, no matter which strand of its meaning we are 
tracing, we are always looking at the death side of life. 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
35 Id. 
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For outsiders, perhaps it is the historian’s relationship to the 
particular that epitomizes the discipline and frames our expectations as 
readers.  To mine boundless archival sources for shards of a story, and to 
fashion those odd individual shapes into a coherent one among many 
possible narratives -- this speaks to an intellectual calm beyond the reach of 
most of us.  Delivering on this expectation, Timothy Alborn’s Regulated 
Lives:  Life Insurance and British Society, 1800-1912 tells a story of a 
little-understood institution’s path into modernity, assembled of well-
chosen detail on a foundation of comprehensive research.!   Importantly, 
Alborn’s excavation of Victorian life insurance fills gaps in business 
history.  But its most surprising feature, one that readers glimpse just a few 
pages into the book, is the sweep of its conceptual departure point:  the 
meaning of life.  And not just one meaning, but four distinct 
conceptualizations of modern life – as he terms them:  the sympathetic, the 
numbered, the medicalized, and the commodified life" -- that Alborn argues 
evolved during the Victorian era and are uniquely merged in the institution 
of life insurance.#   
A preliminary project of Alborn’s book is to name and strain out 
these life-dimensions, in something like the way a prism takes in white 
light and separates it into a spectrum.$  He then shows how those bands 
came to be braided together, each one developing alongside and in tension 
with the others as they shaped Victorian life insurance and in turn were %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
! Visiting Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.  I am 
grateful to the University of Connecticut’s Insurance Law Center and Pat McCoy 
in particular for the opportunity to share perspectives on Regulated Lives with 
Sharon Murphy, Geoff Clark, and Tom Baker, with Peter Kochenburger 
moderating the discussion with his usual expertise and generosity.  I owe much to 
Susan Schmeiser for teaching me how to read more smartly and sensitively.  
Finally, many thanks are due Tim Alborn for giving us this important, lovingly 
crafted book to convene around and celebrate.  
1 TIMOTHY ALBORN, REGULATED LIVES:  LIFE INSURANCE AND BRITISH 
SOCIETY, 1800-1914 (2008). 
2 Id. at 7. 
3 Id. at 7-13.   
4 This metaphor is borrowed from the author, who uses it to depict the 
fragmentary nature of modernity and its resistance to being folded into grand 
narrative without stranding or jettisoning facts that do not follow its plot.  Id. at 
296-97. 
440 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL    [Vol. 16:2 
 
shaped by that institution as a producer of culture.   As this express project 
of the book unfolds, a parallel, subtler plot of sorts develops at a linguistic 
level.  In breaking out a typology of “lives,” the author calls into service a 
figure of speech that is ubiquitous in life insurance and in insurance in 
general:  metonymy, the non-literal use of a word to represent an associated 
concept.&  “Lives,” in the parlance of insurance, is nearly always shorthand 
for something associated with lives:  e.g., policy holders, policies, bodies, 
medical subjects, breadwinners, health states, predictions of longevity, and, 
of course, deaths.  In Regulated Lives, Alborn’s multiple meanings of “life” 
both complicate and organize the underlying, undifferentiated metonym in 
ways that mirror certain strange and intriguing paradoxes inherent in life 
insurance.   
Among the fourfold typology of “lives,” we encounter first the 
sympathetic life.  Within this meaning, it is one’s contemplation of dying 
and leaving others destitute that is essential to the demand for life 
insurance,' and insurers aimed to generate a “sympathetic exchange” with 
the public.(  The more impersonal numbered life was the province of the 
actuary, who tabulated life expectancies and organized them into mortality 
tables.  This was the relatively easy task, at least as it reflected mortality for 
“healthy males,” but actuarial science was considerably more challenged to 
convert mortality statistics into meaningful risk categories.  While actuaries 
were zooming out from persons to numbers to norms (sometimes very far 
out, as when seeking in vain an ancient “law of mortality” in the early 
nineteenth century),) medical examiners were focusing closely on 
individual bodies.  In a break from therapeutic or investigative applications 
of medicine, they applied the latest science to scrutinize medicalized lives 
for signs of defect that would render them uninsurable.*  And finally, the 
development of these conceptual categories all took place within a 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
5 See MERRIAM-WEBSETER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 782 (11th ed. 2003).  
Examples of metonymy include “the crown” to represent a monarchy or 
“Hollywood” as a stand-in for the American entertainment industry.  See id.   
6 I mean here to refer to the demand for life insurance as an income substitute 
for the breadwinner-insured, as opposed to the class of debtor-insureds for whom 
life insurance was a condition of credit.  See ALBORN, supra note 1, at 136-37. 
7 Id. at 156 (citing ELAINE HADLEY, MELODRAMATIC TACTICS: 
THEATRICALIZED DISSENT IN THE ENGLISH MARKETPLACE, 1800-1885 30-31 
(1995). 
8 ALBORN, supra note 1, at 124.   
9 Id. at 205-51.   
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rationalizing market that equated mortality with money, giving us the 
commodified life.!+     
Anyone who doubts that these categories work beyond 
characterizing British life insurance should consider the recent public 
controversy over guidelines for breast cancer screening through 
mammography.!!  When a federally appointed medical advisory panel 
recommended delaying routine mammograms, citing a low likelihood that 
more aggressive screening would save lives in significant number,!" the 
ensuing public debate echoed the tensions that Alborn has identified, in 
another life-and-death context.  Both might be characterized as sympathy 
meets medicine meets math meets money.!# 
These four conceptualizations of life might appear to be 
interrelated as natural allies or rivals with their tensions following 
predictable plotlines.  Sympathy, for example, stands apart as humanizing 
life insurance, defining certain essential relations that must hold between 
the insurer and the insured (can the policyholder trust the insurer to be a 
surrogate breadwinner?) and between that insured and his dependants (is 
the policyholder sensitive enough to their plight to pay premiums for their 
benefit alone?).  Symbolized in literature by the Victorian deathbed,!$ the 
perspective of sympathy recognizes the policyholder as an individual with 
complex relationships and responsibilities, in contrast to the other three 
more objectifying dimensions.!&  And just as the deathbed motif has given 
way in to its contemporary equivalent, the hospital bed, we might anticipate 
a story of life insurance’s “softer feelings” losing ground to the cold 
rationality of the mortality table or the scrutiny of the medical examination 
table.   
A more complex dynamic emerges in Regulated Lives, however, 
notably in the chapter on the gatekeeping practices, by which insurers 
excluded or charged higher premiums based on risk.  Insurers in the early 
to mid-nineteenth century screened applicants based on interviews, 
referrals, and a proposal form.!'  Early gatekeeping was largely %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
10 Id. at 181.   
11 TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 158-59 (2d. ed. 2008). 
12 Id. 
13 For commentary on the controversy over mammograms see, e.g., Kevin 
Sack, Screening Debate Reveals Culture Clash in Medicine, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 
2009, at A1. 
14 ALBORN, supra note 1, at 149. 
15 See ALBORN, supra note 1, at 156. 
16 Id. at 232. 
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interpersonal, intuitive, and trust-based; in other words, “intimate but 
unreliable.”!(  With a widening market, a burgeoning field of diagnostic 
medicine, and growing mistrust of the truthfulness of applicants, insurers 
by 1900 had come to rely chiefly on medical examinations to police 
adverse selection.!)  A triumph for the medicalized conception of life?  Not 
so fast.  The indignity of the medical exam made it unpopular with 
consumers and sales agents alike.!*  Products that dispensed with the exam 
gained favor in the early 1900s, striking a blow for sympathy as mediated 
through the market.    
Another surprising relationship emerges in the tension between 
numbered and medicalized conceptions of life, two dimensions of science 
that appear from a distance to reinforce each other.  Starting from the 
baseline of confident mortality tables, it seemed to insurers that diagnostic 
medicine could be brought into the service of actuarial science.  Medicine 
held the prospect of refining the sweepingly general mortality statistics by 
introducing meaningful risk categories.  Once having identified the markers 
of mortality, the medical gaze could be trained on the individual body in 
order to screen out or rate up “inferior lives,” or so insurers hoped.   
But bodies do not give up “Fate’s secrets”"+ easily, we learn, either 
individually or in the aggregate.  This was true in two senses.  First, being 
“poked and prodded” made people uneasy enough when undertaken by an 
attending physician for the purpose of treatment; swapping the attendant 
with the “medical police”"! and replacing therapy with evaluation only 
made the scrutiny more objectionable.  Second, many features that were 
deemed abnormal (e.g., a lanky build,"" albumin in the urine,"# etc.) turned 
out to be of little use as predictors of mortality.  It made sense that insurers 
screened for lung problems in a period of rampant tuberculosis, but even 
some of this attention was misplaced, as when insurers took chest 
circumference and breathing capacity as a measure of respiratory health."$  
Much of Victorian gatekeeping of the medicalized life calls to mind the 
saw of “looking for one’s lost keys under the lamppost”:  insurers tended to 
collect information on deviance that was easy to detect (e.g., epilepsy, %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
17 Id. at 241.   
18 Id. at 245. 
19 Id.  
20 Id. at 265. 
21 Id. at 253. 
22 Id. at 263. 
23 Id. at 267. 
24 Id. at 263. 
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insanity, physiognomic judgments), with disappointing results for risk 
classification."&  But in the end – and here is the twist wrought by the 
numbered conception of life – there was always the law of large numbers.  
Medicine might take pains to sniff out pathology in applicants, but as 
numbered lives, those applicants were often normal enough to be 
insurable."'  Doctors had arrived at the actuaries’ starting point:  “the future 
could be predicted only for aggregate populations and never for 
individuals.”"(  This nuanced story of medical thinking, counterposed to 
statistical thinking, showcases Alborn’s typology of “lives” to full effect, 
so much that it is hard to imagine how we have been able to talk about life 
insurance at all without it up until now. 
And how do we talk about life insurance, or insurance more 
generally? Metonym is central to the language of insurance, beginning with 
its key term, risk.  While risk’s literal meaning is the possibility of loss, it is 
just as often used figuratively to signify the insured:  not the actual risk 
itself, but the individual associated with risk.")  Nowhere is this semantic 
slippage more arresting than in life insurance.  Lives in this specialized 
context is a reduction of “life” in the sense we ordinarily intend it, a boiling 
down of the “noble self” of personhood into the “six sheets of paper” that 
interest the insurer."*  Whatever the ordinary meaning of this most 
expansive word, anyone not habituated to the language of insurance would 
likely find the industry’s references to “lives” jarring.  Imagine what an 
individual might consider to be “prerequisites for ‘a model life’” and 
compare it to this 1861 medical advisor’s list:  “absence of scars or 
hoarseness, a capacious and symmetrical chest, and ‘equable’ pulse, and ‘a 
considerable warmth to the skin.’”#+  As one Victorian novelist voiced 
through a character, nothing could be “more likely to destroy natural 
feeling . . . than to sit down with strangers and reduce his life to the 
measure of an insurance table,”#! 
Alborn adopts the industry-wide usage of “lives,” and while he 
does not address this aspect of insurance rhetoric outright, he seems to put %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
25 Id. at 227. 
26 Id. at 312. 
27 Id. at 270. 
28 BAKER,  supra note 11, at 2. 
29 For a colorful quotation comparing life insurance underwriting to boiling 
down beef into broth, see Alborn, supra note 1, at 220. 
30 Id. at 269. 
31 Id. at 147 (citing Edward G. Bulwer-Lytton, My Novel, 72 BLACKWOOD’S 
MAG. 53-54 (1852)). 
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the tension between it and a more ordinary meaning of “life” in play, and 
playfully so, on the book’s cover.  “Regulated Lives,” on its own might 
suggest to a bookstore browser an account of the ways that the activities of 
living are governed.  But quite the opposite of activity is the focus of life 
insurance, which might at least as accurately have been termed “death 
insurance.”#"  Not only does the title put a twist on “life” as we know it, it 
sets up an ambiguity in and on the book’s terms.  We may read these plural 
lives as those belonging to the Victorians themselves,## or as the four 
conceptual categories (the four “lives”) that organize this history and that, 
in a sense, regulate one another.    
Thus the word “life” has many lives in this book, depending on 
which strand of modernity we are tracing.   Sympathetic lives are lives 
entrusted to insurers.  Numbered lives are counted lives and measured 
lives, with longer lives subsidizing shorter lives, or else ominously logged 
in a Registry of Declined Lives.  Medicalized lives are screened lives, 
healthy lives, hazardous lives, or lives “looking sickly and indifferent.”  
And commodified lives are marginal, good, select, under-average, first 
class or doubtful, and lives that sometimes lapse (which of course does not 
entail death; rather, they just fade away and fail to pay premiums).  It 
seems the one thing that lives are not, or at least not with any salience, is 
lived.   
Through its typology of life-senses, Regulated Lives casts 
insurance as a technology that slices up the meaning of “life” and 
recombines the conceptual strands into new forms – a semiotic, nineteenth-
century tranching and bundling of sorts.  There is something 
psychologically odd about life insurance, though, that complexity alone 
does not capture.  In order to insure our lives we must contemplate death . . 
. for the purpose of not having to think about the ramifications of death.  In 
contemplating, we overcome denial of death’s inevitability and 
unpredictability, yet we insure precisely in order to deny death its full 
force, to bring some of death’s aftermath into check.  In the final pages of 
Regulated Lives, Alborn captures the paradox of life insurance in the darkly 
incisive musings of Gregory, the insurance clerk in Julian Barnes’s novel, 
Staring at the Sun:  “[W]hen it came down to it, what people were trying to 
do was get the best deal they could out of being dead . . . Even those who 
admitted that they themselves would not actually get the money could still 
be entranced by the transaction.”#$  Gregory concludes of insureds that %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
32 ALBORN, supra note 1, at 163. 
33 See id. at 7 (“Yet the regulated lives who bought insurance policies . . . .”). 
34 Id. at 311 (citing JULIAN BARNES, STARING AT THE SUN 110-11 (1986)).   
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“when departing, they struck the best deal they could.  How strange.  How 
admirable, he supposed, but how strange.”#& This strangeness is what many 
of us find fascinating about life insurance, and about this book.  Perhaps it 
derives from the fact that, no matter which strand of its meaning we are 
tracing, we are always looking at the death side of life. 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
35 Id. 
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REVIEW OF TIMOTHY ALBORN’S  
REGULATED LIVES  
 
Sharon Murphy* 
 
 
One of the most important recurring themes in Timothy 
Alborn’s Regulated Lives: Life Insurance and British Society, 1800-
1914 is the idea of Victorian gatekeeping, meaning the use of 
application forms, statistical tables, and medical exams to carefully 
select only those lives that conformed to a company or industry-
defined standard norm.1  As Alborn demonstrates, this process of 
determining who would be permitted to join a company’s pool of 
policyholders and at what rate of premium was fraught with anxiety 
not only for the applicant, but likewise for the medical doctors, sales 
agents, and company directors, each of whom had a stake in the 
success or failure of the gatekeeping process.2  Yet while individual 
decisions regarding individual lives by individual actors were the 
public face of gatekeeping, the process was ultimately based on the 
definition of a standard normal life in the aggregate.  In order both to 
reduce underwriting individual lives with an unacceptably higher 
than average probability of mortality and to set accurate premium 
rates, companies first had to determine average mortality rates for 
their target clientele.3  Ironically, for an industry dependent on 
actuarial tables during an era when statistical knowledge reigned 
supreme, numbers proved to be the Achilles’ heel for life insurers.  
Victorian gatekeeping publicly promised a rational, scientifically-
based classification of lives, yet privately delivered little more than 
educated guesswork with the hope that future mortality would not 
prove their estimations to be woefully inadequate.4 
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1 See, e.g., TIMOTHY ALBORN, REGULATED LIVES: LIFE INSURANCE AND 
BRITISH SOCIETY 1800-1914 220 (2009). 
2 Id. at 238-39. 
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4 Id. at 128, 130. 
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The nature of all insurance enterprises is spreading risk 
across a large group of people.  Thus, the key to operating a 
successful, profitable insurance company is to accurately assess the 
overall risk of the entire pool of policyholders, and then to set 
premium rates which reflect that level of risk.  But, as Alborn 
demonstrates, this was a particularly vexing problem for British life 
insurers.  Not only was the process of determining average mortality 
much more complex than it might initially appear, but that process 
was further confounded by the difficulty of deciding whose mortality 
was relevant for compiling those tables: which people actually 
belonged to this group of people interested in spreading risks among 
themselves.5  If companies could assume that everyone would 
purchase a life insurance policy, then this problem of determining a 
predicted mortality experience would be greatly simplified, since it 
would be based on the mortality of the population as a whole.  Yet in 
reality, not everyone desired insurance (at least not at first), and 
companies initially sought to underwrite only the least risky lives.6  
Insurers thus needed to calculate tables based on the expected 
mortality experience of their target clientele. And whereas predicting 
mortality rates for the overall population was a difficult task, gauging 
the future mortality of a significant subset was especially daunting, 
not least because the attributes of this group were endlessly shifting.  
On the micro level, membership within the target risk pool 
was subject to continuous change.7  Insurers had to face the problem 
of trying to guarantee that new individuals who joined the group did 
not unfavorably impact the aggregate risk profile of the body of 
policyholders.8  If a company was excessively selective in accepting 
policyholders, it would be in danger of having insufficient lives 
across whom to spread the risk adequately.  Additionally, an overly 
restrictive target group would limit the firm’s ability to increase its 
market share in the future.  Yet by defining the parameters of the 
target group more broadly, companies would require even more 
precise knowledge of each additional applicant to ensure that the 
                                                                                                                 
5 Id. at 113. 
6 Id. at 4. 
7 See, e.g., ALBORN, supra note 1, at 33-42. 
8 Id. at 220-21, 271-73. 
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clientele was not being drawn primarily from the least favorable 
portion of the potential risk pool.9  Likewise, as companies and the 
industry inevitably tried to expand the life insurance market, by 
necessity they would need to start accepting less desirable lives.  
Thus, the industry needed a way to select the best lives (i.e., those 
predicted to live the longest among their peers), and then decide how 
to treat other applicants who failed to meet this highest of 
standards.10  This is where Alborn’s gatekeeping – the personal 
assessment of individual risks – became so crucial. 
Unfortunately, shifting parameters for the target risk pool was 
not the only hurdle in the development of accurate mortality tables.11  
Companies were trying to make predictions about mortality twenty, 
thirty, even forty years into the future, yet external factors impacting 
expected mortality on the macro level were likewise in rapid flux 
during the nineteenth century.  For example, urbanization facilitated 
the spread of disease, industrialization enlarged the number of 
hazardous occupations, and transportation innovations encouraged 
travel to less salubrious climates; all of these factors increased 
mortality rates among certain populations.  On the other hand, 
improvements in medical knowledge and medical care, better 
sanitation, access to fresh foods, etc., were lowering mortality rates 
for another subset of the population.  Yet these factors did not merely 
cancel each other out; rather, they impacted different segments of the 
population to differing degrees, making calculations of future 
mortality a constantly moving target. 
Therefore, the very first problem which life insurers needed 
to work out was the computation of accurate mortality tables, and 
what is most important to note here is the amount of sheer guesswork 
involved in this endeavor throughout the nineteenth century.12  Yet, 
at the same time, the entire industry was founded upon the premise 
that mortality was governed by scientific laws which were easily 
accessed and understood by the trained company actuary.13 Firms 
                                                                                                                 
9 Id. at 220-21. 
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11 See, e.g., id. at 104-05. 
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assured the public that they could accurately predict how many 
people of a given age would die in a given year, so by purchasing 
insurance, the policyholder was merely spreading the risk of his or 
her individual death across the aggregate of people of the same age.14  
Life insurance advertisements and sales agents were thus adamant 
that life insurance was not a matter of gambling, and they pointed to 
countless tables of data to buttress this assertion.15 
Despite their public assertions to the contrary, insurance 
executives throughout the nineteenth century were never certain that 
they had the right statistical foundation for their premium rates.16  
They suspected that the available tables based on whole population 
data greatly overstated mortality.17  Not only did these tables include 
many low-income individuals for whom mortality was higher than 
average, but they also did not take into account the rigorous selection 
process of insurers.18  Yet tables based purely on a company’s past 
experience (so-called select life tables) were likewise plagued with 
problems.  In an industry making predictions over the long term, 
most companies were too young to draw accurate conclusions from 
their limited experience.  Although industry executives understood 
that the benefits of careful medical selection were short-lived, most 
of the policies available for use in a select life table were recently 
acquired and thus still benefitting from that selection advantage.  
Finally, the crafting of a select life table based on past experience 
assumed that all future applicants would be similarly selected, and 
that it would not be necessary for the firm to loosen its selection 
criteria in attempting to increase its market share.  One potential 
solution to this problem would be to adopt an overly-conservative 
table, returning the excess as bonuses to policyholders in mutual 
companies or as dividends to stockholders.  Yet this option would 
open the door to cut-rate competition from companies employing 
more liberal tables.  Additionally, many companies sold both life 
insurance and life annuities; an overly-conservative mortality 
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schedule would wreak havoc on the annuity business even as it 
guaranteed the safety of the insurance line. 
By the second half of the nineteenth century, life insurers 
(working mainly through the professional organization for British 
actuaries) would agree upon a table that they believed would serve as 
an acceptable basis for the selection process.19  Based on the 
combined experiences of twenty major life insurance offices, this 
“Healthy Males” table suffered from many of the same shortcomings 
as other select life tables.20  Yet because it was so widely adopted 
within the industry, it set the standard for the expected mortality of 
healthy males at a given age21 (lessening the problem of cut-rate 
competition)22. All insurance applicants would now be judged based 
on their predicted adherence to this norm.23  As data continued to 
accumulate,  applicants once denied coverage for falling outside the 
acceptable risk pool were now embraced,  And as mortality risks 
shifted, these tables would be repeatedly revised over the remainder 
of the century.24  While the Healthy Males table was still imperfect, 
by working together as an industry insurers were finally able to 
achieve a reasonably accurate mortality table on which to base their 
decisions.25  
Of course, in setting the standard normal life of a healthy 
male, firms still needed to decide who fit that standard and  how to 
deal with applicants falling outside of this category such as women, 
less than perfectly healthy males, or people exposed to greater 
mortality risks due to a dangerous occupation, residence in an 
unhealthy climate, or hazardous travel. Thus, even the compilation of 
a moderately-accurate mortality table did not eliminate the necessity 
of Victorian gatekeeping.26  Gender, occupation, or travel were all 
factors which companies could identify with relative ease, choosing 
either to reject the applicant outright or add a surcharge to the risk 
                                                                                                                 
19 ALBORN, supra note 1, at 113. 
20 Id. at 113-14. 
21 Id. at 115. 
22 Id. at 103. 
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452 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL       [Vol.16:2        
 
(which, as Alborn points out, was often based more on the maximum 
that the market could bear rather than an accurate reflection of the 
nature of the risk).27  Health issues, on the other hand, were of the 
highest concern for the industry, and the greatest efforts at Victorian 
gatekeeping were devoted to uncovering hidden health problems.28  
British life insurers were obsessed with the possibility that applicants 
would engage in adverse selection.29  They feared that people with 
reason to believe their lives would fall short of the predicted 
longevity would be most likely to apply, and that the applicant would 
hide this information (either inadvertently or intentionally) from the 
company.30  
Just as companies struggled throughout the century to 
determine an accurate basis for their aggregate mortality tables, they 
likewise grappled with the problem of ascertaining the health risk 
posed by individual applicants.31  During the first half of the century, 
the main means of gatekeeping entailed health questions on an 
application form, the corroboration of these answers by reliable 
friends and medical attendants, and a personal appearance before the 
board of directors.32  However, each of these means contained 
serious drawbacks.  As companies extended their reach beyond the 
metropole, it became increasingly difficult for the board to 
personally examine each applicant or to judge the reliability of 
witnesses.33  Additionally, doctors began demanding payment for 
their services34, yet their observations were likely to be biased in 
favor of their patients.35 
Finally, the application form depended first and foremost on 
the honesty of the applicant (“has the applicant ever spit blood?”).36  
Yet even when the policyholder had been completely forthcoming, 
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29 Id. at 221. 
30 Id. at 220-23. 
31 See ALBORN, supra note 1, at 220. 
32 Id., at 224-32. 
33 Id.  at 232, 237. 
34 Id. at 222. 
35 Id. at 232. 
36 Id. at 224-25. 
2010] BOOK REVIEW: REGULATED LIVES               453  
 
he or she may have had an underlying medical issue that was as of 
yet undetected, or a seemingly innocuous symptom that the applicant 
failed to associate with a larger medical problem.37  The desire to 
ensure that all policyholders conformed to the “healthy male” 
standard set in the tables drove companies to construct ever more 
complicated questionnaires, demanding that applicants respond to 
multiple queries about numerous specific ailments or symptoms, as 
well as providing a detailed family history.38  
The gatekeeping of the application form was then reinforced 
with a more robust medical examination.39 Rather than relying on the 
information provided by personal doctors, companies began hiring 
physicians to conduct detailed screenings of all applicants.40  In order 
to facilitate comparisons across applicants and medical personnel, 
these exams became increasingly routinized.41  Once again, 
companies sought to statistically define what constituted normal 
characteristics for their standard healthy male.42  By setting 
parameters for acceptable height, weight, pulse, blood pressure, etc., 
life insurers exuded confidence that they understood the statistical 
impact of these factors on their standard normal life – and then could 
adjust rates accordingly for those who fell outside these parameters.43  
Yet as had been the case with the creation of mortality tables, these 
guidelines were of necessity a combination of sound medical 
knowledge and educated guesswork.44  In attempting to numerically 
define and categorize applicants, firms repeatedly found their efforts 
thwarted by the uniqueness of individual lives. 
In placing so much confidence in the accuracy and objectivity 
of statistics, life insurers were part of a much larger nineteenth-
century phenomenon.  As Geoffrey Clark already mentioned, 
historians such as Patricia Cline Cohen (A Calculating People: The 
Spread of Numeracy in Early America. University of Chicago Press, 
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1982), Theodore M. Porter (The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 1820-
1900. Princeton University Press, 1986), and Lorraine Daston (in The 
Probabilistic Revolution. Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Press, 1990) have all documented a rapid increase in the use and 
acceptance of statistics in daily life during the early decades of the 
nineteenth century.  On both sides of the Atlantic, people were 
becoming more numerically literate and they increasingly associated 
data with objective truths, subjecting to quantification not just 
economic questions but civic, social, and moral issues as well.  For 
the life insurance industry, a statistical understanding of the factors 
contributing to mortality would not only ensure the long-term 
viability of the industry but would create confidence among the 
general public that life insurance premiums were based on 
scientifically sound principles and not merely a matter of chance.  
Yet their search for statistical surety was, of necessity, elusive. 
Regulated Lives reflects not only the nineteenth-century obsession 
with numbers and calculation but, more importantly, underscores the 
messiness and contingency inherent in that compilation of “objective 
truth.”  
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Readers of this journal are likely to be more familiar with the legal 
doctrines pertaining to contemporary insurance practice than they are with 
the scholarly roots of Timothy Alborn’s Regulated Lives: Life Insurance 
and British Society, 1800-1914.1  This essay is meant to provide some 
historiographical context in order that readers may appreciate the full 
measure of Alborn’s achievements in this book. 
Regulated Lives is the latest arrival on a tide of historical and 
sociological research into insurance appearing in the last 25 years or so.  
Although numerous smaller tributaries may be identified, two major 
streams of scholarship have led to these studies into the social and cultural 
history insurance.  The first of these is the company history, a work 
typically commissioned by a firm’s directors to celebrate the passing of a 
noteworthy milestone.  All too often, especially among the older sort, these 
histories are cast in a heroic Victorian mold, featuring as dramatis 
personae the “Great Men” who stood at the company’s helm, steadfastly 
navigating stormy and shark-filled waters to make their sesqui- or 
bicentennial ports.  Gratifying tales of profit and endurance for the stock-
holders and employees who must have comprised the main readership of 
these volumes, but their aims usually did not reach beyond chronicling the 
progress of the firm and celebrating its success.  
This is not to denigrate some really first-rate company histories 
written by outstanding historians that have documented the rise of the 
British insurance business over the past 300 years, works like P. G. M. 
Dickson’s The Sun Insurance Office (1960)2, Barry Supple’s Royal 
Exchange Assurance (1970)3, and Clive Trebilcock’s Phoenix Assurance 
(1985)4.  But even the best of them, as Alborn himself phrases it, mainly 
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adopt the perspective of the board room.5  The problem is not just that the 
histories of remarkably successful firms must inevitably have a whiggish 
whiff.  It is also, and more importantly, that while the companies portrayed 
in these accounts may suffer boardroom clashes, recalcitrant sales staffs, or 
the usual interdepartmental rivalries, the fundamental unit of analysis 
remains the firm as a monolithic entity.  This perspective was adopted even 
by older general histories like Harold Raynes’ History of British Insurance 
(1964)6, which narrate a story largely bounded by the field lines of 
company entrepreneurship, technical innovation, and state regulation. 
One of the achievements of Alborn’s book is to show at a much 
finer level of detail that the nineteenth-century British insurance business 
was internally driven by different constituencies working to some extent at 
cross-purposes because they attributed to their customers different 
ontological or aesthetic meanings: they were sympathetic subjects to the 
pitch men, forensic puzzles to medical examiners, numerical data to the 
actuaries, and commodities to the ledger-keepers and stockholders.7  And 
not all of these terms could dovetail into a consistent and cohesive, to say 
nothing of coercive, address to the insured subject.  As a result, Alborn 
presents a view of the nineteenth-century insurance firm as pluralistic in its 
organization and at times internally divided in its goals, and therefore 
incapable of formulating and enforcing the micro-strategies of control 
imagined by Michel Foucault and the acolytes of “governmentality.”8 
The second major stream of scholarship leading to Regulated Lives 
and other recent studies of insurance flows from the history and philosophy 
of science literature on the emergence of probabilistic thinking, the 
development of statistical analysis, and the strikingly obsessive and 
pervasive reference to number as a legitimating authority in the modern 
world.  Prominent among researchers in this field are the philosopher Ian 
Hacking and historians of science Ted Porter and Lorraine Daston, who are 
concerned with describing the epochal mental and intellectual 
transformations that were associated with reconceptualizations of chance, 
mathematics, and reason from the seventeenth through the twentieth 
centuries.9  Although this body of scholarship is impressive in its ambition 
                                                                                                                                      
5 ALBORN, supra note 1, at 13-14. 
6 HAROLD E. RAYNES, A HISTORY OF BRITISH INSURANCE (2nd ed. 1964). 
7 ALBORN, supra note 1, at 7-13. 
8 Id. at 7. 
9 See IAN HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
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1820-1900 (photo. reprint 1988) (1986); LORRAINE DASTON & MICHAEL STOLLEIS, 
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and scope, and while it has greatly influenced researchers in a variety of 
fields, its preoccupation with seismic shifts in the history of ideas 
inevitably give short shrift to the nitty-gritty details of how, and to what 
extent, probabilism and statistical technique were absorbed into what 
Daston refers to as “the practice of risk” in her seminal Classical 
Probability in the Enlightenment (1988).10  But it is worth noting that it was 
only at the urging of the distinguished historian of science Charles 
Gillespie, who thought her initial draft too absorbed in theory in her book, 
that Daston added a chapter on the concrete application of probability 
theory to risk-taking and insurance. 
We have then in these two scholarly streams the truffle-hunting 
company historians narrowly focused on the fortunes of the firm, and the 
parachutist intellectual historians attentive to shifting conceptual 
landscapes but less adept at tracing the details of how probability and 
statistics were translated into practical activity.  The recent wave of 
insurance histories has sought to bridge this gap between the aerialists and 
the troglodytes by joining business and economic history with social and 
cultural history.  Regulated Lives stakes out this new ground for the period 
in which Britain’s life insurance industry grew to maturity.  It stands 
alongside Robin Pearson’s Insuring the Industrial Revolution: Fire 
Insurance in Great Britain, 1700-1850 (2004)11 and my own Betting on 
Lives: The Culture of Life Insurance in England, 1695-1775 (1999)12 in 
providing synthetic studies of the development of the British insurance 
market (in most respects the progenitor of the modern insurance business) 
while also teasing out the meanings of insurance to various market 
participants and in the culture at large.13 
In comparing my account of the early formation of the British 
insurance market in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with Alborn’s 
account of its subsequent development across the long nineteenth century, 
the continuities in business practice and culture are more striking than the 
dissimilarities.  This is a surprising result given the widely shared 
assumption by experts that the character of life insurance fundamentally 
                                                                                                                                      
NATURAL LAW AND LAWS OF NATURE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE: 
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11 ROBIN PEARSON, INSURING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: FIRE INSURANCE 
IN GREAT BRITAIN, 1700-1850 (2004). 
12 GEOFFREY CLARK, BETTING ON LIVES: THE CULTURE OF LIFE INSURANCE 
IN ENGLAND, 1695-1775 (1999). 
13 See ALBORN, supra note 1, at 7-13. 
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changed after the foundation, in 1762, of the Equitable Society (the first 
firm to issue sell “modern” age-based premium insurance) and the 
appearance of several imitators near the end of the eighteenth century.14  
Alborn shows that, despite refinements in actuarial knowledge, product 
design, marketing, and medical screening, in important respects the life 
insurance industry displayed the same tentative reliance on actuarial data 
and appealed to the same speculative tastes of its customers as it did in the 
previous century.15 
Nineteenth-century actuaries, for example, generated a succession 
of mortality tables that generally confirmed one another’s evaluations of 
the risk of death at specified ages – the risk of mortality, that is, among 
middle-class adult males, a group that actuaries established as a standard 
reference population.16  It had been obvious to Daniel Defoe as far back as 
the 1690s that other factors such as occupation or place of residence were 
likely to be at least as important as age in determining the likelihood of 
death.17  150 years later actuaries showed little inclination to compile 
mortality tables that quantified those risks or to calculate the mortality 
profile for “non-standard” populations like women or the working classes.18  
Instead, insurers resorted to other techniques for coping with increased 
quanta of risk (or at least the increased uncertainty of risk) posed by these 
groups.  One such method was termed “rating up” of under average lives, 
an intuitive procedure by which insurers notionally added some number of 
years to proposed lives that would compensate for their perceived 
deficiencies in health and habits from those of good male lives of the same 
age.19  In other words, insurers took their carefully calibrated demographic 
scales and then crudely pressed their thumbs down on one side in order to 
make them appear in balance. 
Another method of reckoning with demographic uncertainty 
involved the office of the marketer rather than the actuary.  Rather than 
investing the time and effort to attain systematic mortality data of select 
populations with differing demographic profiles, insurers cannily shunted 
higher-risk lives into endowment insurance or contingent debt policies, 
which provided a financial inducement to purchasers to live long.20  These 
                                                                                                                                      
14 CLARK, supra note 13, at 72; see also FREDERICK BLAYNEY, A PRACTICAL 
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15 See ALBORN, supra note 1, at 16. 
16 Id. at 9.    
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20 Id. at 195-96.  
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highly successful marketing devices transferred some demographic risk 
from the firm to the consumer, who effectively bet on his or her own 
longevity, a speculative atavism from eighteenth-century life insurance.21 
This speculative dimension of life insurance was also carried into 
the nineteenth century through the bonus system, another device popular 
with the public in which companies periodically distributed accumulated 
excess premiums among policyholders.22  The insurance bonus generated 
demand by giving life insurance the appearance of paying dividends in the 
medium term like other investments.23  It also reflected firms’ enduring 
caution in relying too heavily on actuarial data, and their corresponding 
conservatism in maintaining premiums above their true value, again, an 
approach characteristic of eighteenth-century life insurance companies.24 
A third noteworthy thread of continuity pertains to the medical 
screening of lives proposed for insurance.  The fact that insurers in the 
Victorian era ultimately limited their use of medical surveillance, 
acquiescing in the face of market competition to regard as acceptable lives 
deemed “normal enough,” recall the loose and intuitive (although 
admittedly less discriminating) classification of insurable lives in the 
eighteenth century as those drawn from a broadly defined prime of life and 
not obviously infirm or besotted.25 
One of those lives rejected by insurance offices belonged to Robert 
Louis Stevenson, whose “crazy health,” as he himself described it, made 
him absolutely uninsurable.26  (The offices proved right: he died aged 44.)27  
But Stevenson did live long enough to exact some literary revenge in a 
novella he wrote with Lloyd Osbourne titled The Wrong Box, , a comedy of 
errors about the maniacal winding up of a tontine.28  One of the book’s 
central characters is an insufferable pedant and middle-class improver 
named Joseph Finsbury, the author of several edifying essays including 
“‘Life Insurance Regarded in its Relation to the Masses’, read before the 
Working Men’s Mutual Improvement Society, Isle of Dogs, . . . [and ] 
received with a ‘literal ovation’ by an unintelligent audience of both 
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22 Id. at 166-69.  
23 Id. at 177-80. 
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sexes.”29  Stevenson’s caricature of the middle class’s moralistic 
condescension in recommending the manifold benefits of life insurance, as 
well as the working class’s uncomprehending assent to professional 
expertise and numerical authority, has a recognizable basis in Alborn’s 
description of the social dynamics of Victorian life insurance.30  Many 
companies – not least the growing cadre of “industrial” offices – moved 
down market to enlist the multitude of laboring families in the cause of 
financial improvement and social respectability.  Alborn also demonstrates 
that the mathematical basis of insurance – its legitimating scientific 
foundation – was roundly ignored by customers who were swayed much 
more by emotional appeals than by the calculus of mortality, whose 
authority they uncritically accepted.31  
Finally, Stevenson’s hilarious juxtaposition of Finsbury’s vaunting 
praise of life insurance with its tepid reception by his audience suggests 
something about the limitations of insurance to subject people’s lives to its 
manifold controls.32  Alborn not only describes the difficulty of bending all 
parts of the insurance bureaucracy towards a common goal, he observes 
that the objects of that bureaucratic control evaded or transcended the 
categories into which the insurance industry tried to place them.33  Despite 
the implication of its title, Regulated Lives is in fact an optimistic book.  
Optimistic, because it suggests that the widely feared totalizing capabilities 
of modern financial and bureaucratic institutions is exaggerated and that 
insurance companies, however grandiose their real or imagined ambitions, 
are too compromised from within and too vulnerable to rivals from without 
to exert too exact a control over our bodies and our lives.  This is an insight 
well worth celebrating, along with this superb book. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
29 Id. at 4-5.  
30 See ALBORN, supra note 1, at 193.  
31 Id. at 129. 
32 See STEVENSON AND OSBOURNE, supra note 29, at 33-34. 
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Timothy Alborn*!
 
 
To repeat one of the acknowledgements in my book, I wish to 
thank the University of Connecticut School of Law for so directly shaping 
the direction Regulated Lives took as it evolved over the past decade; and 
more specifically, in this case, for sponsoring such a stimulating (and 
flattering) discussion of my book earlier this year.  (That panel discussion, 
which was the genesis of the three reviews to which I’ve been asked to 
respond, also featured stimulating comments from Tom Baker and Patricia 
McCoy, the past and present directors of the Insurance Law Center.)  The 
privilege of responding to such incisive reviews accompanies several 
opportunities: to rethink imperfections in execution, to elaborate on some 
unfinished business, and to smuggle in a few historical “out-takes” that will 
assist me in carrying out the first two tasks. 
To start with the book’s title, Regulated Lives.  All three reviewers 
imply, more or less directly, that this title is not quite right, since the 
insured lives discussed therein were not quite regulated.  As Sharon 
Murphy points out, actuaries did not know as much as they often claimed 
regarding the statistical laws dictating morality; as Geoffrey Clark points 
out, medical screening techniques often had more in common with the 
eighteenth-century gatekeeping devices he describes in Betting on Lives 
than with obviously “modern” diagnostic methods; and as Jill Anderson 
points out, the title Regulated Lives implies a book about “the activities of 
living” but in fact contains a more ambiguous “typology of life-senses.”  
Sharon Murphy made a similar point more critically in her review of my 
book for EH.net: “the voice of the insuring consumer is largely absent, 
appearing only as reflected by the firms themselves.”" 
So is there a meaningful sense in which the lives discussed in this 
book (however they might have been defined) were regulated? I would 
argue that there is: namely, the large extent to which the various groups 
who were involved in the industry thought they were engaging in forms of 
regulation, and—even when they consciously fell short of their 
aspirations—kept trying to do so for most of the nineteenth century.  The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
* Timothy Alborn is a professor at the City University of New York, Lehman 
College, and is the author of Regulated Lives: Life Insurance and British Society 
1800-1914.  
1 Sharon Ann Murphy, review of TIMOTHY ALBORN, REGULATED 
LIVES: LIFE INSURANCE AND BRITISH SOCIETY, 1800-914, EH.net 
(http://eh.net/bookreviews/). 
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search for a hoped-for “law of mortality” lurked in actuarial papers into the 
1880s, and doctors continued to insist that their careful medical 
examinations were vital to the success of life insurance, in the face of 
mounting evidence that they made little difference.  In their persistent 
ambition to regulate their customers’ lives, the actuaries and doctors in my 
book represented a very significant break with Clark’s eighteenth-century 
actors. In the process, they contributed to an increasingly regulatory 
culture, albeit one whose reach has often been exaggerated. 
In the realm of statistics, a useful contrast can and should be drawn 
between eighteenth-century demographic thought, which (as Clark states in 
Betting on Lives) “did not possess the immediate and overwhelming 
persuasiveness that many historians have attributed to statistical 
knowledge” (118),# and a nineteenth-century belief in a “law of mortality” 
that hovered between religious faith and scientific certainty.  As Murphy 
points out, there was a wide gap between this belief and what was 
statistically possible for much of the century (although not as wide as she 
implies, since the tables they used adequately corrected for the inclusion of 
lower-income individuals). Some of this actuarial hubris derived from the 
training of nineteenth-century insurance technicians, which tended towards 
astronomy and mathematical physics: Augustus De Morgan and Benjamin 
Gompertz (to cite two examples) extended the order they saw in the 
heavens to the human populations who bought life insurance.  Some of it, 
as I point out in my book, derived from the marriage of convenience 
between this sincere form of certainty and the more dodgy variety 
expressed by salesmen, who were eager to use the scientific basis of life 
insurance to divert policyholders’ attention from the periodic waves of 
severe uncertainty that enveloped its financial side. 
Medical practice in the nineteenth century, especially prior to the 
“therapeutic revolution” just before the century’s end, fell famously short 
of what anyone would define as “modern medicine.”  Hence it comes as no 
surprise that medical surveillance in life insurance recalled what Clark calls 
the “loose and intuitive” methods of an earlier era.  Rather more surprising 
is the extent to which life insurance companies insisted on medical 
screening at all, given the discipline’s modest diagnostic capacity and the 
availability of actuarial fixes (endowment policies and contingent debt 
schemes) that rendered medical exams largely unnecessary.  An 
explanation for this puzzle, as Murphy implies, lies in the strange mixture 
of hubris and paranoia on the part of company directors. With prominent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 GEOFFREY CLARK, BETTING ON LIVES: THE CULTURE OF LIFE INSURANCE IN 
ENGLAND, 1695-1775, 118 (1999). 
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London physicians whispering in their ears, companies set in motion a 
proliferating arsenal of screening techniques between 1850 and 1920; at the 
same time, they never retreated from their conviction that adverse selection 
was a serious threat to their bottom line.  Here again, I would argue, we 
find a perverse desire to regulate (among doctors and directors alike) in the 
face of evidence that these regulatory devices accomplished little beyond 
scaring customers away. 
Insurance salesmen often appear in my story as policyholders’ 
allies, who deflected the regulatory urge of actuaries, doctors, and 
managers.  They not only played the role of friend to the insured, they often 
actually were friends of the insured—their wide circles of friends were why 
they got the job in the first place.  Hence we find them going to bat for 
policyholders to reduce extra premiums, settle contested claims, and 
otherwise soften the industry’s unbending façade.  What I would add to this 
story (and in keeping with my claim about a regulatory culture that 
pervaded Victorian Britain) is the sheer volume of oppressively hot air that 
these insurance agents added, bellows-like, to the Victorian tropes of 
domestic duty and sentimental morality.  Even though these salesmen 
mostly preached to the converted, their message—multiplied thousands of 
times over— added to a general Victorian culture that was ceaselessly 
intent on teaching people how to improve their lives.   
All this adds up to a distinctly regulatory culture in which the 
whole (what Clark calls “the widely feared totalizing capabilities of 
modern financial and bureaucratic institutions”) is often a good deal less 
than the sum of its parts.  One very good reason for this, as I emphasize in 
my book, was the fractured nature of expertise that comprises any 
regulatory regime.  The lives in my book achieved relative autonomy 
precisely because they were subject to regulation by so many different 
people.  If one doctor didn’t give candidates for insurance the answer they 
was looking for, they could try another down the street. If one company 
required a medical exam, would-be policyholders could try their luck with 
another that was willing to substitute a double-or-nothing bet for a safer, if 
more stringent, contract.  This range of choices yielded a paradox, which 
remains with us to this day in most avenues of modern life.  Trust in 
expertise has increased over time, in large part because consumers are able 
to choose which experts to trust.  For the same reason, trust in specific 
groups of experts has diminished: witness any opinion poll reporting trust 
in bankers, doctors, lawyers, and the like.  These are still regulated lives—
just not overweeningly so. 
For those who find this defense of my book’s title unconvincing, 
Jill Anderson has, at least, pointed to a possibly more accurate title waiting 
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in the wings: Meanings of Life.  Perhaps the least obvious meaning of life 
that I described in Regulated Lives, but the one that (as Anderson shrewdly 
observes) is at the core of life insurance, is life’s opposite—namely, death.  
Death, in more fancy terms, is life’s “other,” without which it would be 
hard to pin down what it means to us.  Anderson suggests that “we are 
always looking at the death side of life.” True enough, especially in 
reference to this book—but among the other services that the various 
meanings of life (commodification, medicalization, and so on) were called 
on to perform, one of the most important was their capacity for distancing 
the insured subject from having to tackle death head-on.  We can start with 
the obvious fact that the business is called life insurance, not death 
insurance; and that society appears to have moved from less to more 
euphemistic in this regard (sickness insurance has become health insurance, 
and fire insurance has become homeowners insurance). 
As one would expect, the commodification of life has always been 
a handy expedient for distracting policyholders from the fact of their 
ultimate demise, even as it deadens the activity of living.  Translating death 
into the prospect of financial reward performs the same basic alienating 
function that is performed by translating labor into wages.  Hence the 
policyholders in Staring at the Sun were “entranced by the transaction” 
whereby they got “the best deal out of being dead.”$  Here, in bold strokes 
suitable to the edgy late-twentieth century tone of the novel, is the essence 
of commodification, which is capable making death itself seem like an 
entrancing opportunity.  A Victorian take on the same phenomenon makes 
the strangeness of this process even clearer:  Elizabeth Gaskell, in 
describing the human scenery of Yorkshire for her biography of Charlotte 
Bronte, recounted that “West Riding men are sleuth-hounds in pursuit of 
money,” and demonstrated this axiom by referring to a small manufacturer 
who “fell ill of an acute disease” shortly after buying an insurance policy.  
When a doctor informed him of his “hopeless state,” the man jumped for 
joy, exclaiming: “By jingo!... I shall do the insurance company! I always 
was a lucky fellow!”%  
Here we have a nice illustration of what Clark calls “a speculative 
atavism from eighteenth-century insurance”; though why we should think 
of it as atavistic puzzles me, since speculation never disappeared as the 
lifeblood of the financial industry.  But Victorians had their limits, as well. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 See TIMOTHY ALBORN, REGULATED LIVES: LIFE INSURANCE AND BRITISH 
SOCIETY 1800-1914 311 (2009). 
4 ELIZABETH GASKELL, THE LIFE OF CHARLOTTE BRONTE, 18 (Penguin Books, 
1997). 
2010] AUTHOR RESPONSE: REGULATED LIVES!!!!!!!!!!!! 465!
 
In this context it’s worth lingering a bit longer on Clark’s example of The 
Wrong Box, which he uses to illustrate the revenge of the uninsurable (in 
this case the sickly Robert Louis Stevenson).  Victorian critics vilified the 
book—not because it poked fun at the middle-class moralism associated 
with life insurance, but because Stevenson refused to deviate sufficiently 
from death. The book’s sense of humor, according to one typical review, 
was “revolting when one stays to consider for a moment its nauseating 
subject—a corpse left unburied and unembalmed for several days, and 
hustled here and there!” The reviewer concluded that “the whole book is in 
unpardonably bad taste; its decency is less than the decency of savages.”&  
The balancing act between speculative allusions to death and “savage 
decency” was one of the many fine lines life insurance companies needed 
to walk in the nineteenth century. Viewed from a wider angle, the tension 
between selling a sense of security and anticipating misfortune has 
remained central to all forms of insurance down to the present time. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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   INTO THE UNKNOWN: 
      THE REACH OF ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE IN CASES 
 
Caroline Vazquez! 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Brownfields are the next development frontier in many urban 
areas.1  Even the economic recession has failed to deter developers from 
entering into new projects focused on reclaiming contaminated sites.2  
Developers continue to strike deals with municipalities that are hungry for 
new tax revenue, and find state authorities steadfastly ready to help, despite 
the country’s struggling real estate market and general financial disarray.3 
But, any purchase or planned redevelopment of a brownfield can 
have large, sometimes unforeseen, costs.  A brownfield is a site with 
“actual or perceived contamination,” but with a “realistic potential for 
redevelopment.”4  Brownfield rehabilitation generally “involves the sale of 
a former industrial, commercial or institutional property to a developer who 
intends to redevelop the site for a ’less intensive use.’”5 Experts estimate 
that the total remaining costs of decontaminating these polluted sites in the 
United States may range from $700 billion to $1 trillion,6 excluding 
perhaps “tens if not hundreds of billions of dollars more” in potential toxic 
tort suits and industrial spills.7  In the face of these potentially huge 
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Martin, Why Dumps are Gaining Allure, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2008, available at 
http://nytimes.com/2008/03/30/realestate/30njzo.html. 
2 Antoinette Martin, Reclaiming Contaminated Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 
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4 Janice E. Falini, Using Environmental Insurance to Manage Risk 
Encountered in Non-Traditional Transactions, 14 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 95, 108 
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liabilities, transactions involving brownfields become contentious when the 
parties negotiate rehabilitation cost estimates and the closure of future 
liabilities.8  Typically, the seller wants to minimize its indemnification 
obligations to the developer and achieve regulatory closure, while the buyer 
wants to quantify accurately and carefully manage future costs and 
potential liabilities.9   
The buyer’s concerns about unexpected clean-up costs and 
liabilities can destroy transactions and prevent the rehabilitation of land 
otherwise slated for redevelopment.  For example, unexpected 
contamination halted a transaction between an auto body shop seeking to 
sell its land and a clothing retailer looking to build a fourth boutique.10  The 
retailer was enthusiastic about the deal until a site inspector developed an 
allergic reaction from exposure to chemicals once used for paint and 
enamel work.11  When the contamination was discovered, the retailer 
angrily backed out of the agreement, claiming the seller had failed to 
disclose this pollution.12  Environmental insurance might have saved this 
deal, protecting the buyer from cost overruns and liability associated with 
unknown contamination and providing the seller with protection from 
liabilities arising after the sale.13  
Insurance makes transactions involving these contaminated sites 
more feasible and makes ownership of such properties with questionable 
use histories less risky.14  For example, a zoo in Fort Worth, Texas 
discovered that it sat on land that had served other, possibly industrial, 
purposes in the past.15  The zoo’s general liability policy did not cover 
environmental liability risks, leading it to seek additional insurance to fill 
                                                                                                                 
insurance, which emphasizes the compensation and deterrence functions of 
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11 See id. 
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the gap in coverage.16  The zoo negotiated and paid a one-time $20,000 
premium for a three-year environmental insurance policy with a $3 million 
cap.17  The zoo’s chief operating officer explained, "I can't imagine what 
could be under [the zoo’s land], but [the policy] was just a fairly 
inexpensive way to make sure that gap in our liability was covered.”18  The 
environmental insurance policy thus mediated the zoo’s risk of incurring 
large costs down the road. 
In addition to mediating risk, environmental insurance policies can 
help developers secure financing for their projects.19  Lenders are willing to 
provide funding up to the market value of a property, but may not cover the 
excess costs that are inherent to brownfields, such as environmental 
assessments, remedial plans and cleanup.20  By keeping remediation costs 
close to initial estimates for the developer, insurance can fill some of this 
“financing gap” that would otherwise forestall remediation projects.21  
Even as environmental insurance facilitates brownfield 
rehabilitation, the increasing popularity of these projects is contributing to 
the growth of the environmental insurance market.22  The growing appeal 
of brownfield projects can be attributed to a number of factors.23   In 
particular, developers are encountering improved regulatory predictability 
and incentives on federal and state levels.24  A federal district court in 
California noted how state and federal initiatives were expediting 
brownfield cleanups by reducing “the cost and burden of returning such 
properties to beneficial use.”25  The court observed that these laws had 
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achieved “some level of predictability” for developers, allowing them to 
make reasonable estimates of the costs and liabilities associated with taking 
on a cleanup.26  “Such certainty,” the court stated, “to the extent that it is 
available, greatly encourages prospective purchasers to rehabilitate 
contaminated property and put it back into productive use.”27 
Developers are also finding that brownfields are increasingly 
competitive investments relative to other properties on the market.  In some 
areas, preservation efforts have removed undeveloped land from the 
market.28  And, towns are willing to strike compelling deals with 
developers, permitting denser development of a brownfield than the town 
would otherwise permit in exchange for the developer taking the property 
off the municipality’s hands and overseeing its cleanup.29  Indeed, 
developers can combine municipal, state, and federal incentives, which can 
make brownfield redevelopment a more profitable investment than building 
on an uncontaminated site.30  Developers can sometimes get a substantial 
proportion of their investment in brownfields returned to them through 
government subsidies more quickly than they would see a return on their 
investment in an uncontaminated property.31  Market forces and 
government incentives are thus making brownfield projects appealing 
investments for developers willing to purchase environmental insurance to 
keep attendant risks within reasonable limits.32 
Insurance’s risk-spreading function compliments regulatory and 
market incentives in reducing the deterrent effects of pollution liabilities.33  
Estimates indicate that insurance could pay for as much as two-thirds of the 
decontamination costs for U.S. brownfields.34  With brownfields becoming 
increasingly attractive investments, the global market for environmental 
insurance policies has grown from an estimated $500 million in 1993 to 
between $2 billion and $3 billion in recent years, with the big sellers 
including American International Group (AIG), ACE, Zurich, Liberty 
Mutual, and Chubb.35  Environmental insurance is thus becoming an 
                                                                                                                 
26 Id. at 948. 
27 Id. 
28 See Tarquinio, supra note 1. 
29 See Martin, supra note 1. 
30 See id.; Tarquinio, supra note 1. 
31  See Tarquinio, supra note 1. 
32 See generally Martin, supra note 1; Tarquinio, supra note 1. 
33 See generally Martin, supra note 1; Tarquinio, supra note 1. 
34 Leiter, supra note 7, at 259. 
35 Patel, supra note 15, at 1-2. 
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indispensable and broadly accepted tool for development projects with a 
known or suspected risk of contamination.36 
This article examines the role of environmental insurance policies 
in the remediation of contaminated lands.  Section II provides background 
on environmental insurance policies, describing how the policies developed 
to fill a gap in coverage caused by general liability insurance “absolute 
pollution exclusions” and detailing specific types of environmental 
insurance contracts in current use.  Section II argues that complex 
negotiations, and attendant expenses, associated with environmental 
insurance policies have reduced parties’ incentive to litigate, such that the 
first disputes have only recently begun to be heard in court.  Section III and 
IV discuss recent litigation on environmental insurance policies.  Section 
III provides a framework based on recent litigation for interpreting 
environmental insurance policies and argues that courts should consider the 
web of agreements that may influence a policy.  Section IV discusses 
recent litigation regarding “known conditions” exclusions.  Section IV 
argues that contra proferentem should generally apply to these exclusions 
where the scope of “known conditions” is ambiguous to encourage insurers 
to assume an information-forcing role when issuing coverage.  
 
II. THE ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE LANDSCAPE 
 
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE 
POLICIES 
 
Policies explicitly covering pollution costs and liabilities have 
emerged only since the late 1980s in their modern form.37  They developed 
to fill a gap that insurers purposefully manufactured in Commercial 
General Liability (CGL) policies,38 which provide businesses with broad 
coverage for liabilities not specifically excluded by the policy’s terms.39   
Prior to the 1970s, CGL policies did not specifically exclude 
pollution coverage; but then, modern environmental liability law and the 
concurrent demand for pollution coverage did not yet exist.40  Growing 
awareness of environmental issues and risks combined with federal 
                                                                                                                 
36 See id.; see also Howard, supra note 23, at 957-58. 
37 See Falini, supra note 4, at 95-97. 
38 See DYBDAHL, supra note 6, at 17. 
39 Ralph A. DeMeo, et al., Insuring Against Environmental Unknowns, 12 J. 
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 61, 62 (2007). 
40 See id. at 63. 
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legislation such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which forced businesses to bear 
the costs of remediating the environmental harms they caused, led 
businesses to bring claims for pollution liabilities under their CGL 
policies.41  Insurers had not anticipated the number and scope of these 
environmental claims and began taking steps to exclude pollution-related 
liabilities for future policyholders.42 
Insurers meandered somewhat before excluding pollution liabilities 
from CGL policies entirely.  To relieve the pressure on CGL policies, 
insurers introduced a “sudden and accidental” occurrence exclusion in 
1973, which was intended to exclude leaks and spills of contaminants from 
coverage.43  However, courts found the exclusion ambiguous and required 
insurers to cover many pollution liabilities regardless.44  Thus, in 1985, 
many CGL policies included “absolute pollution exclusions,”45 broadly 
defining the exclusion to ensure no ambiguity.46  Thereafter, policyholders 
faced with pollution liabilities could not obtain coverage under their CGL 
policies. 
Demand for environmental coverage remained even as CGL 
policies solidified the “absolute pollution” exclusion.47  In response, 
insurance policies that specifically covered environmental risks gradually 
entered the market,48 with demand intensifying throughout the 1980s.49  
Reasons for the spike in demand included growing corporate concern over 
environmental risks and disclosure requirements, financial incentives for 
                                                                                                                 
41 See supra n. 14-28 and accompanying text; see also John Conley, Hidden 
Dangers: Taking Uncertainty Out of Mergers and Acquisitions, 47 RISK MGMT. 
12, 14 (2000) (explaining environmental insurance developed in response to 
legislation that required clean-up of contaminated properties);Falini, supra note 4, 
at 95 (noting that insurers created environmental insurance policies in response to 
government legislation that increased environmental liabilities during the 1970s). 
42 See supra n.14-19 and accompanying text. 
43 See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Rise and Fall of Commercial Liability 
Insurance, 87 VA. L. REV. 85, 93, 97 (2001). 
44 See id. at 97. 
45 See id. at 99. 
46 Falini, supra note 4, at 96 & n.14. 
47 See DYBDAHL, supra note 6, at 1, 19-20; see also Falini, supra note 4, at 95-
97 (“Environmental insurance has been available for commercial clients since 
1979.”). 
48 DYBDAHL, supra note 6, at 1. 
49 Falini, supra note 4, at 97 & n.16. 
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redevelopment of brownfields, and stricter enforcement of federal and state 
environmental laws.50  Moreover, developers began finding projects on 
contaminated sites to be savvy business decisions, but required insurance to 
mitigate the financial risks associated with rehabilitation projects.51 
Today, the annual sales volume for environmental insurance 
exceeds $1 billion and continues to grow.52  By 2002, demand for 
environmental insurance was growing at a twenty percent annual rate to 
more than $2 billion of premiums.53  This growth is particularly striking in 
contrast to the 1990s “when premium volume was less than one-tenth the 
current level.”54  This growing market contains numerous, highly 
specialized policies, each covering a particular type of risk associated with 
projects on potentially contaminated lands. 
 
B.  AN OVERVIEW OF MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE 
POLICIES 
 
Pollution Legal Liability (PLL) policies55 and Cost Cap policies 
dominate the market for environmental insurance, although the options 
continue to diversify.56  PLL policies provide third-party insurance 
coverage against liability resulting from contamination at or emanating 
from properties that the policy covers.57  More specifically, PLL policies 
                                                                                                                 
50 Howard, supra note 23, at 957-58; see also Brent C. Anderson, Valuation of 
Environmentally Impaired Properties, 15 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT. 100, 137 
(2000) (“Environmental insurance has been in the marketplace for the past decade.  
However, only in the past several years has it become a viable means of 
transferring environmental risks.”). 
51 See supra notes 23-36 and accompanying text. 
52 DYBDAHL, supra note 6, at 1. 
53 Howard, supra note 23, at 957 n.1. 
54 Id.; see also Dave Lenckus, Pollution Risk Transfer Continuing to Evolve: 
Market for Clean-up Coverage Growing, 36 BUS. INS., June 10, 2002, at 10. 
55  The precise name for the policy varies somewhat by insurer. Alternate 
names include “Pollution Legal Liability Select,” “Environmental Impairment 
Liability,” and “Pollution and Remediation Legal Liability.” DeMeo et al., supra 
note 39, at 76. 
56 Newer, highly specialized forms of environmental insurance have emerged 
that are “considerably more tailored” than their broader predecessor environmental 
insurance policies.  These specialized policies are often geared towards specific 
industries, such as education, health care, or real estate development. Howard, 
supra note 23, at 958-60; see also DeMeo, supra note 39, at 82. 
57 Howard, supra note 23, at 959. 
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offer claims-made58 coverage for on-site cleanup of unknown preexisting 
and new conditions, off-site cleanup resulting from unknown preexisting or 
new conditions, and coverage for injuries occurring on neighboring 
property.59  Such policies may also include coverage for third-party claims 
for bodily injury and property damage, liability arising from waste 
transportation, business interruption, and a duty to defend.60 
Cost Cap policies compliment PLL policies.  Whereas PLL 
policies protect against liabilities associated with the remediation of 
unknown environmental harms and resulting injuries to people and 
property,61 Cost Cap insurance protects parties that plan to remediate a site 
from vastly exceeding their estimated costs.62  Cost Cap insurance is thus 
“designed to address the risk and uncertainty associated with beginning an 
environmental remediation project.”63  Insurers design the policies to cover 
clean-up expenses that accrue beyond expectations and the “self-insured 
retention,” which functions as the policy’s deductible.64   
To obtain coverage, the policyholder must submit detailed plans 
and cost estimates from environmental consultants to insurers,65 who 
require “substantial analytical data, agency-approved work plans, 
sophisticated cost estimates, and formal contractor quotations . . . to 
                                                                                                                 
58 Claims-made policies cover claims first made during the policy period.  See, 
e.g., Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 656 A.2d 
1094, 1095 (Del. 1995) (“Claims-made policies provide coverage only where the 
underlying claim is first made, in writing, during the policy period. Therefore, the 
initial focus under a claims-made policy is on the date of the first written assertion 
of the claim, rather than the date of the injury or damage alleged within that 
claim.”).  Many PLL policies contain language similar to the following: “Many of 
the coverages [provided herein] contain claims-made-and-reported requirements.  
Please read carefully.” Howard, supra note 23, at 962. 
59 Howard, supra note 23, at 959. 
60 Id. 
61 Id.  “Cleanup cost cap coverage generally excludes coverage for bodily 
injury, property damage, third-party liability, fines, penalties, and policyholder 
noncompliance for criminal acts,” the very coverage offered through PLL policies.  
Id. at 960. 
62 Id. at 959-60 (“Cleanup cost cap insurance coverage is first-party coverage 
designed to protect the policyholder against possible cost overruns in the course of 
performance of planned environmental remediation projects.”). 
63 Id. at 960. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
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underwrite” policies.66  These procedures aid parties in accumulating the 
information necessary for the policyholder to determine what, specifically, 
must receive coverage and the insurer to underwrite the risk accurately.67   
However, the nature of environmental contamination makes 
accuracy only a roughly achievable goal, despite hefty investments in due 
diligence.68  “Each environmental cost is the product of probability and 
consequence,” requiring the use of mathematical models to eliminate bias 
and to account for the interrelationship between numerous environmental 
factors.69   Ultimately, these models achieve estimates of liability, 
rendering it necessary for developers to offset the risks that “cannot be 
accurately determined” via insurance.70  Those environmental costs that 
parties cannot anticipate in advance are those best suited for environmental 
insurance.71   
Such uncertainty, combined with the size of potential liabilities, 
means that both developers and insurers have a clear incentive to negotiate 
the terms of environmental insurance policies carefully.72  Since absolute 
accuracy regarding the risks is difficult to obtain on the contaminated site, 
accuracy must exist in the policy’s negotiated terms to circumscribe the 
unknown costs on either side.73  Unlike property, casualty, and liability 
insurance, which insurers sell in standard form, the terms of environmental 
policies are often rigorously negotiated.74 
The cost of accumulating the relevant information and negotiating 
the terms of the policy is the first major expense associated with purchasing 
                                                                                                                 
66 See e.g., Frazer Exton Dev., LP v. Kemper Envtl., Ltd., No. 03 Civ. 0637, 
2004 WL 1752580, at *1 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2004) (citations omitted). 
67 See Anderson, supra note 50, at 137. 
68 See id. at 101. 
69 Id. at 137. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id.; Video Webcast: Tips for Negotiating & Using Envtl. Ins. Policies & 
Selected Case Law Concerning Claims (ALI–ABA 2008) available at 
http://www.ali-
aba.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=online.mp3downloads_detail&segmentid=14764 
[hereinafter ALI-ABA Video Webcast].  
73 See Anderson, supra note 50, at 137 (“Environmental insurance is a 
particularly effective tool for transferring low-probability, high consequence risk 
…. Moreover, thoughtful use of environmental insurance can effectively reduce 
the impact of the risks transferred under the policy to a financial consequence 
defined by the premium cost and applicable deductibles.”). 
74 See ALI-ABA Video Webcast, supra note 72. 
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environmental insurance.75  Because of the high financial stakes and the 
degree of uncertainty, the party purchasing the insurance will often engage 
a team of professionals to assist in the negotiations, including lawyers, 
environmental consultants, insurance brokers, and high-level 
representatives of the insured.76  The cost of this upfront risk assessment 
and negotiation generally benefit the policyholder.77   Although 
environmental insurance policies prior to negotiations may not provide 
significant transfer of environmental risks, “careful manuscripting of 
endorsements to integrate coverages between policies and to integrate 
insurance into the overall transaction can provide a very effective means of 
allocating risk.”78  As a result, properly drafted environmental insurance 
may be the most certain and successful means of defining environmental 
risk.79 
The high costs associated with environmental insurance policies do 
not end with the upfront costs of risk assessment and representation for 
policy negotiations.80  The second set of costs involves the actual purchase 
price of the policy.81  Premiums for PLL policies, for example, can start at 
between $5,000 and $15,000 per year with a minimum deductible between 
$5,000 and $10,000 dollars per incident.82  Policy limits for PLL policies 
range from $1 million to $100 million, with higher limits frequently 
possible through negotiation.83  Similarly, Cost Cap policies often carry 
hefty premiums and deductibles.84  Typically, a minimum premium for a 
Cost Cap policy will run between eight and fifteen percent of a site’s 
estimated clean-up costs with a policy limit of twice the estimated clean-up 
cost.85  Insurers will generally not provide coverage for cleanups estimated 
to cost less than $1 million, but will provide coverage limits as high as 
$300 million depending on whether reinsurance is available.86  In addition 
to paying premiums, policyholders are responsible for paying a “self-
                                                                                                                 
75 See id. 
76 Id. 
77 See Anderson, supra note 50, at 103. 
78 Id. at 137. 
79 Id. 
80 See DeMeo et al., supra note 39, at 77. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 See id. at 83. 
85 Id. 
86 See DeMeo et al., supra note 39, at 83. 
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insured retention” (SIR) before the insurer will begin paying.87  The SIR 
functions as the policy’s deductible, and is equal to the estimated clean-up 
cost of the property plus ten to thirty percent “to eliminate any incentive for 
underbidding and to account for losses almost certain to occur … ”88  Thus, 
when a policyholder purchases Cost Cap insurance, he agrees to pay 
premiums, all estimated clean-up costs, and a certain amount of costs above 
that estimate before the insurer begins covering unanticipated costs.89  
Environmental insurance policies thus require substantial contributions 
from policyholders both at the time of purchase and whenever a claim 
arises.90 
With such high stakes, a third cost associated with environmental 
insurance policies may be litigation.  But, even though environmental 
insurance has been available in some form since the late 1970s,91 litigation 
has been infrequent.92  Until recently, few cases have gone to trial, perhaps 
because, with such high stakes, the parties prefer to settle disputes out of 
court.93  Another explanation for the lack of case law is that the costly, 
team-based negotiations described above may reduce both the need and the 
incentive to litigate.94  On one hand, thorough negotiations generally mean 
that parties have brought all available information to the table, allowing the 
insurer the opportunity to underwrite accurately and the potential 
policyholder the opportunity to carefully assess and define the specific 
risks that require coverage.95  On the other hand, negotiations reduce the 
incentive of either party to commence litigation because they effectively 
create (or demonstrate) equal bargaining power between the parties, 
thereby rendering judicial treatment of the policies uncertain.96   
Generally speaking, the common law doctrine of contra 
proferentem governs all ambiguities in insurance policies when coverage is 
litigated, dictating that ambiguous terms should be construed against the 
insurer, who deals in the subject matter routinely and had the benefit of 
                                                                                                                 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 Falini, supra note 4, at 95. 
92 Interview with David Platt, Attorney, Murtha Cullina LLP, in Hartford, 
Conn. (Oct. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Platt Interview]. 
93 Id.; see also Falini, supra note 4, at 98. 
94 See ALI-ABA Video Webcast, supra note 72. 
95 See Falini, supra note 4, at 98. 
96 See ALI-ABA Video Webcast, supra note 72. 
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drafting the terms.97  However, where parties individually negotiate terms 
and have relatively equal bargaining power, as with environmental 
insurance policies, the rationale for applying contra proferentem may be 
diminished.98  Lack of knowledge as to how courts will treat environmental 
insurance policies reduces the incentive for either the insurer or the insured 
to bring a dispute to trial.99  Thus, up until recently, few cases involving 
disputes over environmental insurance have made it to court.100 
Despite this apparent reluctance to litigate, courts have heard the 
first batch of cases involving environmental insurance policies in recent 
years.101  One increasingly litigated issue involves allocation and priority of 
coverage.102  A second litigious issue involves the known risk doctrine, 
which dictates that an insurer should not be obliged to provide coverage for 
a liability that the policyholder knew about or reasonably should have 
foreseen.103  Section III discusses the allocation and priority of coverage 
and provides a framework for interpreting environmental insurance 
policies.  Section IV analyzes the issue of “known conditions” and argues 
that contra proferentem should be applied to environmental insurance 
policies to encourage insurers to assume an information-forcing role during 
negotiations. 
 
III.   ALLOCATION AND PRIORITY OF COVERAGE LITIGATION 
 
Environmental insurance policies generally consist of a standard 
form policy and numerous, individually negotiated endorsements 
modifying the standard terms.104  Policyholders may have multiple 
environmental insurance policies to cover risks associated with different 
aspects of their operations; each of these policies may contain exclusions 
intended to eliminate coverage of risks that are not insured or that are 
insured against by other types of policies.105  Thus, complicated 
relationships may exist within a policy and also between multiple types of 
environmental insurance policies, each with different focuses, exclusions, 
                                                                                                                 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 See id. 
100 Id.; see also Platt Interview, supra note 92. 
101 See Platt Interview, supra note 92. 
102 See Howard, supra note 23, at 979. 
103 See ALI-ABA Video Webcast, supra note 72. 
104 Id. 
105 See Platt Interview, supra note 92. 
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and individually negotiated endorsements.106  Broader indemnification 
agreements and other forms of liability coverage may further complicate 
coverage, leading policyholders and insurers to dispute issues of allocation 
and priority of coverage.107  Furthermore, the opinions and requirements of 
environmental agencies and regulations may bear upon the interpretation of 
environmental insurance policies.108 
Given this complex of interrelated obligations, both within a policy 
and in related agreements, confusion may arise regarding the interpretation 
of a policy’s terms.  This section argues that environmental insurance 
policies must be considered within the context of multiple agreements, and 
proposes a framework for interpreting these policies based on recent 
litigation.  Under the framework, courts should first determine the policy 
terms by considering the relationship between a policy’s standard form 
terms and endorsements, which may modify the terms in the standard 
contract.  Second, courts should evaluate the policy’s exclusions to 
determine the intended scope of coverage.  While this analysis is done 
primarily on the basis of the policy’s language, consideration of other 
environmental insurance policies held by the same insured may clarify the 
intended scope of each agreement assuming the parties sought to avoid 
coverage overlap during drafting. Third, courts should consider broader 
business and indemnification agreements, if any, between the insured and 
other parties working on the contaminated site covered by the policy.  
Fourth and finally, courts should consider how the policy treats agency 
preferences and regulatory requirements in determining the application of 
the policy terms. 
A Pennsylvania case, URS Corporation v. Tristate Environmental 
Management Services, illustrates the first element of the framework: 
determining the policy’s terms by assessing how the individually-
negotiated endorsements modify the “standard form” coverage.109  This 
step helps determine liabilities covered by the environmental insurance 
policy, such as cost overruns, harms to people or property resulting from 
environmental contamination, or harms to people or property arising from 
negligence in the remediation process.110   
                                                                                                                 
106 See Howard, supra note 23, at 957-58. 
107 See infra pp. 20-22. 
108 See id. at 23-24. 
109 See, e.g., URS Corp. v. Tristate Envtl. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 08-154, 
2008 WL 2944875, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2008). 
110 See id. at *1, 2, 4, 5. 
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In URS Corporation, URS purchased a PLL policy to cover 
liabilities resulting from an environmental remediation project that 
included significant drilling.111  The policy’s standard form contained a 
broad exclusion for “professional services,” which exempted coverage for 
harms caused by negligence during the remediation project to people or 
property.112  During the course of drilling, the corporation damaged cables 
belonging to Amtrak and was sued for negligence to recover appropriate 
damages.113  When URS requested indemnification and defense under its 
PLL policy, the insurer disagreed with URS about whether an endorsement 
modified the broad standard form exclusion of professional services from 
coverage.114 
In reaching its decision, the court determined that the policy could 
be divided into three parts: the policy declarations, the portion with eight 
individually negotiated endorsements, and the standard form.115  The 
standard form included a broad exclusion for “professional services,” 
excluding coverage for “any professional service, including but not limited 
to…. [s]upervision, inspection, construction or project management, quality 
control or engineering services” (emphasis omitted).116   But, in one of the 
individually negotiated endorsements, the insurer agreed to provide 
coverage for professional and contracting services narrowly defined to 
include certain environmental consulting services and certain 
environmental drilling.117  The court held that the narrower definition in the 
                                                                                                                 
111 See id. at *1. 
112 Id. at *2. 
113 Id. at *1. 
114 Id. at *2-3. 
115 See URS Corp., 2008 WL 2944875, at *1 (emphasis omitted). 
116 Id. at *2. The professional liability exclusion from general liability 
coverage, in pertinent part, reads as follows:  “‘Bodily injury’ or ‘property 
damage’ arising out of the rendering or failure to render any professional service, 
including but not limited to (1) The preparing, approving or failure to prepare or 
approve maps, drawings, opinions, recommendations, reports, surveys, change 
orders, designs or specifications; (2) Supervision, inspection, construction or 
project management, quality control or engineering services . . . .”  Id. 
117 Id. at *1-2.  “This Policy applies to a ‘claim’ based upon or arising out of 
the following ‘Professional Services’ or ‘Contracting Services’ only …. ”  It then 
lists “professional services” and “contracting services,” defining them as 
“environmental consulting services” and “environmental drilling and probing 
activities,” respectively.  Id. at *2. 
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endorsement should be applied in this instance and that the insurer should 
provide indemnification.118   
The court’s rationale demonstrates the importance of considering 
how a policy’s endorsements modify standard form provisions.119  Courts 
should consider what terms the endorsements are meant to modify and read 
that modification into the standard form.120  Because the endorsements 
represent the individually-negotiated component of the policy, they take 
precedence over other terms, including broad exclusions, within the 
standard form.121  Thus, endorsements may indicate that the policyholder 
may be indemnified for environmental harms—or, as in this case, 
accidental or negligent damage to people or property—that would 
otherwise be excluded within broad and general standard form 
provisions.122  Identifying the scope of a policy’s coverage for 
environmental or negligent harms thus relies upon careful consideration of 
how endorsements modify standard form coverage.123 
Another case, Denihan Ownership Co. v. Commerce and Indus. 
Ins. Co., illustrates the second step within the framework for interpreting 
environmental insurance policies.124  This step entails consideration of the 
scope of policy exclusions, and potentially implicates the interplay between 
multiple environmental insurance policies held by the same insured.125  In 
Denihan Ownership, the company purchased a PLL policy to supplement a 
Cost Cap policy purchased in connection with the remediation of several 
parcels of land containing low-rise commercial property, such as a parking 
garage, a car repair shop, and a dry cleaner.126  The insured purchased the 
insurance policies based on due diligence performed by an environmental 
consultant to provide estimates for the land’s remediation.127  During 
                                                                                                                 
118 Id. at *3. In fact, the court held that the policy’s definition of “professional 
services” was ambiguous and construed the terms in favor of the insured. Id. at *3, 
4. Thus, the court applied “contra proferentem” in the case although the parties 
were both, arguably, sophisticated and the policy entailed individual negotiations. 
See URS Corp., 2008 WL 2944875, at *3; see also infra, Part II. A.  
119 See URS Corp., 2008 WL 2944875, at *5. 
120 See id. 
121 See id. 
122 See id. at *4-5. 
123 See id. at 4. 
124 See, e.g., Denihan Ownership Co., v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 830 
N.Y.S.2d 128, 129-30 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). 
125 See, e.g., id. at 129. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
482 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL            [Vol. 16:2 
 
remediation, the insured accrued expenses beyond the Cost Cap policy’s 
coverage limit.  The insured claimed that this excess expense should be 
covered under the supplemental PLL policy.128  The insurer denied this 
claim.129   
Ensuing litigation between these parties illustrates the interplay 
between conditions covered under a Cost Cap policy and a PLL policy 
purchased by the same insured.130  The policyholder claimed that the 
insurer should be required to pay the excess costs of remediation under the 
PLL policy, which provided coverage for liabilities arising from “unknown 
and unidentified conditions.”131  The excess costs, the policyholder further 
argued, derived from “unknown and unidentified” contamination that the 
environmental consultants had overlooked, and thus fell within the scope of 
the PLL policy’s coverage.132  In contrast, the insurer argued that the 
“unknown and unidentified” contamination had been contemplated if not 
specifically identified by the reports the environmental consultants 
submitted.133  Thus, the insurer urged that the PLL policy, which was not 
intended to cover the excess of contemplated remediation costs, should not 
be obliged to pay for the costs of remediating the specific conditions at 
issue.134  Rather, the Cost Cap policy was specifically intended to cover the 
excess costs of remediation; the fact that the policyholder had accrued 
excess expenses beyond the Cost Cap policy’s limits did not make the PLL 
policy suddenly applicable to liabilities resulting from excess costs.135 
Evaluating the language of the PLL policy, and therein considering 
its relationship to the Cost Cap policy, the court held for the insurer.136  The 
court evaluated the PLL policy’s language, noting that it contained a broad 
exclusion of contamination “‘arising from’” pollution conditions in the 
environmental consultant’s report.137  The court held that, because the 
contamination the insured wanted the PLL supplemental policy to cover 
was “contemplated,” if not expressly listed, in the environmental 
                                                                                                                 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 See Denihan, 830 N.Y.S.2d at 129. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Denihan, 830 N.Y.S.2d at 129. 
137 Id. at 130. 
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consultant’s report, the court said it fell within the broad exclusion’s 
scope.138 
In reaching this decision, the court cited the existence and scope of 
the Cost Cap policy as evidence of the policy’s intended scope.  The court 
noted that the known condition exclusion “was clearly intended to ensure 
no overlap between the underlying [Cost Cap] policy, which provided 
coverage for petroleum contamination on the site, and new and different 
pollution conditions covered by the [PLL] policy.”139  Thus, even as the 
court based its decision on the PLL policy’s language, it gave a nod to the 
scope of a sister policy as an interpretive tool in clarifying the intended 
scope of the policy in question.140   
Indeed, since policies like PLL and Cost Cap insurance are 
intended to compliment each other,141 each may contain exclusions that 
broadly eliminate risks insured against in a complimentary policy.142  The 
exclusions and scope of coverage in one policy can inform the intended 
scope of coverage of the other policy.143  In interpreting a policy’s 
language, courts may consider the relationship between policies in the same 
insurance portfolio to reinforce the intended scope of each policy and 
perhaps resolve ambiguities.144  Doing so prevents overlap, ensuring 
efficient coverage and giving force to the parties’ original intentions.145 
A third consideration when construing ambiguous environmental 
insurance policies may entail an assessment of broader indemnification 
agreements.  A 2001 dispute between General Motors (GM) and American 
Ecology illustrates the complicated relationship between environmental 
insurance policies and other business agreements held by the same 
company.146  GM hired American Ecology, a waste management company, 
to dispose of some of its hazardous waste.147  The parties entered into a 
                                                                                                                 
138 Id. 
139 Id.  
140 Id. 
141 See infra Part II.B. 
142 See Denihan, 37 A.D.3d at 315. 
143 See id.  
144 See Denihan, 37 A.D.3d 314. 
145 See id. at 315. 
146 See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Am. Ecology Envtl. Servs. Corp., No. Civ. A 
399CV2625L, 2001 WL 1029519 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2001). 
147 The predecessor to American Ecology was called Gibraltar.  For the 
purposes of this case, the two companies are the same entity and the court indeed 
uses the two names interchangeably when referring to the waste management 
company.  See id. at *2, n.4. 
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mutual indemnification agreement, which included a provision that 
American Ecology would secure PLL coverage and name GM as an 
additional insured.148  The purpose of this provision was to ensure that GM 
would be covered should a toxic tort suit be brought against American 
Ecology and, by extension, GM.149  American Ecology purchased PLL 
insurance, but failed to name GM as an “additional insured” as stipulated in 
the mutual indemnification agreement.150  Thus, GM found itself lacking 
indemnification when several hundred plaintiffs brought a toxic tort suit for 
improper disposal of GM’s waste and claimed that GM was directly and 
vicariously liable for American Ecology’s improper actions.151   
In response, GM brought a suit against American Ecology 
primarily to recover several hundred thousand dollars in attorneys fees 
incurred in defending a declaratory judgment action that the insurer 
brought seeking subrogation.152  American Ecology claimed, firstly, that it 
was not required to indemnify GM under the agreement because the suit 
involved a “mixed” claim of both direct and vicarious liability which was 
not stipulated in the contract.153  It also claimed that it was excused from its 
contractual obligation to add GM to the PLL policy because the insurer, 
Zurich, did not permit the practice of naming “additional insureds” on PLL 
policies.154   
                                                                                                                 
148 Id., at *2. 
149 See id. Under the indemnification agreement, American Ecology was 
required to “obtain and maintain all insurance required herein,” including PLL 
policy with a $4,000,000 per occurrence combined single limit for personal injury 
and property damage and an $8,000,000 annual aggregate limit.  Id., at *2, *11.  
Additionally, American Ecology was required to purchase a CGL with a 
$5,000,000 per occurrence combined single limit, and an Automobile Liability 
insurance policy with a $5,000,000 per occurrence combined single limit.  Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. For details pertaining to the underlying toxic tort case against American 
Ecology and GM, see Virgie Adams v. American Ecology Environmental Services 
Corp., Cause No. 236-165224-96, in the 236th Judicial District Court in Tarrant 
County, Texas. 
152 See Gen. Motors Corp., 2001 WL 1029519, at *8.  ("GM contends that it 
incurred . . . $505,800.45 in attorneys' fees and expenses including guardian ad 
litem fees, expert witness fees, jount counsel fees and fees incurred in . . . [the 
Zurich litigation]."). 
153 Id., at *5. 
154 Id. (noting that Zurich, in fact, does not add clients of principal 
policyholders as additional insureds on their environmental impairment liability 
policies because it would “broaden the coverage of the policy to an unacceptable 
degree”).  Id., at *12. 
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The court rejected American Ecology’s arguments regarding its 
responsibilities under both the mutual indemnification provision and the 
PLL policy.155  The court interpreted the company’s responsibilities under 
the mutual indemnification agreement to require indemnification of GM 
and an obligation to purchase a PLL policy with GM as a named insured, 
absent notice to GM to the contrary.156  The court remanded the case for a 
factual determination of damages GM incurred as a result of American 
Ecology’s failure to name it as an additional insured on a PLL policy.157   
In this case, the court determined a party’s responsibility to obtain 
environmental insurance on the basis of a broader indemnification 
agreement, thereby illustrating the need for courts to take other business 
agreements into account.158  These other agreements may inform the issue 
of coverage and will, in particular, shed light on the liabilities parties 
agreed to incur as part of a project.159  The sheer number of interrelated 
business agreements may make this process complicated.  However, the 
exercise may frequently be worthwhile considering the immense liabilities 
that a party left without coverage may face.160 
Finally, courts should consider a fourth element when construing 
the terms of an environmental insurance policy.161  Unless terms expressly 
exclude the risk that agency preferences and regulatory requirements may 
impact the costs a policyholder incurs at a covered site, such costs should 
be covered under the policy.162   Because environmental contamination is 
subject to numerous regulations and is under the auspices of both state and 
federal agencies, a contaminated site may be subject to more stringent, or 
simply different, remediation requirements than the parties originally 
anticipated.163  For example, environmental agencies may set new 
remediation requirements or play a role in choosing the course of site 
clean-up.164  As a result, many environmental insurance policies take the 
future determinations of environmental agencies into account because 
                                                                                                                 
155 Id. 
156 Id., at *13. (holding that the only way American Ecology could be excused 
from naming GM as an additional insured was by providing notice that it was 
unable to do so within 30 days, but that such notice was not provided in this case). 
157 Id., at *14. 
158 See Gen. Motors Corp., 2001 WL 1029519, at * ___. 
159 See id. 
160 See id. 
161 See, e.g., Frazer, 2005 WL 2850247, at *1.   
162 See, e.g., id. 
163 See, e.g., id. 
164 See, e.g., id. 
486 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL            [Vol. 16:2 
 
agency opinions and regulations may directly alter the scope of risk.165   
Litigation may emerge as to whether a policy should cover liabilities 
arising from changes in the law governing remediation where the policy 
does not expressly account for this contingency or does so ambiguously.166 
For example, in Frazer Exton Development v. Kemper 
Environmental, Kemper refused an insurance claim under an environmental 
insurance policy because the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
required that the policyholder undertake remediation measures that Kemper 
maintained were not covered by the policy.167  The insured, Frazer, argued 
that the policy included Cost Cap coverage for any remedy the EPA 
required.168  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court's order finding for Frazer, holding that the policy provided broad Cost 
Cap coverage subject to EPA-selected remedies.169  The court based its 
holding on its reading of the policy language, which it held to be 
unambiguous, but stated that it would have reached the same result even 
had ambiguity existed.170  The court noted, “[e]ven if the policy is 
ambiguous, the outcome is dictated by the principle of interpretation known 
as contra proferentem.”171  Thus, the court held that all ambiguities in the 
insurance policy should be construed in favor of the insured.172  Moreover, 
it acknowledged the need for environmental insurance policies to cover 
liabilities arising from changes in law where the policy does not expressly 
exclude such risks.173 
Complicated relationships exist between an environmental 
insurance policy’s standard form and endorsements, complimentary 
environmental insurance policies, other agreements between parties, and 
the laws that influence remediation requirements.  This complicated 
landscape creates substantial room for misunderstanding, conflicting 
information and expectations, and, thus, litigation.  Courts must be 
prepared to navigate these relationships when determining coverage. 
                                                                                                                 
165 See, e.g., id. 
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168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id., at *1-*2. 
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IV.     KNOWN AND UNKNOWN CONDITIONS LITIGATION 
 
Another litigious area relates to the issue of “known condition” 
exclusions.  This section provides background about the role of the “known 
condition” exclusion in environmental insurance policies.  It then details 
litigation that has emerged over the exclusion, and argues that courts 
should construe these conditions in a manner consistent with the doctrine of 
contra proferentem so that insurers feel compelled to play an information-
forcing role during negotiations.  Finally, this section discusses litigation 
involving claims of misrepresentation of “known conditions” and again 
argues that placing the burden on the insurer to clearly identify known 
conditions will reduce claims of misrepresentation by giving the insurer 
added incentive to seek information during negotiations.   
 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE “KNOWN CONDITION” EXCLUSION  
 
Environmental insurance policies typically exclude coverage of 
pollution liabilities that are known to the insured at the time the policy is 
purchased.174  During the risk assessment and negotiation stage of issuing a 
policy, the insurer has particular incentive to identify, and broadly define, 
“known conditions” to minimize the scope of future liabilities.175  
Likewise, the insured has the incentive to narrowly define “known 
conditions,” to ensure coverage for as many liabilities as possible down the 
road.   
To trigger the “known condition” exclusion, specified employees176 
must have known or reasonably foreseen that the pre-existing condition 
would give rise to a claim under the policy.177  The term typically excludes 
from coverage all otherwise covered liabilities “[a]rising from Pollution 
Conditions existing prior to the Inception Date and known by a 
Responsible Insured and not disclosed in the application for” this policy or 
a renewing policy.178  Through this exclusion, insurers seek to eliminate 
                                                                                                                 
174 See Howard, supra note 24, at 973; see also DYBDAHL, supra note 7, at 31. 
175 See infra Introduction. 
176 DYBDAHL, supra note 7, at 31 (“To provide a reasonable degree of 
protection for the insurer without eliminating all pre-existing conditions, EIL 
policies commonly exclude only those pre-existing conditions that are known to an 
individual or a group of designated persons.  The exclusion usually limits the list 
of employees who must have knowledge of pre-existing conditions to (1) those 
directly responsible for environmental affairs or (2) senior managers.”). 
177 Id. 
178 Howard, supra note 24, at 973. 
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coverage where the policyholder anticipated a claim.179  The goal is thus to 
avoid moral hazard rather than to eliminate coverage simply because the 
insurer “should have anticipated” a particular, coverable occurrence.180 
The “known condition” exclusion implicates the common law 
“known loss doctrine,” which stands for the principle that an insurer should 
not be obliged to assume losses known or reasonably knowable to the 
policyholder, but not to the insurer, at the time a policy is purchased.181  
This doctrine, in turn, derives from the “fortuity principle” which states that 
all risks or losses insured against must be fortuitous or contingent.182  Lack 
of contingency necessarily negates insurance coverage given that insurance 
is, at its fundamental level, a “method of managing risk by distributing it 
among numbers of individuals or enterprises” where risk means “the 
possibility of injury or loss.”183  Where a loss is “known,” a “possibility” of 
injury or loss is no longer possible, but certain, and insurance is thus no 
longer appropriate.184 
Though uncontroversial in itself, the fortuity principle resulted in 
litigation when applied to CGL pollution coverage suits that predated 
separate environmental insurance coverage.185  These suits led to divergent 
applications between courts and substantial confusion.186  Under CGL 
policies, the difficulties in application arose because of the information 
asymmetry that often occurs when purchasing or issuing an insurance 
policy.187  An applicant might seek to transfer a loss he knows has already 
occurred or is likely to occur to an insurer that believes the loss is still a 
contingent event.188  Obliging an insurer to pay for an event that was not 
                                                                                                                 
179 DYBDAHL, supra note 7, at 31. 
180 Id. 
181 Howard, supra note 24, at 973. 
182 See Richard L. Freuhauf, Note, The Cost of Knowledge: Making Sense of 
“Nonfortuity” Defenses in Environmental Liability Insurance Coverage Disputes, 
84 VA. L. REV. 107, 112 (1998). 
183 Id. at 111 (internal citations omitted).  
184 See id. at 118.  (“[T]he known loss doctrine is the most straightforward 
application of the fortuity principle among the three non-fortuity defenses.”). 
185 See id. at 110. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 112. 
188 A frequently cited case on this point is Summers v. Harris, 573 F.29 869 
(5th Cir. 1978), in which the insured attempted to claim indemnification under a 
flood insurance policy that he purchased after floodwaters had reached within a 
few feet of his home.  The court barred coverage under the loss-in-progress rule.  
See id. at 115, n.37.  Another classic example of this danger is when an insured 
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actually contingent would disregard the bargain the parties struck, which 
was to exchange a certain premium for the chance that a loss might occur 
later.189  Hence, the fortuity principle is necessary to ensure that the 
policyholder does not exploit the information asymmetry to his 
advantage.190 
Environmental insurance policies are no less prone to abuse 
concerning information asymmetry and thus run-ins with the fortuity 
principle than CGL or any other type of insurance policy.191  Typical cases 
surrounding the known conditions exclusion fall into two categories.   
In the first category, the insurer argues that a claim brought by the 
insured was a “known” condition, thus exempt from coverage.  This section 
argues that courts should apply a narrow definition of “known condition” 
through the doctrine of contra proferentem where the exclusion is 
ambiguous and the insurer is in a superior position to play an information-
forcing role during due diligence and negotiations.   
In the second category, the insurer acknowledges that the liability 
was “unknown,” as defined by the policy, but argues that the insured in fact 
knew about the liability and misrepresented the facts (and thus the risk) to 
the insurer.192  This section again argues that courts should give deference 
to the policyholder because of the difficulty of identifying material facts 
without the benefit of hindsight.  Doing so would place the burden on the 
insurer to request all relevant information during negotiations and bring 
greater clarity to cases involving misrepresentation.  However, in both 
types of dispute, courts may be justified in limiting their application of 
contra proferentem where the bargaining power and familiarity with 
environmental risks is relatively equal between the parties.193 
                                                                                                                 
attempts to collect on a fire insurance policy that he purchased after learning his 
property was destroyed by fire.  Id. at 112. 
189 See id. at 112.  
190 Id. (“The potential for a policyholder to exploit the information asymmetry 
inherent in the insurance contract by fraudulently seeking indemnification for a 
loss that the carrier did not bargain to insure is the rationale for the ‘fortuity’ 
requirement in all insurance contracts, as well as for the doctrines of concealment 
and misrepresentation found in general contract law.”) 
191 See id. 
192 See, e.g., Goldenberg Dev. Corp. v. Reliance Ins. Co. of Ill., No. CIV. A. 
00-CV-3055, 2001 WL 872944 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (discussing insurer’s argument that 
insured allegedly did not give insurer engineering reports saying that there was 
substantial underground trash that would result ins significant remediation costs). 
193 RICHARD A. LORD, 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 32:12 (4th ed. 2008). 
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B. LITIGATION ABOUT THE DEFINITION OF A “KNOWN CONDITION” 
 
Disagreement over whether a condition is “known” at the time a 
policy was purchased arises because of the difficulty in defining 
environmental risks, given the uniqueness and complexity of conditions on 
any given property.194  Early in the development of the environmental 
insurance market, experts urged insurers to develop a clear set of standards 
for evaluating environmental risks.195  While insurers have certainly heeded 
this recommendation, as evidenced by the substantial data collection 
required during the negotiation of an environmental insurance contract, 
obtaining “clear” standards is a lofty goal considering the context.196  When 
an insurer issues a policy for, say, car insurance, it may collect information 
from the insured pertaining to age, location, demographics, car type and 
age, and more.  This data can be used to facilitate the underwriting process, 
because the insurer can compare it to reams of like-data and determine 
relative risks.   
In contrast, when an insurer negotiates an environmental insurance 
policy, it is assessing risk in a relative vacuum.197  Certainly, it may collect 
large quantities of data from the insured about the site to determine what, 
exactly, represents a risk on that location.198  But, no comparable sites, with 
the same soil, water tables, and use history, necessarily exist.199  Although, 
“[g]eneral procedures for dealing with contaminated site evaluation and 
remediation have been developed . . . the wide variety of natural site 
conditions and release characteristics have made it difficult to establish 
useful databases” to assist actuaries in evaluating the risk being 
transferred.200  Absent comparable sites, insurers have difficulty assessing 
                                                                                                                 
194 See Anderson, supra note 50, at 137; see also David E. Langseth, Valuing 
Environmental Remediation Liability Transfers, 20 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 2, 2–3 (Jan. 
2008). 
195 See, e.g., Paul K. Freeman & Howard Kunreuther, The Roles of Insurance 
and Well-Specified Standards in Dealing with Environmental Risks, 17 
MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECON. 517 (1996). 
196 See, e.g., id. 
197 See Langseth, supra note 194, at 2–3. 
198 See id. 
199 See id. 
200 See id. (noting that “[t]his situation has led some insurance companies to 
adopt site-specific approaches, of varying degrees of sophistication, for assessing 
[risk values] and created considerable variability in pricing methods for 
remediation cost cap insurance”) 
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what other conditions might exist and how great the risk might be for this 
particular site verses any other.201   
Facing this relative actuarial void, insurers wish to construe 
“known” risks broadly, implicating anything alluded to in initial surveys 
and data collection.202  Meanwhile, policyholders typically define the term 
“known conditions” literally, referring to specific contamination or risks 
clearly identified, defined, and labeled on a site map at the time of the 
initial surveys and data collection.203  These divergent definitions of 
“known conditions” have lead to litigation construing the meaning of the 
exclusion in different situations. 
For example, in Denihan Ownership Co., discussed supra,204 the 
policyholder and the insured were essentially litigating the breadth of the 
definition of a “known condition” in addition to the issue of whether the 
PLL policy or the Cost Cap policy provided the appropriate coverage.205  
Whereas the policyholder claimed that storage tanks not specifically 
identified in the environmental consultant’s reports should be considered 
unknown conditions, the insurer argued that the possibility of discovering 
additional storage tanks had been contemplated by the report and were thus 
excludable known conditions.206  In this case, the court agreed with the 
insurer, adopting a broad definition of “known conditions.”207  The holding 
suggests that, because additional conditions similar to those already 
discovered were reasonably foreseeable to the insured and the insurer, they 
may be deemed “known” for the purposes of the policy.208 
In contrast, the court in Chambliss v. Commerce and Industry 
Insurance Company refused to adopt a broad definition of “knowledge,” 
holding that knowledge should be handled as an issue of fact.209   This 
holding leaves open the possibility that a narrow, technical definition of 
knowledge will be applied in some cases.  In this case, Chambliss owned 
property with underground storage tanks.210  Inspectors of the property told 
Chambliss that they suspected a leak from one of the storage tanks and 
                                                                                                                 
201 See id. 
202 See id. at 204. 
203 See, e.g., Denihan, 37 A.D.3d 314. 
204 See supra notes 119-128 and accompanying text. 
205 See, e.g., Denihan, 37 A.D.3d at 315. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 See Chambliss Ltd. v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., No. 06-61202-CIV-
JOHNSON, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77664 *16 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2007). 
210 Id., at *2.  
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recommended that Chambliss seek laboratory analysis for confirmation.211  
Before receiving the laboratory results, Chambliss purchased storage tank 
third-party liability and Cost Cap coverage, stating on the application 
questionnaire that no known conditions—that is, contamination from the 
storage tanks—existed on the property.212  When laboratory reports 
confirmed that one of the storage tanks was leaking, Chambliss submitted a 
claim to its insurer, which denied coverage on the basis that Chambliss had 
misrepresented what known conditions were on the property when it 
applied for coverage.213 
 
In the subsequent litigation, Chambliss argued that 
coverage for the clean-up hinged on “its knowledge of a 
confirmed release . . . at the time of applying for that 
coverage.”214  The company urged that “only an 
investigation and confirmation of a release can elevate a 
pollution condition to a confirmed release.”215  Since the 
laboratory results had not confirmed a release at the time 
Chambliss applied for coverage, the company argued that 
it did not misrepresent its knowledge of pollution 
conditions.216  The insurer, in turn, argued that knowledge 
under the policy included a reasonable expectation of a 
pollution condition, which  should have had because of the 
inspectors recommendation to obtain additional testing.217 
 
The court ultimately declined “to issue summary judgment on the 
issue of knowledge.”218  However, the court might have more accurately 
held that it declined to issue summary judgment on the definition of 
knowledge—which was really the point in dispute.  The parties did not 
disagree over the relevant facts, but over whether those facts gave rise to 
“knowledge” within the meaning of the policy, which included a 
reasonable expectation of a pollution condition within its definition.219  
                                                                                                                 
211 Id. 
212 Id., at *3. 
213 Id., at *4. 
214 See Chambliss, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77664, at *10. 
215 Id. 
216 Id., at *10-*12. 
217 Id., at *14. 
218 Id., at *15. 
219 See id. (“Exclusion A states: ‘[T]his insurance does not apply to claims: 
arising from Pollution Conditions existing prior to the inception of the Policy and 
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Taking the definition of the policy, the court might have asked: could the 
company have reasonably expected the laboratory tests to come back 
positive for contamination from the storage tanks given the findings of the 
inspector prior to applying for the insurance policy?  Because the court left 
the issue of knowledge as a factual determination subject to ambiguity, it 
refused to issue a holding as to whether the definition of known condition 
should be construed narrowly or broadly.220 
Although the facts of this case suggest that Chambliss was relying 
on a technicality to avoid liability for a foreseeable future risk, the court 
might have been justified in adopting a narrow definition of “knowledge.”  
A narrow definition of a known condition would be consistent with the 
judicial doctrine of contra proferentem, which states that all ambiguities in 
a contract should be interpreted against the insurer.221  The general 
justification for contra proferentem is that insurers had the benefit of 
drafting the document, and thus should not receive any benefit from 
ambiguous terms they incorporated.222  This justification holds less force 
with environmental insurance policies because they are often rigorously 
negotiated by both sides.223 Indeed, as previously discussed, it is uncertain 
whether this doctrine is applicable in the environmental insurance context 
because they have negotiated components in addition to the standard 
form.224  
However, contra proferentem may be justified in many 
environmental insurance cases where the policyholder is not a repeat 
player, does not hold a portfolio of contaminated sites, and may lack the 
expertise necessary to identify material information that the insurer fails to 
request.  Insurers typically are repeat players in issuing environmental 
insurance and therefore have an advantage in understand the risks of 
environmental remediation over policyholders that are relative novices.  
While some policyholders may be able to spread their environmental risks 
across a portfolio of brownfields, insurers often have the unique advantage 
of being able to spread risk across many sites.  Moreover, insurers may 
                                                                                                                 
not disclosed in the application for the Policy, if the Insured knew or reasonably 
could have expected that such Pollution Condition could give rise to a Claim, 
Corrective Action or Cleanup.”) (emphasis added). 
220 See id. 
221 See Waeger, supra note 73. 
222 LORD, supra note 194,  §32:12. 
223 Id.; see also, DeMeo, supra note 40. 
224 However, the Second Circuit has applied it in this context, creating 
persuasive precedent for other jurisdictions. See Frazer, 2004 WL 1752580, at *2. 
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have far more knowledge of brownfields generally because of their status 
as repeat players issuing coverage for many sites at any given time.  As a 
result, insurers are better able to identify uncertainty when negotiating a 
policy.  Their superior ability to know what questions to ask about a site 
and what uncertainty remains even after the questions have been answered 
justifies placing pressure on them to identify known conditions as clearly 
and narrowly in the policies they issue.  Given that uncertainty is 
inevitable, clear drafting of known conditions will at least encourage the 
highest quality risk assessment and potentially avoid unnecessary litigation 
due to ambiguity.  Litigation about knowledge of a pre-existing condition 
would thus become limited to cases involving misrepresentation on the part 
of the policyholder.  Application of contra proferentem in this context may 
be less justified where the bargaining power and familiarity with 
environmental sites is relatively equal between the parties, such as where 
the policyholder has a portfolio of properties and routinely purchases 
environmental coverage. 
 
C.  THE KNOWN CONDITION EXCLUSION AND 
MISREPRESENTATION DISPUTES 
 
The second category of “known condition” litigation contains 
misrepresentation cases.  In such cases, one party fails to disclose 
information that is material to the decision to enter into the policy, but that 
is not otherwise reasonably ascertainable by the other party.225  The 
contract law principle that dictates misrepresentation and concealment void 
contract obligations also applies to insurance policy misrepresentation 
cases.226  To prevail in court on a denial of coverage because of 
misrepresentation, an insurer must prove that: 1) the representation was 
untrue or misleading, 2) it was material to the risk transferred, and 3) it was 
relied upon by the insurer in writing the policy at an agreed-upon 
premium.227   
The facts of Goldenberg Development Corporation v. Reliance 
Insurance Company of Illinois perfectly illustrate the relationship between 
                                                                                                                 
225 Freuhauf, supra note 182, at 112. 
226 Id. For a discussion of the extent to which insurance policies are subject to 
general rules of contract interpretation, see James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance 
Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995 (1992). 
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“known conditions” and misrepresentation.228  In this case, Goldenberg 
sought summary judgment regarding whether Reliance had breached a Cost 
Cap policy purchased to protect against unforeseen remediation costs for a 
number of Goldenberg’s development sites.229  Reliance’s underwriters 
granted a policy extension for the site in question, which was purchased 
after the issuance of the initial policy.230  They did so after Goldenberg 
provided them with a summary report of the land’s conditions that 
indicated “no further action” was needed to remedy any problems 
regarding construction debris, woodchips, and chemicals found in the 
soil.231   
After the insurer extended the policy to cover the site, however, 
Goldenberg performed additional environmental review and discovered 
significant “solid waste,” including tires, telephone poles, and appliances, 
which required expensive remediation.232  Goldenberg filed a claim under 
its environmental insurance policy that Reliance denied on the basis of the 
policy’s “known conditions” exclusion.233  The term excluded coverage for 
losses arising from conditions that pre-dated the policy and known to 
Goldenberg employees responsible for environmental affairs, unless “all 
material facts relating to the pollution conditions were disclosed to [the 
insurer] prior to the inception of this Policy.”234  In this instance, 
Goldenberg had disclosed a summary report, but not two reports with 
further detail, which were cited in the summary but not fully provided to 
Reliance.235   
Reliance claimed that Goldenberg’s failure to disclose these reports 
constituted misrepresentation because they contained evidence that 
suggested additional, costly remediation was necessary.236  Goldenberg 
countered that the reports had been appropriately disclosed because they 
were expressly cited in the summary report, and that Reliance could have 
asked to see them had it needed more information to effectively underwrite 
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the policy extension.237 Goldenberg further argued that the detail about the 
debris contained in the two reports had been sufficiently integrated into the 
summary, which referred to the presence of “trash” and thus contained 
language that unambiguously encapsulated the debris eventually 
uncovered.238 
Ultimately, the court denied summary judgment to the insurer, 
Reliance, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding 
whether the details contained in the reports, namely the presence of small-
scale trash on the property, were relevant to the underwriting decision and 
barred coverage because they were not disclosed.239  The court also rejected 
Reliance’s request for summary judgment under the known loss doctrine, 
holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Goldenberg could reasonably have foreseen the costs incurred for the 
cleanup based on the additional reports which suggested relatively less 
expensive remediation measures than were ultimately required.240  
The facts of this case and its subsequent appeal241 reveal the 
difficulty in determining the materiality of information where there is at 
once a flood of facts and an inability to know what those facts signify in the 
big picture.242  Parties may have plenty of information on a property and 
                                                                                                                 
237 Id. Goldenberg also argued that the reports in question were immaterial to 
the claim under the policy because they did not identify the larger solid waste 
items and recommended a remediation technique that was significantly less 
expensive than what was ultimately required.  Id. 
238 Id. 
239 Id., at *2. (The existence of smaller-scale trash may or may not have been 
material to the policy extension, since the possibility of additional cost may or may 
not have influenced defendant's determination of the premium, or the decision to 
issue the policy extension in the first place. When, as here, reasonable minds can 
differ on the question of the materiality of a fact, materiality is a question for the 
fact-finder, rather than a question of law for the court and summary judgment is 
inappropriate.). 
240 Goldenberg I, supra note 233, at *7 (applying the standard, “The ‘known 
loss' doctrine precludes insurance coverage of a loss when the insured knew or 
reasonably should have known of a likely exposure to losses which would reach 
the level of coverage.”) 
241 See Goldenberg Dev. Corp. v. Reliance Ins. Co. of Ill., No. Civ. A. 00-CV-
3055, 2001 WL 872782 (E.D. Pa., June 26, 2001) (denying appeal of summary 
judgment because affadavit from underwriter stating that she “would have wanted 
to see the information contained in the [undisclosed] reports” does not establish 
that the information was material to the policy as a matter of law). [hereinafter 
Goldenberg II]. 
242 See Goldenberg I, supra note 233; see also Goldenberg II. 
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even information pertaining to a hypothetical future claim, but limited 
means to sort out what will eventually be material and what will remain 
irrelevant.243  Thus, what is “known” has a shifting form—knowledge of 
facts that will eventually be relevant to a future claim becomes different 
from knowledge that the future claim is probable.244  As in Goldenberg, 
knowledge that small trash exists could seem irrelevant until one knows 
that there is also large trash on the site, which suddenly makes the small 
trash a clue to the unknown bigger problems.245  Absent hindsight, it is hard 
to know whether the knowledge of the small trash would meet the 
materiality test by influencing an insurer’s decision to issue a policy, 
evaluate the degree and character of risk on the site, and determine an 
appropriate premium.246  The question thus becomes whether hindsight 
should be allowed to influence a court’s evaluations of what undisclosed 
known facts are material. 
An almost identical dispute to Goldenberg arose in Technology 
Square, again illustrating the fine line between misrepresenting known 
information and not recognizing the relevance of facts.247   In this case, 
United National Insurance Company (UNIC) alleged that a policyholder, 
Technology Square, misrepresented material facts in an application for 
pollution liability insurance to cover a piece of property with a history of 
“heavy industrial” use, first as a soap factory, then as a hose factory, and 
lastly a gas station.248  Technology Square provided UNIC with a report 
chronicling this history.249  On the policy application questionnaire, 
Technology Square referred to the report in response to a question asking 
whether it was “aware of any circumstances which may reasonably be 
expected to give rise to a claim under this policy?”250 
Other insurers, with the same report and similar applications, either 
refused to issue a policy for the site or would do so only for a very high 
premium.251   For example, an AIG Environmental underwriter described 
the site as “pretty gnarly” and would not provide coverage out of concern 
                                                                                                                 
243 See id. 
244 See id. 
245 See id. 
246 See Goldenberg I, supra note 233. 
247 Tech. Square, LLC v. United Nat’l Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 04-10047-
GAO, 2007 WL 534450 (D. Mass. Feb. 15, 2007). 
248 Id. 
249 Id. 
250 Id., at *5. 
251 Id. 
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for “the amount of contamination on the site.”252   Likewise, a Kemper 
Environmental underwriter expressed concern about the potential 
environmental issues and gave a high premium quote because, absent 
additional investigation, he would be issuing the insurance using a “cross 
your fingers technique.”253  
UNIC, however, extended insurance to Technology Square for 
“significantly” less than other offers.254  At no point did UNIC request 
additional information about the level of environmental damage or the 
likelihood of significant remediation becoming necessary.255  Yet, when 
presented with a claim for the overrun of costs for remediating the 
property, UNIC denied the claim, stating that coverage was limited by a 
“known conditions” exclusion and that Technology Square had failed to 
turn over material information—namely, internal documents discussing the 
due diligence report handed over to UNIC—when applying for the 
insurance.256  Technology Square argued that the full due diligence report 
had been disclosed and that the contents of the report were “coextensive” 
with their knowledge of the material facts about the property’s condition.  
It further argued that UNIC “was capable of deriving from the [report] the 
same conclusions and speculations about the pollution conditions on the 
property as those contained in” the internal documents that Technology 
Square did not turn over. 
Considering whether withholding these documents was a material 
misrepresentation as a matter of law,257 the court held that “the conclusions 
that an environmental professional could have drawn from the Phase I 
Report were various” and that it could not be determined as a matter of law, 
                                                                                                                 
252 Id. 
253 Tech. Square, LLC, 2007 WL 534450, at *5. 
254 Id. (“Kemper's offer was ‘significantly more expensive’ than the one 
provided by UNIC, although both underwriters had received the same 
information”). 
255 Id. 
256 Id., at *7-*8.  The policy defined the exclusion as follows: “[k]nown 
conditions . . . arising from ‘Pollution Conditions' existing prior to the inception of 
this Policy, and reported to any officer, director, partner or other employee 
responsible for environmental affairs of the Named Insured, unless all of the 
material facts relating to the ‘Pollution Conditions’ were disclosed to the company 
in materials prior to the inception of this Policy.”  Id., at *6. 
257 The court applied the following standard: “A ‘material fact’ is one which 
would ‘naturally influence the judgment of [an] underwriter in making the contract 
at all, or in estimating the degree and character of the risk, or in fixing the rate of 
the premium.’” Id., at *8. 
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even with deference to Technology Square, on a motion for summary 
judgment.258  The court further held that it could not decide whether the 
claim was for a “known condition” on summary judgment “while the facts 
that form the basis for providing coverage are in dispute.”259  The court 
determined that both the materiality of the information and whether the 
facts constituted information about “known conditions” were questions of 
fact for the jury.260 
Thus, in both Goldenberg and Technology Square the court 
determined that the materiality of the information withheld and whether 
that information was related to a “known condition” were questions of 
fact.261  In both cases, the courts might better have considered who should 
bear responsibility for identifying and carefully defining known conditions.  
The party bearing this responsibility would shoulder the burden of seeking 
out additional information pertaining to the site, requesting additional due 
diligence if the scope of the risk was particularly unclear, and sifting 
through relevant and irrelevant information to ensure accurate underwriting 
and unambiguous policy terms. 
This approach would be in line with the policyholders’ arguments 
in Goldenberg and Technology Square.  In those cases the policyholders 
argued that the insurers should bear the burden of seeking additional 
information about risk.262  The implication of this argument is that a 
policyholder cannot misrepresent facts that it simply failed to recognize as 
important and that, if the insurer wants this information, it should ask for 
all the available data.  The insurer should not be allowed to claim 
misrepresentation when, in retrospect, it wishes it had known certain facts 
but never asked for such information—even though it knew more reports 
and data were available.   
Put more simply, the insurer should bear the burden of filtering 
through all the information in the name of efficiency.  If all reports are 
requested and the insured does not turn over certain documents, the case for 
misrepresentation of known conditions would be relatively clear.  If all the 
                                                                                                                 
258 Technology Square, 2007 WL 534450, at *10-*11. 
259 Id. at *13. 
260 Id.  The court also granted summary judgment on a claim that the policy 
was supposed to cover property damage, which was expressly excluded under 
Coverage A of the contract.  Id., at *13-*14. 
261 Id., at *12-*13; Goldenberg I, supra note 233, at *7-*9; see also Chambliss 
Ltd., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77664, at *15-*16. 
262 See Goldenberg I, supra note 233, at *3; see generally Technology Square, 
2007 WL 534450.   
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reports are requested and turned over, and the insurer fails to identify pre-
existing conditions from the reams of data, ignorance of the pre-existing 
condition becomes similarly clear. After all, the insurer is the repeat player 
with respect to performing risk assessment, and if it does not identify a risk 
when it has all relevant information, it would be hard to attribute superior 
knowledge to the insured.  Moreover, the insurer has the incentive to 
broadly define the known condition, whereas the insured may choose to 
turn a skeptical eye on the relevance and implications of the facts before 
them. The result would be fewer cases going to trial, because the scope of 
known information would reside in the hands of an insurance underwriter, 
rather than the subjective hands of the policyholder.  
A recent complaint by the Los Angeles Unified School District 
against AIG illustrates how this scenario might play out in practice. The 
school district was engaging in a school rehabilitation and construction 
project for which it purchased a PLL policy, which also contained Cost Cap 
provisions, from AIG after a bidding process.  During negotiations, AIG 
agreed to assume responsibility for identifying all “known conditions” and 
to include policy endorsements expressly listing those conditions.263  The 
goal of this arrangement was to provide the school district with certainty 
that no dispute would later arise about whether a condition was known or 
unknown at the time the Policy was issued.264  According to the school 
district’s complaint, the policy included two endorsements containing 
exhaustive lists of known pollution conditions.265 AIG initially denied 
certain claims as known conditions, but entered into settlement negotiations 
with the school district after the initial complaint was filed.266    
The case thus demonstrates the effectiveness of assigning the 
responsibility of identifying known conditions to the insurer.267  The 
approach clarifies what conditions should be deemed “known” under the 
policy, by producing the standard that anything the insurer failed to identify 
as a pre-existing condition is unknown for the purposes of the policy, 
assuming the policyholder turned over all requested information.  Where 
the insurer has the upfront responsibility of delineating what is “known” by 
collecting all pertinent information, the insurer has added incentive to play 
an information-forcing role.  It cannot, after a claim is produced, argue that 
the insured should have more clearly called attention to facts suggesting 
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267 See Waeger, supra note 72, at 65. 
2010]  INTO THE UNKNOWN                       501 
 
additional risk because the responsibility of doing so rested with its 
underwriters.  Misrepresentation cases will thus be limited to those 
situations where the insured withheld explicitly requested information. 
Applying contra proferentem to policies and adopting a narrow 
definition of “known conditions,” discussed earlier, would compliment 
burden-shifting the identification of known conditions to the insurer.  With 
the responsibility of identifying known conditions and the knowledge that 
the conditions will be narrowly defined, insurers will assume responsibility 
for drafting clearer, specific terms.  Furthermore, the insurer may feel 
compelled to set rigorous due diligence standards and disclosure 
requirements of all environmental reports.  Having thorough information 
on the table will reduce the gray area between known and unknown 
conditions that are leading to litigation. 
 
V. CONCLUSION: A TALE OF THREE BROWNFIELDS 
 
As environmental insurance policies continue to play a key role in 
the redevelopment of brownfields, courts should be aware of the policies’ 
unique role relative to other liability coverage.  Courts should interpret the 
terms of a policy in light of its relationship to its endorsements, while 
considering complimentary policies and regulatory influences. When 
construing its terms, particularly those pertaining to “known conditions,” 
the court should generally apply contra proferentem to encourage the 
insurer to play an information-forcing role while underwriting the policies.  
However, courts may wish to exercise their discretion and not apply contra 
proferentem where the policyholder is sophisticated and experienced with 
brownfield rehabilitation.   
An illustration of three brownfield projects may elucidate how the 
recommendations of this Note might play out in practice.  In each example, 
the court should first look to the policy language for guidance, analyzing 
the relationship between the endorsements and the standard form, perhaps 
considering complimentary policies for further guidance, and also taking 
into account relevant regulatory issues.  Should ambiguities remain, the 
court must assess whether application of contra proferentem is justified. 
At one extreme, Brownfield A is a “light” brownfield with little 
suspected contamination.  The site’s developer does not usually deal with 
contaminated properties and purchases a PLL policy to cover possible 
liabilities, including clean up of “unknown” conditions.  Remediation is not 
anticipated to be costly enough to justify the purchase of a Cost Cap policy 
to cover cost overruns in remediating “known” conditions.  Since initial 
due diligence reveals little evidence of contamination other than some 
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trash, the insurer and developer agree on a policy with relatively few 
negotiated endorsements.  Then, the developer discovers an oil barrel 
among the trash that has been leaking into the soil.  The insurer refuses to 
cover the clean-up, arguing that the harm was caused by a “known 
condition,” namely the trash on the property.  In this situation, a court 
would be justified in applying contra proferentem to the “known 
conditions” exclusion and holding that the spilled oil was not “known” for 
the purposes of the PLL policy.  The bargaining power between the parties 
was relatively unequal and the policy had few individually negotiated 
components.  And, unlike the insurer, the policyholder was not a repeat 
player and did not own a portfolio of sites.  The insurer was thus in a better 
position to clarify the environmental risks and to ask questions about what 
due diligence might be necessary, assuming an information-forcing role. 
On the opposite extreme, Brownfield B is a site with more 
substantial suspected contamination.  The developer is a large multinational 
corporation that is currently remediating ten brownfields nation-wide and 
has successfully developed one hundred brownfields in the past twenty 
years.  After substantial due diligence, the developer holds a series of 
meetings between its project managers, lawyers, and environmental 
consultants and representatives of its insurer.  The parties discuss and 
thoroughly negotiate expanding the developer’s current PLL policy to 
cover Brownfield B and obtain a Cost Cap policy for the same purpose.  
The developer performs further due diligence at the prompting of the 
insurer, and the parties carefully identify the site’s “known conditions” 
before issuing coverage.  Thereafter, a dispute arises over whether the 
developer misrepresented its knowledge of four storage tanks not marked 
on a map turned over to the insurer.  A court in this case would be justified 
in refusing to apply contra proferentem because both parties were in a 
position of familiarity with environmental remediation and insurance 
policies.  Less justification thus exists for placing the burden of 
information-forcing on the insurer. 
Somewhere along the middle of the spectrum is Brownfield C 
which has substantial contamination and a sophisticated developer 
remediating it.  The developer has redeveloped several brownfields in the 
past, but does not have a portfolio of properties.  When a known condition 
dispute arises over insurance coverage for this site, the court will have a 
more difficult task than with Brownfield A and B in assessing whether 
contra proferentem is appropriate. Factors the court might consider would 
be the relative sophistication of the developer and the extent of the 
developer’s experience with brownfield rehabilitation.  The court could 
also consider whether the insurer failed to perform adequate due diligence 
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in the underwriting or if the policyholder misrepresented information it 
should reasonably have known would be relevant to assessing the site’s 
risks. 
Generally speaking, courts may wish to give deference to the 
policyholder, and apply contra proferentem unless the policyholder is truly 
as sophisticated in assessing environmental risks as the insurer.  Greater 
predictability regarding interpretation considerations and reduced litigation 
over potentially ambiguous terms will enhance environmental insurance’s 
appeal as a tool for managing risk when redeveloping brownfields. 
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THE LIABILITY INSURANCE REGULATION OF 
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AFTER THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 
SEXUAL ABUSE SCANDAL 
Alana Bartley1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Both religion and insurance play important roles in the lives of 
many around the world.  And while one may never think of religion and 
insurance as being interrelated, they can both be seen as serving the same 
underlying purpose.  As William Sumner has suggested, religion is an 
ancient form of insurance, since mankind “has tried in all ages somehow to 
insure himself – to take out a ‘policy’ of some sort on which he has paid 
regular premiums in some form of self-denial or sacrifice.”2  This view 
presents an interesting comparison when considering the role of insurance 
in the sexual abuse scandal of the Roman Catholic Church.   
The sexual abuse scandal within the Roman Catholic Church 
occurred in two distinct waves.3  The first instance in which knowledge of 
clergy sexual abuse became public was in the 1980s, when accounts of 
molestation by a widely-regarded priest in Louisiana surfaced in the 
media.4  Yet, like most news phenomena, the stories eventually faded from 
the news until another resurgence occurred in the 2000s.5  In 2002, many 
people throughout the United States began coming forward with allegations 
that they had been victims of sexual misconduct by Roman Catholic 
priests. 6  There were so many allegations that it was impossible for Church 
officials to dispute the claims of sexual misconduct.7  Although similar 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 J.D. Candidate, University of Connecticut School of Law, 2010; B.A., 
College of the Holy Cross, 2007.   
2 See Spencer L. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A 
Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 479-
80 (1961) (quoting SUMNER & KELLER, THE SCIENCE OF SOCIETY 749 (1927)). 
3 See infra text accompanying notes 25 to 68. 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 25 to 37. 
5 See infra text accompanying notes 38 to 68. 
6 Nearly 200 people have come forward so far–all alleging that they were 
abused by the same priest, Father John J. Geoghan. See THE INVESTIGATIVE STAFF 
OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, BETRAYAL: THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 6 
(Little, Brown & Co. 2008).  However, Geoghan was one of many priests who 
committed acts of sexual misconduct against parishioners. Id. 
7 See infra text accompanying notes 56 to 61. 
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allegations had been previously made public, the shear number of 
allegations arising at this time and the extensive media coverage of these 
stories of sexual misconduct made it seem like clergy sexual abuse was a 
relatively new problem for religious institutions;8 however, allegations of 
sexual misconduct by members of the Roman Catholic clergy were not a 
recent phenomenon, 9 and allegations have plagued other religious groups 
as well.10  One study conducted estimated that approximately four percent 
of all Catholic priests serving between 1950 and 2002 have been accused of 
sexual misconduct.11  The problem of sexual misconduct by priests within 
the Catholic Church was even confirmed by the repeated apologies of Pope 
John Paul II.12 
As victims of clergy sexual abuse came forward, courts became 
overwhelmed with the unique legal issues the sexual abuse cases 
presented.13  When the first wave of accusations arose in the 1980s, diocese 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 See infra text accompanying notes 42 to 45. 
9 Pamela Ferdinand, Report Reveals Long History of Abuse by Boston Clergy, 
WASH. POST, July 23, 2003, at A03 (“More than 1,000 people were likely sexually 
abused by more than 250 clergy and church workers in the Boston archdiocese 
over six decades.”); Jay Tokasz, Pedophilia's Causes Complex: Counselors Say 
Need for Power, Misplaced Sexual Urges Play Roles, DEMOCRAT & CHRON. 
(Rochester, N.Y.), Aug. 18, 2002, at 10A (featuring decades-old accusations of 
abuse against a Capuchin priest); Draft Survey: 4,450 Priests Accused of Sex 
Abuse, CNN, Feb. 17, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/02/16/church.abuse/ 
index.html [hereinafter Draft Survey] (detailing allegations of abuse from 1950 to 
2002). 
10 James T. O’Reilly & JoAnn M. Strasser, Clergy Sexual Misconduct: 
Confronting the Difficult Constitutional and Institutional Liability Issues, 7 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 31, 34 (1994) (“The Presbyterian Church U.S.A. estimates that 10 
to 23 percent of clergy nationwide have engaged in inappropriate sexual behavior 
or sexual contact . . . The United Methodist Church reported in a 1990 survey that 
nearly 23 percent of the laywomen had been sexually harassed, 17 percent by their 
own pastor and 9 percent by another minister.”). 
11 Draft Survey, supra note 9. 
12 See, e.g., Pope's Web Apology over Sex Abuse, CNN, Nov. 23, 2001, 
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/11/22/pope.apology/; Alessio Vinci, 
Pope Responds to Sex Abuse Cases, CNN, Mar. 22, 2002, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2002/WORLD/europe/03/21/vatican.sex.abuse/. 
13 Jesse J. Cooke, Beyond an Unfortunate “Occurrence”: Insurance Coverage 
and the Equitable Redress of Victims of Sexual Predator Priests, 36 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 
1039, 1041 n.10 (2004) (noting the various issues as including: “[H]ow far, if at 
all, will the courts, as instruments of the government, interfere with the Catholic 
Diocese, a religious entity protected by First Amendment concepts of separation of 
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possessed general liability insurance to cover injuries occurring on church 
property.14  One of the main issues within the cases arising during this time 
was whether the general liability insurance for the Churches covered the 
lawsuits and injuries arising out of the priest’s sexual misconduct.15  Often, 
this question rested on the Court’s interpretation of the definition of 
“occurrence,”16 which is commonly defined as “an ‘accident’ that ‘results 
in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the 
standpoint of the insured.”17  Courts found that the question of whether 
there is coverage turns on the Court’s interpretation of what is an “accident 
. . . neither expected nor intended.”18  Courts have reached varying 
outcomes on this issue.19  As a result, liability insurance companies began 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
church and state; how would courts be willing to extend applicable statute of 
limitations in instances where victims' memories of abuse were recovered only 
after years of repression; how should criminal penalties and civil sanctions be 
adjusted to address the particularly heinous nature of these acts; how would further 
governmental oversight of internal church activities be implemented to interrupt 
the common church practice of nonreporting the allegations filed by parishioners; 
how would courts mandate that the Catholic diocese's insurance carriers indemnify 
any awards to abuse victims as the perpetrator's employer; how would courts 
determine liability for conduct that was often repeated, involved numerous victims, 
and extended over long periods of time.”). 
14 See TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE: HOW 
LAWSUITS HELPED THE CATHOLIC CHURCH CONFRONT CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE 76 
(Harvard Univ. Press 2008). 
15 See infra text accompanying notes 77 to 85. 
16 Liability insurance policies can either afford coverage for claims or 
occurrences.  A claims-based insurance policy covers all claims made in the year 
of the policy.  See Graman v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 409 N.E.2d 387, 390 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1980) (“It is well-established that the 'claims made' or 'discovery' policy is 
characterized by coverage for negligent acts or omissions only if such are 
discovered during and brought to the attention of the insurer within the policy 
term.”).  Compare Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 59 
(3d Cir. 1982) (“Occurrence policies indemnify the insured for acts or occurrences 
which take place within the policy period.”).  Whether coverage is based on an 
occurrence policy or a claims-based policy depends on the language of the policy 
and the court’s interpretation of the policy.  James A. Serritella, Insurance 
Coverage Issues in Cases of Clergy Misconduct, 39 CATH. LAW. 55, 57 (1999).  
This article deals solely with occurrence policies. 
17 ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 518-19 (1988) 
(1988). 
18 Id. 
19 McAuliffe v. N. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 69 F.3d 277, 279 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that a liability insurance policy held by the Catholic Diocese of Jefferson City, 
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including clauses specifically exempting injuries and lawsuits arising out of 
sexual misconduct in policies sold to religious institutions.20  The 
exemption of sexual misconduct from general liability insurance policies 
has caused religious institutions to specifically purchase insurance against 
clergy sexual misconduct, in addition to their general liability insurance 
policy.21  However, even when the sexual misconduct policies have been 
purchased, not all claims are accepted under the policy, and the vast 
majority of claims are denied.22  This article will show that through these 
actions, liability insurance companies have shifted the risk back to the 
religious institutions and have, in a sense, “regulated” religious institutions, 
causing them to be more proactive in taking precautions to prevent their 
clergy from committing acts of sexual misconduct with parishioners. 
Part I of this Note describes the history of the Catholic Church 
sexual abuse scandal, delineated into two periods of litigations, each 
induced by a significant case.  Statistics of the amount of clergy sexual 
abuse claims are also discussed.  Part II addresses liability insurance 
generally, and then details how liability insurance has affected the Catholic 
Church sexual abuse scandal.  Part III discusses the litigation of clergy 
sexual abuse cases, including how the term “occurrence” in liability 
insurance policies has been interpreted by the courts.  Part III also describes 
how “bodily injury” has been interpreted by courts in clergy sexual abuse 
cases.  Part IV addresses the aftermath of litigation, including how courts 
have dealt with self-insured retentions when damages are awarded.  Part IV 
also discusses how liability insurance policies for religious institutions have 
changed in the aftermath of the Catholic sexual abuse scandal. 
 
I. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH SEXUAL ABUSE SCANDAL 
 
A.  HISTORY 
 
Reports of sexual abuse by priests within the Catholic Church can 
be found dating back to the nineteenth century.23  However, these instances 
attracted little to no press coverage and were largely unknown because the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Missouri excluded coverage of claims arising out of a priest’s sexual relationship 
with a parishioner).  Compare infra text accompanying notes 133 to 156. 
20 LYTTON, supra note 14, at 76-77. 
21 See id. at 76. 
22 Id. at 77. 
23 Id. at 43. 
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resulting civil claims were quietly settled.24  In 1984, a civil lawsuit 
alleging clergy sexual abuse filed against Father Gilbert Gauthe and the 
Diocese of Lafayette attracted national attention to clergy sexual abuse.  As 
a result, many other victims of clergy sexual abuse came forward and also 
filed claims.   Yet, as what occurs with many news phenomena, the stories 
of clergy sexual abuse faded from the public’s consciousness until 2002, 
when another shocking case of clergy sexual molestation claimed the 
media’s attention.  As with the Gauthe case, the Geoghan case also led to a 
surge of victims to come forward and make claims against the Church. 
 
1. 1984-1991 
 
Father Gauthe was a highly regarded priest in Henry, Louisiana.25  
However, during his five and a half year tenure, he sexually molested 
young boys in his parish.26  Gauthe was first accused when a 9-year-old 
child told his parents of the abuse, stating that the incident made him think 
that “God doesn’t love [him].”27  When the boy’s parents discussed the 
matter with other parents in the community, it was discovered that 
Gauthe’s exploitation did not end with one boy.28  The parents of the 
violated children went to a local attorney, who voiced a complaint to the 
bishops of the diocese.29  In response, the bishops removed Gauthe from 
the diocese, but they refused to publicly announce why he was removed or 
what he had done.30  Frustrated by the Church’s response to their 
complaint, the families filed suit.31 
At the time of the Gauthe case, other cases alleging clergy sexual 
abuse had been previously filed in California, Oregon, Idaho, Wisconsin, 
Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Rhode Island.32  Yet 
the Gauthe case gave clergy sexual abuse national attention as it was 
covered in Time magazine, the New York Times, and the Washington 
Post.33  However, only the American public was first learning of the clergy 
sexual abuse epidemic; the Catholic Church had known about the problem 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 1. 
26 LYTTON, supra note 14, at 1. 
27 Id. at 1. 
28 Id. at 1-2. 
29 Id. at 2. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 LYTTON, supra note 14, at 2. 
33 Id. at 14. 
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of clergy sexual abuse for years.34  In response to the media attention on the 
case, states increased reporting requirements and relaxed their statute of 
limitations for child sexual abuse.35  In addition, youth programs 
implemented required fingerprinting, background checks, and references of 
people working with children.36   
The Gauthe case paved the way for the national attention on clergy 
sexual abuse cases.  After the case hit the mainstream media, victims of 
clergy sexual abuse began coming forward with their stories and a number 
of cases alleging clergy sexual abuse were filed. 37  However, similar to the 
previous era where the allegations did not make national headlines, most of 
these cases quietly settled.38  As a result, clergy sexual abuse faded from 
the nation’s conscience.  In 2002, clergy sexual abuse was once again 
thrust onto the front pages of the newspapers with the emergence of sexual 
abuse claims against Father Geoghan and the Boston Archdiocese.    
 
2. 2002- Present 
 
Stories of the most current wave of clergy sexual abuse within the 
Catholic Church first began appearing in the Boston Globe in the winter of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 “[P]ersonnel files in dioceses around the country document complaints 
dating back to the 1930s.”  Id. 
In 1976 the Servants of the Paraclete [a Catholic religious order] 
opened what was perhaps the first program in the world with a 
treatment regime designed to treat psychosexual disorders 
including disorders involving the sexual abuse of minors.  The 
ability of the Catholic community to design and implement such 
a program is both a reflection of the need for such a program and 
the degree of knowledge of the scope of the problem of sexual 
misconduct with children by Catholic priests and religious.  The 
fact that preparations for the opening of the program were years 
in the making demonstrates widespread knowledge of existing 
sexual misconduct with minors by Catholic clergy by the late 
1960s and early 1970s.  
A.W. Richard Sipe, Sipe Report (BishopAccountability.org, Waltham, MA), at ¶ 
48, available at www.bishopaccountability.org/tx-dallas/resource-files/snipe-
report.htm. 
35 LYTTON, supra note 14, at 15. 
36 Id. 
37 According to a study commissioned by the U.S. Conference of Catholic 
Bishops, 328 abuse reports were made in the five years prior to the Gauthe case, 
while 817 were received in the five years following. Id. 
38 See INVESTIGATIVE STAFF, supra note 6, at 3-4. 
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2002.39  What differentiated these stories from the previous wave was that 
the stories not only featured the acts of sexual abuse committed by 
individual priests, but they also detailed the lengths other high-ranking 
priests, including Cardinal Bernard F. Law, the most influential American 
Catholic priest, had gone to cover up the incidents of sexual abuse.40  The 
public was shocked by the accusations, as the acts of sexual misconduct 
violated childrens’ innocence, parents’ trust, priestly vows, bishops’ 
responsibilities, and the basic tenants of the Catholic Church.41  However, 
the evidence supporting the claims of the acts of sexual abuse, and the 
massive cover-up of these claims, was irrefutable.42   
Before the news of the Geoghan sexual abuse cases broke, lawyers 
for the Church would quietly settle cases with sexual abuse victims.43  
However, after the news broke, these same lawyers publicly declared the 
private settlement agreements not to be in the Church’s or the public’s best 
interest, as the extent of the sexual abuse remained concealed.44  
Additionally, law enforcement officers in Boston, who had previously 
turned a blind eye to accusations of sexual misconduct due to fear of 
exposing the Church they belonged to, began to seek records so they could 
decide whether to prosecute priests who had committed sexual abuse.45  
Within these records, there was overwhelming evidence that the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 Id. at 3. 
[Boston] became the epicenter of the scandal, because the story 
broke there, because of the sheer number of priests implicated 
there, and because of the Catholic character of the city.  More 
than 2 million of the 3.8 million people who live in the 
metropolitan Boston area are Catholic.  It is the only major 
archdiocese in the United States where Catholics account for 
more than half of the population.  In no other major American 
city are Catholics more represented in police precincts, 
courtrooms, or boardrooms.   
Id. at 7. 
40 Id. at 3.  Cardinal Law and the members of the Boston Archdiocese were 
not the only Church officials to cover up accusations of clergy sexual abuse.  The 
practice of removing accused priests to other dioceses was widespread.  Cardinal 
Law’s involvement was shocking to the public, however, because he was a widely 
known and influential figurehead of the Catholic Church. Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 See INVESTIGATIVE STAFF, supra note 6, at 3-4. 
44 Id. at 4. 
45 Id. 
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Archdiocese of Boston chose to protect the reputation of the Church at the 
expense of the sexual abuse victims.46 
Boston was not the only Archdiocese implicated by the Catholic 
Church sexual abuse scandal.47  Across the country, many priests were 
pulled from their assignments;48 Bishops across the United States and 
Europe resigned.49  The Pope addressed the scandal in his Holy Thursday 
letter to priests, but his statements in this letter were meant to “comfort 
good priests,” and did not mention the victims at all.50   
Others within the Church were more sympathetic to the sexual 
abuse victims.  In his Good Friday letter, Cardinal Law stated,  
 
Betrayal hangs like a heavy cloud over the Church 
today…While we do not presume to judge anyone’s 
relationship with God, there is no doubt that a betrayal of 
trust is at the heart of the evil in the sexual abuse of 
children by clergy.  Priests should be trustworthy beyond 
any shadow of a doubt.  When some have broken that trust, 
all of us suffer the consequences.51 
 
Even with his sympathetic public statements, opinion polls found a 
sense of disillusionment among parishioners with the Cardinal’s handling 
of the sexual abuse scandal; many called for Cardinal Law to resign.52  
Many Catholics responded to the church’s handling of the scandal by 
withholding money from the archdiocese.53   
Three months after the news of the scandal broke, the Pope 
summoned all of the American cardinals to the Vatican for an emergency 
meeting.54  At this meeting, the Pope’s tone changed drastically from his 
Holy Thursday letter.  He stated that the sexual abuse of minors by priests 
was not only an “appalling sin” but was also a crime.55  Also unlike his 
previous letter, the Pope addressed the victims of the clergy sexual abuse, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 Id. 
47 See id.   
48 In the United States, 176 priests were pulled in the first four months of 
2002. Id. 
49.Id. 
50 INVESTIGATIVE STAFF, supra note 6, at 4 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 5. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 INVESTIGATIVE STAFF, supra note 6, at 5. 
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stating “[t]o the victims and their families, wherever they may be, I express 
my profound sense of solidarity and concern.”56   
In contrast to the past, the Church could not deny the existence of a 
sexual abuse problem when the documents from the Boston Archdiocese 
clearly demonstrated Cardinal Law and his aides were repeatedly warned 
about certain priests, but took no action to keep them from sexually abusing 
children.57  The alarming case of Father Geoghan was the most prominently 
featured in exposing the cover-up.58   
Geoghan was a serial molester.59  Almost two hundred claims of 
sexual abuse were filed against him and his supervisors, and some believe 
that the number of his actual victims could be three to four times as many 
as have made claims.60  Geoghan’s astounding number of victims is due to 
the fact that when a complaint was filed against him in a particular parish, 
he would be moved to a new parish and his new parishioners would not be 
made aware of the previous allegations of sexual abuse made against him.61  
Although Geoghan’s case is the most notorious, and perhaps the most 
egregious, moving accused priests from one parish to another was a 
common practice throughout the Catholic Church when allegations of 
sexual misconduct arose.62 
Geoghan’s victims came forward and filed suits against him and 
the Church.  The Church’s lawyer successfully moved to have the case files 
sealed, as was common in clergy sexual abuse cases.63  However, the 
Boston Globe, who was looking to do a series on clergy abuse, sued to have 
the case files unsealed.64  The Judge ruled in favor of the Globe, and the 
resulting series was the spark that re-ignited national attention on the clergy 
sexual abuse cases.65  These documents provided much of the proof that the 
Church knew of the abuse complaints against Geoghan, yet continued to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 5-6. 
58 See id. at 6. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 INVESTIGATIVE STAFF, supra note 6. 
62 See id.  In one case, Cardinal Law wrote another diocese and gave a priest, 
who he knew had been accused of sexual abuse, a good retirement letter and stated 
that the priest should head a Church-run guest home, whose guests included 
youths. Id. 
63 LYTTON, supra note 14, at 33.  It is for this reason that there have only been 
periods of media coverage of clergy sexual abuse cases. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
514! CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL       [Vol. 16:2         
!
move him from parish to parish.66  As with the Gauthe case, the national 
attention of the Geoghan case induced a resurgence of suits by victims of 
clergy sexual abuse.   
 
B. STATISTICS 
 
The fact that the Gauthe and Geoghan cases caused increases in 
clergy sexual abuse claims can be illustrated by insurance company data 
during this time period.  Between 1989 and 2005, “Company A” provided 
sexual misconduct coverage to U.S. Catholic dioceses.67  Between 1990 to 
the present, “Company A’s” market share of clergy sexual misconduct 
coverage was “30 percent in 1990, 40 percent in 1995, 45 percent in 2000, 
and 50 percent in 2005.”68  Of a total of 275 clergy sexual abuse 
misconduct claims made against policies, over one-third of the claims were 
made in the times after the Gauthe case and during the Geoghan case.69  
Therefore, the data shows that the media attention of these two sexual 
abuse cases caused a dramatic increase in clergy sexual abuse claims.   
However, the fact that a claim of clergy sexual abuse has been 
made by a victim does not guarantee the victim will see restitution.70  The 
surge of claims filed after the Gauthe cause opened the door for a bounty of 
insurance issues that needed to be resolved before it was decided if victims 
would receive damages.   
 
II. HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE HAS AFFECTED THE 
CATHOLIC CHURCH SEXUAL ABUSE SCANDAL 
 
A.  LIABILITY INSURANCE IN GENERAL 
 
A basic tenant of liability insurance is that it compensates for 
accidental injuries or unexpected loss; intentional acts are not covered.71  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 53. 
68 Id. 
69 See LYTTON, supra note 14, at 53. 
70 McAuliffe, 69 F.3d at 280 (holding that a liability insurance policy held by 
the Catholic Diocese of Jefferson City, Missouri excluded coverage of claims 
arising out of a priest’s sexual relationship with a parishioner). 
71 Serritella, supra note 16, at 55; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mauldin, 869 F. Supp. 
478, 479 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (noting "courts afford coverage for fortuitous damages 
but deny coverage when damages are the natural and probable consequences of 
intentional conduct."). 
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“If a single insured is allowed to consciously control the risks covered by 
the policy, a central concept of insurance is violated."72  For example, most 
owners of commercial property obtain a commercial general liability 
insurance policy to protect themselves against the risk of liability for 
accidents and injuries occurring on their property.73  Religious institutions 
are no different.   
When a policy is obtained, the insuring agreement obligates the 
insurer to pay any legal obligations of the insured due to bodily injury or 
property damage caused by an occurrence during the policy period.74  The 
coverage for these policies typically provides for bodily injury or property 
damage to a third party, medical expenses accruing to the underlying 
incident, and the costs of defending lawsuits.75  The cost of a lawsuit 
includes investigations and settlements, and any bonds or judgments 
required during an appeal process.76   
Whether coverage will be extended under the policy is determined 
by whether the claimed event can be considered an “occurrence.”77  In 
commercial general liability insurance policies, an “occurrence” is typically 
defined as “[a]n accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 
conditions, which results during the policy period in bodily injury or 
property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the 
insured.”78  When claims are made against them, the insured turns to the 
general liability carrier for defense and indemnification in the event 
damages are awarded. 
In the context of the Catholic Sexual Abuse scandal, “[d]efinitions, 
exclusions, and occurrence provisions make up the significant policy 
language where damages are sought against the Diocese.”79  These terms 
have been extremely relevant when parishioners allege priests have 
committed unthinkable crimes against them.80  As most parishes only 
carried general liability insurance when the initial wave of claims of clergy 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386, 1392 n.7 
(8th Cir. 1996). 
73 Commercial general liability insurance policies can also insure businesses 
from exposure to liability related to their products. 
74 KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 408 (3d. 2000). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Cooke, supra note 13, at 1043. 
80 Id. at 1044. 
516! CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL       [Vol. 16:2         
!
sexual abuse arose,81 courts were forced to use definitions, exclusions, and 
insurance provisions to decide whether and how church insurance policy 
language applies in cases where victims of clergy sexual abuse were 
awarded civil damages. 
The analysis of what constitutes an occurrence in resolving 
whether there is liability insurance coverage has many crucial 
determinations.  Concluding what events are considered to be occurrences, 
the time an occurrence is found to have taken place, and the number of 
occurrences that took place is critical, especially when coverage is 
disputed.82  Insurance coverage for an incident often depends on the event 
falling within the policy’s definition of an occurrence.83  Also, when a 
policyholder has taken a succession of policies over time, the date of the 
occurrence determines which policy the claim falls under.84  The 
determination of which policy covers the claim is important because all 
liability insurance policies are sold with specific limits on the amount of 
money that the insurer is obligated to pay for a particular claim or event.85  
The insurer’s payment will not exceed this amount even if damages owed 
by the insured are greater.86  Therefore, the amount of insurance coverage 
available to the insured is affected by the number of occurrences found to 
have taken place during a specific period of time.   
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 See LYTTON, supra note 14, at 76.  “ . . . Michael Bemi, president and CEO 
of The National Catholic Risk Retention Group, one of the primary liability 
insurance providers to the Catholic Church” stated: 
[T]he Gauthe claims, we’ve all since learned, were just the tip of 
the iceberg.  But they were spectacular at the time and 
[reinsurance] underwriters at Lloyd’s  . . .  took 100 percent loss 
ratios [i.e., zero profit on the coverage sold], simply based on 
sexual misconduct claims that they never expected to pay 
because they didn’t think there were going to be sexual 
misconduct claims . . . So they really took a beating.  
82 Cooke, supra note 13, at 1043. 
83 See ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at 408. 
84 Cooke, supra note 13, at 1043. 
85 Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways That Liability 
Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L. J. 1, 6 (2005).  In addition 
to per-claim or per-event limits, an insurance policy may also have a specified 
limit on the amount of money the insurer is obligated to pay for all claims covered 
by the policy as a whole. Id. 
86 Id. 
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B.  LIABILITY INSURANCE AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH SEXUAL 
ABUSE SCANDAL 
 
As insurance has become increasingly more entwined with tort 
law, it has been noted that “[i][i]nsurance has a fundamental effect on . . . 
the defendant’s ability to pay and the facility with which the defendant can 
be made to pay.”87  Because of consumer debt, the ability of bankruptcy to 
discharge civil liabilities, and the existence of exemptions to the assets that 
must be liquidated in a bankruptcy proceeding, “liability insurance is the 
only asset that plaintiffs can count on collecting.”88  Guaranteed collection 
is a very important notion in the context of the sexual abuse claims against 
the church as priests have little to no assets.  As a result, for a claimant to 
be successful in obtaining damages, and a lawyer working on a 
contingency basis to want to handle their case, there has to be a party who 
has the ability to pay the damage award.  For this reason, the diocese and 
their respective insurers are always named as defendants in claims alleging 
clergy sexual abuse.89  They have much larger bank accounts than the 
priests who commit the offenses.90 
The problem with the insurance coverage for sexual abuse acts is 
that sexual abuse, by definition, is never an accidental act.91  Yet, as 
previously discussed,92 liability insurance policies have an exclusion for 
intention harm,93 and only apply to “occurrence[s]…neither expected nor 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87 Id. at 4.  
88 Id.  
89 See id. 
90 Derrick Z. Jackson, Archdiocese Adds Up as Big Business, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Feb. 13, 2002, available at http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/stories/ 
021302_jackson.htm (“Nationally, the Catholic Church takes in $8.2 billion a year 
in donations at the parish level . . .  plac[ing] the church ahead of R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco, Pepsi bottling, John Hancock Financial Services, General Mills, Kellogg, 
America Online, Union Carbide, Campbell’s Soup, and Quaker Oats [in terms of 
revenues.]”). 
91 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 2242 (West 2000) (“Whoever . . . knowingly . . . 
engages in a sexual act with another person if that other person is . . . incapable of 
appraising the nature of the conduct; or physically incapable of declining 
participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act; or 
attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for any term of 
years or for life.”). 
92 See supra text accompanying notes 76 to 82. 
93 Baker, supra note 85, at 8 (“[T]he exclusion for intentional harm . . . is 
nearly universal in liability insurance policies in the U.S. covering bodily injury.”). 
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intended.”94  Because of this exclusion, plaintiffs looking to recover large 
damage awards must allege a form of negligence on the part of the Church 
in order for their incident to be covered under the Church’s insurance 
policy.  In cases alleging clergy sexual abuse, this has been done under the 
theories of respondeat superior, negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
clergy malpractice, and negligent/reckless hiring and supervision.95  Claims 
made under the theory of negligent supervision have had the most 
success.96   
Within the theory of negligence, liability attaches to a person if the 
person fails to employ reasonable care and subsequently injures another 
person.97  However, liability only exists under these circumstances when 
(1) the injury that occurred could have been reasonably foreseen and care 
could have been taken to prevent it and (2) where the risk of the injury did 
not arise due to third party conduct, unless a special relationship exists 
between either the liable person and the third party injurer or the liable 
person and the victim.98   
When defending against a claim of negligent supervision, the 
diocese needs to show that it did not expect nor intend for injuries to occur 
to be covered by liability insurance.99  Any evidence that would establish a 
reasonable foreseeability on the part of the diocese would make it 
impossible for an event to be considered an occurrence.100  During the 
Catholic Church sexual abuse scandal, it was discovered that many 
churches kept extensive documentation of internal Church communications 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94 ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at 408.  
95 Cooke, supra note 13, at 1051. 
96 Soc’y of the Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Lafayette & Lake 
Charles, Inc. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 26 F.3d 1359 (5th Cir. 1994) (denying 
parent’s claims, but awarding negligent supervision claims); Rita M. v. Roman 
Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685, 690 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) 
(setting aside respondeat superior claims because the abuse was not a required duty 
of the priest and abuse was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the 
priest’s duties); O’Reilly & Strasser, supra note 10, at 39 (“State courts have 
tended to decline the invitation to apply respondeat superior to clergy sexual 
misconduct.”). 
97 LYTTON, supra note 14, at 58. 
98 Id. 
99 See id. 
100 See id. 
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revealing the Church’s awareness of priests who had numerous abuse 
allegations made against them, and their resulting relocations.101 
The Church practice of relocating priests who had sexual 
misconduct allegations lodged against them was longstanding.102   This 
practice continued until the media discovered the extensive sexual abuse 
allegations and more careful scrutiny was placed on the Church.103  The 
documentation proving that the Catholic Church authorities were aware of 
many abusive priests and did little to prevent the abuse from continuing 
made them susceptible to claims of negligence within lawsuits.104   
Although the Church did know about the sexual abuse allegations, 
law enforcement officials did not.105  Victims who came forward usually 
filed formal complaints against the priest with the Church, so many of the 
matters were handled informally and kept away from the public 
knowledge.106  The practice of relocating accused priests, in part, stems 
from the fact that most laws which compel the disclosure of sexual abuse 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
101 Cooke, supra note 13, at 1051-52.  The Catholic Church, when an 
allegation of sexual abuse was received, would, either verbally or in writing, 
reprimand the priest, mandate therapy, and then relocate them to a different area 
where the allegations would be unknown to the parishioners. Id.  
102 See supra text accompanying notes 57 to 62. 
103 See, e.g., INVESTIGATIVE STAFF, supra note 6, at 53 (stating that Father 
John Geoghan committed known sexual abuse for thirty years in six different 
parishes). 
104 A February 9, 1996 letter from the Archbishop of Boston to Father 
Graham, a priest accused of sexual abuse, shows the Church was aware of the 
allegations and did nothing to prevent them.  The letter reads, in part:  
The Review Board and the Delegate have recommended that 
your case be determined to be a case reported and handled 
appropriately before the present Policy was in place, and thus 
one to which the Policy does not apply.  They recommended that 
you do not require further assessment and there should be no 
limits or restrictions on your ministry.  I hereby approve the 
recommendation. 
Letter from Cardinal Bernard Law, Archbishop of Boston, to Reverend Daniel M. 
Graham, Saint Joseph Rectory (Feb. 9, 1996), available at 
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/documents/law_letter_020996.htm. 
105 See supra text accompanying notes 43 to 46. 
106 See, e.g., INVESTIGATIVE STAFF, supra note 6, at 53 (stating that Father 
John Geoghan committed known sexual abuse for thirty years in six different 
parishes). 
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accusations apply specifically to professional organizations.107  These laws 
do not expressly require Church officials to report these accusations.108  In 
the states that require disclosure from religious institutions, the churches 
claimed they were not aware of mandatory-reporting laws, argued that 
these types of matters were best handled within the Church, or contended 
that reporting these types of matters to law enforcement would have been 
contrary to the Church’s “culture of forgiveness.”109   
 
III. LITIGATING CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 
 
A.  HOW “OCCURRENCE” HAS BEEN INTERPRETED BY THE 
COURTS 
 
On its own, the Catholic Church has taken a very passive stance in 
redressing the harms to the clergy sexual abuse victims.  Many times, the 
Church would make an accused priest go to therapy for their molestation of 
children.110  The Roman Catholic Church has internal rules that inhibit a 
priest’s discharge for sexual misconduct,111 although the Church forbids 
sexual misconduct.112  Perhaps for this reason, courts have tried to work 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
107 Mark Clayton, Why Child Abuse Goes Unreported, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR, Mar. 18, 2002, http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0318/p01s05-usju.html 
(noting that “[eighteen] states have mandatory-reporting laws that do not 
specifically require clergy to report sexual abuse of children . . . [nineteen] 
mandate that church officials . . . pass on information . . . [and in six states] the 
clergy’s status is unclear.  Seven states always require churches to relay 
information, even what’s heard in the confessional . . .”). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Kate S. Lombardi, Parish Recalls Priest in a Sex Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 
25, 1993, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/25/nyregion/parish-
recalls-priest-in-a-sex-case.html. 
111 For instance, the Code of Canon Law mandates the intervention of the 
Vatican before releasing a priest from his duties for sexual misconduct where 
psychological or physical deficiencies are present. See 1983 CODE c.1324, § 1, 
available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG1104/_P4W.HTM (stating that 
punishments for violations “be tempered” if the violation was committed “by a 
person who had only the imperfect use of reason . . . because of drunkenness or . . . 
similar culpable disturbance of mind.”). See also id. at c.1342-53, available at 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG1104/_P50.HTM (limiting the unilateral 
actions of those administering penalties). 
112 Id. at c.1395, § 2, available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/ 
ENG1104/_P56.HTM. 
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with the policy language to find coverage so victims can receive some form 
of remedy. 
Courts seeking to redress victims of clergy sexual abuse have had a 
difficult time with the accidental nature of occurrence defined in the policy 
language.  “Clever judicial constructions of occurrence have resulted in 
unpredictable, often excessive, coverage awards to churches found to be 
liable to abuse victims.”113  Single-injury cases have proved to be the 
exception, however, as they have almost unanimously been found to 
involve only one occurrence.114  Cases where the abuse has occurred over a 
long period of time, where many victims are involved, where multiple 
insurance providers have been used by the diocese, and where varying 
layers of coverage exist require a more intricate analysis. 
 
1. The Fifth Circuit 
 
Society of the Roman Catholic Church v. Interstate Fire & 
Casualty Co.115 presented the question of how many occurrences took place 
in a sexual abuse situation involving two priests who abused over thirty 
children over a six-year time span.116  Although the exact number of 
instances of molestation was not disclosed in the case, it was agreed to by 
the parties that each child had been abused at least one time per year over 
the six year period.117  During this time frame, the diocese had numerous 
primary and excess insurance policies.118   
The District Court held that each abused child constituted an 
occurrence and that the first encounter rule should be used in delegating 
coverage among insurers.119  In reaching this conclusion, the Court applied 
the effects test, which treated each individual victim as an individual 
occurrence.120  The rationale of the effects test is that the number of 
occurrences should be determined from the standpoint of the insured, not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
113 Cooke, supra note 13, at 1054. 
114 ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at 442. 
115 26 F.3d 1359. 
116 Id. at 1361. 
117 Id. at 1361-62. 
118 Id. at 1362. 
119 Id. at 1362-63.  The first encounter rule is defined by the court as saying 
that “the insurance carrier covering the Diocese during the occurrence of the first 
molestation of each child was responsible for all resulting damages to that child… 
including damages from molestations occurring after the expiration of that carrier’s 
policy.” Id. at 1363. 
120 26 F.3d at 1363-64. 
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its victims,121 as it does not take into account the number of times the 
victims may have been abused. 
However, the Court of Appeals rejected the lower court’s holding 
and stated that “the church’s continuous negligent supervision of a priest, 
the negligent supervision of a priest with respect to each child, the 
negligent supervision of a priest with respect to each molestation, or each 
time the diocese became aware of a fact which should have led it to 
intervene,” were all events that could be an occurrence depending on the 
court’s approach.122  The Court of Appeals took the occurrence analysis 
from asbestos cases,123 and held that:  
 
When a priest molested a child during a policy year, there 
was both bodily injury and an occurrence triggering policy 
coverage.  All further molestations of that child during the 
policy period arose out of the same occurrence.  When a 
priest molested the same child during the succeeding 
policy year, again there was both bodily injury and an 
occurrence.  Thus, each child suffered an “occurrence” in 
each policy period in which he was molested.124  Any 
instances of CSA that followed the coverage-triggering act 
and occurred in the same coverage year, were not deemed 
occurrences, but conditions from which “repeated exposure 
. . . unexpectedly result[ed] in personal injury.”125 
 
Here, the court, in holding that the first encounter rule should not 
apply because “a subsequent molestation, occurring outside the policy 
period, is not a consequential damage of the previous molestation; it is a 
new injury, with its own resulting damages,”126 strikes a balance between 
finding an occurrence for every instance of molestation and denying that an 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
121 Id. at 1362. 
122 Id. at 1364. 
123 Porter v. Am. Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1981); Ducre v. Mine 
Safety Appliances Co., 645 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. La. 1986); Cole v. Celotex Corp., 
599 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1992); Houston v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 506 So. 2d 149 
(La. Ct. App. 1987).  These cases applied the exposure rule to conclude that 
inhalation of asbestos constituted a single occurrence each year that asbestos was 
ingested. Soc’y of the Roman Catholic Church, 26 F.3d at 1365. 
124 Soc’y of the Roman Catholic Church, 26 F.3d at 1364. 
125 Id. at 1366. 
126 Id. 
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occurrence has taken place altogether.127  In this sense, the analysis “would 
lessen coverage to a church whose negligent supervision allowed a child to 
be abused one hundred times in one policy year (thus constituting one 
occurrence), than to a church that allowed two instances of [clergy sexual 
abuse] over two policy years (thus two occurrences).”128 
 
2. The Ninth Circuit 
 
In Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Archdiocese of Portland in 
Oregon, 35 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1994),129 the Court of Appeals reversed the 
finding of the District Court and held that there had been four occurrences 
involved in the claim.130  This amounted to one occurrence in each policy 
period.131  The Court stated: 
 
[B]ecause each policy covers only damages stemming 
from [the child's] exposure to the [priest] occurring during 
the policy period, and because the parties do not contest 
that [the child] was exposed to the negligently supervised 
priest in each of the four policy periods, we conclude that 
[the] claim implicates four occurrences.132 
 
Based on the policy definition of occurrence, the Court found that 
"the repeated 'exposure' of the boy to the negligently supervised priest," 
rather than the negligent supervision alone, resulted in injury.133  Also, the 
court found it significant that the policy only covered injuries arising from 
occurrences “happening during the period of insurance.”134  Therefore, the 
court concluded that although the child’s injuries arose from the same 
general conditions, based on the facts, the child’s “exposure to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
127 It is important to note that the coverage is not being provided for instances 
of molestation, but rather for the negligent supervision that facilitated the instances 
of abuse. 
128 Cooke, supra note 13, at 1056. 
129 35 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1994). 
130 Id. at 1331. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 1329. 
134 Id. 
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negligently supervised priest in each of the four different policy periods 
constituted a separate occurrence.”135 
 
3. The Seventh Circuit 
 
In Lee v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co.,136 the court rejected the 
insurer’s argument that the “continuous exposure” language rendered a 
priest’s molestation of one child during two policy years and in two distinct 
places to constitute one occurrence.137  The court held that Rhode Island 
law “would not treat negligent supervision as invariably one 
‘occurrence.’”138  The court also rejected the analogy of asbestos cases to 
clergy sexual abuse cases and stated:  
 
The language defining “cause” does not speak directly to 
this question.  It assumes a two-party perspective- that an 
insured tortfeasor has harmed a victim.  Its language is a 
mismatch for a case in which the tort is negligent 
supervision of an intentional wrongdoer.  “[C]ontinuous or 
repeated exposure to conditions” sounds like language 
designed to deal with asbestos fibers in the air, or lead-
based paint on the walls, rather than with priests and 
choirboys.  A priest is not a “condition” but a sentient 
being, and of course the victim was never “exposed” to the 
Diocese’s negligent supervision.139   
 
The court decided neither to rule on the occurrence issue nor 
remand the case for further findings, claiming that the parties submitted 
insufficient information to make a determination of the number of 
occurrences and refusing to make a decision based upon the policy alone.140  
Although it did not formally rule on the issue, the court undermined the 
analogy between toxic torts and clergy sexual abuse.   
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
135 35 F.3d at 1330; see also Soc’y of the Roman Catholic Church, 26 F.3d at 
1363-64 (the court reached a similar conclusion on almost identical facts). 
136 86 F.3d 101 (7th Cir. 1996). 
137 Id. at 104-05. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 104. 
140 Id. at 105. 
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It is…doubtful that the insured could reasonably expect 
[the toxic tort] language to afford coverage for sexual 
abuse by church employees.  This language clearly 
contemplates contact with contaminants like asbestos, 
radiation, or noxious gases (preceded by the insured’s 
neglect, at worst, and where only extended contact 
produces injury).  Stretching such language to cover child 
molestation (where a single intentional act results in 
immediate injury) strains logic to the breaking point.141 
 
Courts routinely caution against judicial expansion of insurance coverage 
to arenas outside the agreed policy terms.142   
 
4. Other Jurisdictions 
 
Some jurisdictions have questioned the finding that negligent 
supervision could amount to an occurrence for general liability insurance 
purposes.  Courts in these jurisdictions do not recognize the negligent 
supervision of priests on the part of the Church as triggering insurance 
coverage.  “[T]he occurrence is not the Archdiocese’s negligent 
supervision of [the priest] as such, but the ‘exposure’ of the boy to the 
negligently supervised priest . . . ”143  “[E]ach child was ‘exposed’ to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
141 Cooke, supra note 13, at 1057. 
142 See, e.g., Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65, 73 
(Wis. 2004) (“If it is clear that the [insurance] policy was not intended to cover the 
claim asserted, the analysis ends there.”); Nicholls v. Zurich Am. Ins. Group, 244 
F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1156 (D. Colo. 2003) (“[Under Colorado law,] insurer cannot be 
held liable beyond the scope of risks which have been clearly covered in the 
insurance policy.”); Yale Univ. v. Cigna Ins. Co., 224 F. Supp. 2d 402, 410 (D. 
Conn. 2002) (“[Under Connecticut law,] mere absence of specific exclusions, 
standing alone, does not create coverage where it otherwise does not exist under 
the express terms of the policy.”); Hallum v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 
257 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (“To establish a prima facie case on a 
claim under a policy of insurance, the insured must show the occurrence was 
within the risk insured against.”); Turner v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 112 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 277, 283 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“[W]hen an occurrence is clearly not 
included within the coverage afforded by the insuring clause, it need not also be 
specifically excluded.”); Bush v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 124 F. Supp. 2d 
1203, 1205 (D. Or. 2000) (“Under Oregon law, analysis of insurance coverage 
issues is based on specific terms of the policy, not on the court’s general concepts 
of what coverage various kinds of insurance should provide.”). 
143 Archdiocese of Portland, 35 F.3d at 1329. 
526! CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL       [Vol. 16:2         
!
pedophilic employee, not to [the insured’s] negligent employment 
practices.”144 
Most courts apply the causal test, which encompasses the separate 
acts of clergy sexual abuse and only recognizes instances where a new 
person is exposed.145  These courts count the parish-to-parish relocations as 
a single occurrence, despite the number of parishioners that were abused by 
the priest while at a single parish.146 
Additionally, a few courts have required a high level of Diocese 
awareness to establish that the Church should have known of the high 
probability of sexual misconduct.  In Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire 
& Cas. Co.,147 the court stated that “[t]he issue…is whether a reasonably 
prudent person in the position of the Diocese…knew or should have known 
that [the priest’s] abuse of [the victim] was substantially probable as a 
result of the continuing exposure caused by their willful indifference.”148  
The priest accused of sexual abuse in this case had admitted to eight 
instances of sexual abuse prior to the instance concerning the case at 
hand.149  There were reports that the priest had previously attempted to 
molest a boy on “five or six occasions” and had admitted to the diocese that 
he had touched the boy.150  In another instance, the priest told a diocese 
official that he had asked two boys to disrobe.151  The priest also admitted 
to the diocese that he had tried to molest a boy in a swimming pool; the 
priest admitted to touching another boy in a sauna a year later.152  In that 
same year, the diocese received allegations that the priest had molested 
over twenty boys during the past fifteen years, and that at least one child 
had been molested for over a decade.153  In response to these allegations, 
the Church moved the priest to different churches, insisted the priest take 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
144 H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 526, 533 (5th 
Cir. 1998). 
145 See, e.g., Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, No. 912321, 1997 WL 10243, at 
*20-*21 (E.D. La. Jan. 8, 1997) (In discussing a priest who molested children at a 
parish for over a decade, the Court stated, “[a]lthough this negligence was present 
in each of the policy years at issue, it was continuous negligence, and not a number 
of discrete episodes of negligence.”).  
146 Id. 
147 89 F.3d 1386. 
148 Id. at 1391. 
149 Id. at 1393. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 89 F.3d 1386. 
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leave of absences, and imposed treatment programs in which the Bishop 
testified that he “didn’t have any confidence.”154 
The district court found that the diocese “neither expected nor 
intended the injuries cause by [the priest], and that the abuse therefore 
constituted an ‘occurrence’ as defined in the insurance policies.…”155  
However, after reviewing the numerous reports, considering the failed 
therapy treatments, parish-to-parish relocations, multiple confessions, the 
Court of Appeals found that “[a] reasonably prudent person in the position 
of the diocese should have known there was a substantial probability that 
[the priest] would continue to sexually abuse children.”156 
 
B.  HOW “BODILY INJURY” HAS BEEN INTERPRETED BY THE 
COURTS IN CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 
 
Commercial general liability insurance policies generally obligate 
the insurer to pay any legal obligations of the insured due to bodily injury 
or property damage caused by an occurrence during the policy period.157  In 
cases of clergy sexual abuse, courts have interpreted “bodily injury” to 
refer to actual physical injury, rather than mental or emotional injury.158  
Therefore, a claim arising out of clergy sexual abuse may not fit within the 
coverage of the insurance policy if it does not allege a physical injury, but 
only alleges emotional injuries such as humiliation or embarrassment.159 
However, some courts have found emotional injuries to fall within 
“bodily injury,” and thus within the policy terms.  In Servants of the 
Paraclete, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co.,160 the court found psychological and 
emotional injuries, such as depression, anxiety, poor self-esteem, and self-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
154 Id. at 1393. 
155 Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 916 F. Supp. 923, 926 (D. 
Minn. 1995). 
156 Diocese of Winona, 89 F.3d at 1394. 
157 ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at 408. 
158 See e.g., Kline v. Kemper Group, 826 F. Supp. 123, 129 (M.D. Pa. 1993), 
aff'd mem., 22 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 1994) ("The Pennsylvania courts have soundly 
rejected the contention that policy definitions of injury or bodily injury encompass 
mental or emotional harm.") (citing Jackson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 606 A.2d 1384 
(Pa. 1992)). 
159 Lapeka, Inc. v. Sec. Nat'l Ins. Co., 814 F. Supp. 1540, 1548-49 (D. Kan. 
1993) (finding claims for pain, humiliation, and embarrassment outside the 
definition of "bodily injury" covered by policy). 
160 857 F. Supp. 822 (D.N.M. 1994), modified on other grounds, 866 F. Supp. 
1560 (D.N.M. 1994). 
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destructive behavior to be covered under a policy that defined “bodily 
injury” as “bodily injury, sickness or disease.”161  Additionally, courts have 
held that a policy provided coverage for current bodily injuries that were 
the result of sexual abuse that had taken place years before.162 
 
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF LITIGATION 
 
The varying outcomes of cases alleging clergy sexual abuse have 
had an effect on liability insurance coverage of religious institutions.  More 
and more cases are finding that self-insured retentions are to be used, 
causing the Diocese themselves to have to pay damage awards awarded to 
victims of clergy sexual abuse.  Additionally, the liability insurance 
policies of the religious institutions have changed, where sexual abuse is 
specifically exempted from coverage.  This has caused religious institutions 
to purchase insurance specifically covering sexual abuse.  However, this 
new form of “sexual abuse insurance” remains insufficient to cover the 
damage awards handed down to victims.  Therefore, religious institutions 
have been forced by insurance companies to increase their efforts to stop 
the sexual abuse of parishioners by clergy members, as the continuing of 
both the practice of sexual abuse by clergy members and the turning a 
blind-eye by the institutions causes large damage awards to come out of the 
institution’s own pocket.   
 
A.  HOW HAVE COURTS DEALT WITH SELF-INSURED RETENTIONS 
WHEN DAMAGES ARE AWARDED IN CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE 
CASES 
 
The determination of how a court will deal with a self-insured 
retention in each policy period can significantly affect the parties’ financial 
responsibilities for damages.  How a party is financially affected by a 
court’s treatment of self-insured retentions is best understood through this 
scenario:  A claim was brought in which there was five years of abuse, and 
the case was settled for $500,000.  The diocese had five one-year policies, 
each with a $100,000 self-insured retention.  How the court deals with 
these self-insured retentions determine whether the diocese would be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
161 857 F. Supp. at 834. 
162 See Milbank Ins. Co. v. J.T., No. C7-96-1225, 1997 WL 10525 (Minn. 
App. Ct. Jan. 14, 1997) (finding that the time of "occurrence" is not necessarily 
when the act was committed, but rather when the individual was actually 
damaged). 
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responsible for $100,000 in damages or the whole claim.  Based on the 
court’s decision in Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co.,163 the 
diocese would be responsible for the entire damage award. 
In Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co.,164 the court 
held that the Church was responsible for the self-insured retention for “each 
of the triggered policies.”165  The court had previously determined that the 
churches were liable only for a single, weighted self-insured retention; 
however, the court changed their decision in light of an intervening 
decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court.166  The court in Winona 
concluded that the two cases were “factually indistinguishable,”167 and 
stated: 
 
Each litigation involved indemnification under 
[comprehensive general liability] policies that contained a 
layer of self-insurance (the SIR) for which the insured was 
responsible. Each involved injuries incurred over an 
extended period of time, a period during which the insured 
was covered by a number of distinct insuring agreements. 
And, each involved damages that could not rationally be 
allocated to specific policy periods in which the damages 
actually occurred.168 
 
Based on this reasoning, the court concluded that the diocese had to pay the 
entire damage award.169 
Additionally, in Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Archdiocese of 
Portland in Oregon,170 the Archdiocese argued that a finding that abuse 
constituted more than one occurrence would be contrary to public policy 
because "such a finding would require the Archdiocese to pay more than 
one [self-insured retention]."171  The court rejected this argument because 
although the Archdiocese would have to bear a significant burden of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
163 916 F. Supp. 923, 929. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 929. 
166 Id. at 926 (relying upon N. Power Co. v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 523 
N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994) (a case involving continuous environmental 
contamination)). 
167 Id. at 928. 
168 Id.  
169  916 F. Supp. 929. 
170 35 F.3d 1325. 
171 Id. at 1331. 
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settlement, this was “dictated by the terms of the policies the Archdiocese 
purchased.”172  The court did not reach the issue of how the damages 
should be apportioned among the four insurance policies at issue in this 
case. 
 
B.  HOW INSURANCE POLICIES FOR THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 
HAVE CHANGED IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SEXUAL ABUSE 
SCANDAL 
 
After courts began to interpret insurance policy language to find 
ways to award clergy sexual abuse victims damages, insurance companies 
began to take more express measures to ensure that they would not be 
responsible for large amounts of damages awarded to clergy sexual abuse 
victims.173  These measures have ranged from expressly excluding 
insurance coverage for claims arising out of the sexual abuse by clergy174 to 
limiting insurance company liability for claims arising out of clergy sexual 
abuse.  Additionally, after being blind-sided by the claims arising after the 
Gauthe case, insurance companies began to offer religious institutions 
policies specifically covering clergy sexual abuse claims.175 
 
1. Exclusions from Coverage 
 
In the aftermath of the sexual abuse scandal, some insurance 
companies extending coverage to religious institutions have expressly 
excluded coverage for claims “arising out of” abuse or molestation.176  This 
express exclusion will obviously prevent coverage being found for claims 
arising out of clergy sexual misconduct, the “arising out of” language has 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
172 Id. 
173 “[S]ince 1982, American dioceses have lost more than $400 million in legal 
and medical costs because of sexual misconduct.”  In addition, the New Mexico 
archdiocese faced “$50 million in liability suits” in the 1990’s. O’Reilly & 
Strasser, supra note 10, at 32-33. 
174 LYTTON, supra note 14, at 77. 
175 Id. at 76-77. 
176 See, e.g., McAuliffe, 69 F.3d at 279 (affirming district court's decision that 
the abuse and molestation exclusion precluded coverage for claims of tortious 
conduct against priest and claim of negligent supervision against Bishop); Hough 
v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 481 N.W.2d 393, 397-98 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) 
(finding no duty to defend because sexual abuse exclusion precluded claims of 
negligent counseling which were based on sexual relationship between pastor and 
parishioner). 
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also been found to preclude claims for negligent hiring and supervision or 
retention of the abuser.177  These claims of negligence on the part of the 
Church are excluded from “arising out of” abuse due to the fact that the 
sexual abuse is found to be an essential element of these claims.178  
 
2. Limitations on Coverage 
 
While some policies have expressly excluded claims arising from 
sexual abuse from their coverage, some others have set lower limits on 
such claims.  One policy included, in its “Sexual Misconduct” provision, a 
cap on liability for psychotherapists at $25,000 for "'all claims against any 
Insured(s) involving any actual or alleged erotic physical contact, or 
attempt thereat [sic] or proposal thereof' by the insured with his or her 
former or current patient."179  This cap was considered to apply to other 
claims arising out of the professional relationship if sexual misconduct was 
alleged.180  The provision limiting liability relates to clergy sexual abuse 
cases because the psychotherapist-patient and clergy-parishioner 
relationship are usually considered to be analogous.  Both the 
psychotherapist and the clergy member can be seen to have a therapeutic 
role in relation to the patient or parishioner, respectively. 
These types of limitations have been challenged in cases as 
violating public policy.  However, this argument has had mixed results.  
The Seventh Circuit has rejected arguments that a limitation for liability for 
sexual misconduct claims violates public policy.181  Yet, the Ninth Circuit 
has affirmed a decision finding that a provision limiting liability for sexual 
misconduct is void as against public policy.182  In finding the cap void, the 
court reasoned that it caps liability on non-sexual misconduct claims when 
sexual misconduct claims are also involved.183 
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177 See, e.g., IPCI Ltd. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 758 F. Supp. 478, 480 (E.D. 
Wis. 1991) (sexual abuse exclusion precluded coverage for claims of negligent 
supervision against nursing facility where patient was sexually abused). 
178 See All Am. Ins. Co. v. Burns, 971 F.2d 438, 442 (10th Cir. 1992) (sexual 
molestation by volunteer bus driver was an essential element of negligence claims 
against church and its directors). 
179 Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Stone, 61 F.3d 1321, 1323 (7th Cir. 1995).   
180 See id.  
181 Id. at 1328 (noting that the provision was approved by the Illinois 
Department of Insurance). 
182 See Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Cohen, 815 F. Supp. 365, 370-71 (W.D. 
Wash. 1993), aff'd mem., 67 F.3d 305 (9th Cir. 1995). 
183 Id. 
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3. Clergy Sexual Abuse Insurance Policies 
 
In the early 1990s, after a period of excluding coverage for acts of 
sexual misconduct completely, insurance companies began to offer 
coverage for clergy sexual abuse.184  However, these policies were subject 
to many conditions and, in effect, provided little coverage to the religious 
institutions.185  Examples of conditions imposed on the policies include an 
exclusion for claims involving a “previously identified perpetrator” or an 
exclusion for instances of abuse occurring before a certain date.186  In 
addition, low limits may be imposed on the amount of coverage and some 
insurance companies require religious institutions to “implement risk 
management programs that include policies for screening personnel, 
guidelines for interacting with children, and procedures for investigating 
and responding to allegations.”187  Because of the conditions imposed on 
the sexual misconduct policies, coverage for religious institutions is usually 
not adequate.188  These actions by the insurance companies in the aftermath 
of the Catholic Church sexual abuse scandal have had a regulating effect on 
religious institutions and how they approach clergy sexual misconduct.   
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
184 LYTTON, supra note 14, at 77. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 “The National Catholic Risk Retention Group, which is comprised of sixty-
four dioceses and archdioceses, rejects the overwhelming majority of claims made 
by its members.” Id.  Bemi, the president and CEO, states that: 
[O]f all of the sexual misconduct claims that have been reported to us 
historically, on average in any given year, in excess of 90 percent- most 
recently the average was about 93 percent- will be denied by us.  And that 
is a function of the claims being pre-retro to us [i.e., based on abuse that 
occurred prior to 1988 and therefore excluded from coverage] . . . or . . . it 
was clear that the diocese had knowledge but did not report to us within 
the 120 days that our forms stipulate to report the claim to us or because 
we’re an excess carrier and we don’t [cover the first] $250,000 of loss 
from ground, . . . and the claim . . . is just not big enough to get to us. 
Id. 
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V. HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANIES HAVE 
REGULATED RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS IN THE 
AFTERMATH OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH SEXUAL 
ABUSE SCANDAL 
 
The evolution of liability insurance policies throughout the 
Catholic Church sexual abuse scandal has shed light on how the insurance 
companies issuing liability insurance to religious institutions have 
regulated their behavior.  Because of the transition from general insurance 
policies that courts interpreted to find coverage for acts of clergy sexual 
misconduct to the explicit exclusion of these acts from general liability 
insurance policies, religious institutions have been forced to seek additional 
insurance to cover possible acts of sexual abuse of their clergy.  Yet, even 
with the added coverage, acts of sexual abuse are still more likely than not 
to not be covered by these policies, due to the many conditions and 
exclusions placed on the policy.189  As a result, religious institutions have 
oftentimes been forced to bear the burden of judgments themselves.190  As 
the cost of judgments climbs higher, the religious institutions are forced to 
take a more proactive effort in reducing the acts of clergy sexual abuse.  
Additionally, in granting insurance coverage, insurance companies 
themselves are insisting on reformed policies aimed at curtailing the 
occurrences of clergy sexual misconduct.191  As a result, a greater emphasis 
on reform within the Church has arisen and policy, such as personnel 
screening and strict guidelines for dealing with children, has been 
implemented to prevent acts of clergy sexual misconduct from 
continuing.192  The move toward discouraging Church officials from 
covering up acts of clergy sexual abuse is definitely a much-needed reform, 
and while it is hard to believe acts of clergy sexual abuse has stopped 
because of these policy changes, it seems like a move in the right direction 
towards eradicating them.  As judgments against the Church rise, and 
insurance companies craft new ways to avoid paying for them, we will see 
even more reform aimed at curtailing clergy sexual abuse until it does 
become a thing of the past. 
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189 LYTTON, supra note 14, at 77.   
190 “Current estimates indicate that of the more than $2.6 billion paid by the 
Church in response to clergy sexual abuse claims, less than 30 percent was covered 
by insurance.” See id. at 78.   
191 See id. at 77. 
192 See id. at 78. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The evolution of liability insurance policies for religious 
institutions, as a result of the Catholic Church sexual abuse scandal, has 
been the result of the widespread problem of clergy sexual abuse.  
However, the resulting lawsuits by the victims caused the liability 
insurance carriers of religious institutions to craft conditions and exceptions 
to policies, and placed the majority of the liability for the acts of clergy 
sexual misconduct in the hands of the religious institutions.  Religious 
institutions, like the Catholic Church, , prompted either by liability 
insurance companies or on their own accord, were forced to make drastic 
policy changes to avoid the resulting liability from lawsuits of clergy 
sexual abuse victims.  In this way, liability insurance companies 
incentivized religious institutions to implement policies to curb clergy 
sexual misconduct.  While these policies may not yet have completely 
eradicated the problem of clergy sexual abuse, continuing liability as a 
result of exclusions and restrictions within liability insurance policies 
combined with expansive policies aimed at preventing clergy sexual 
misconduct could make this abuse a thing of the past. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
At its best, the medical practice of organ transplantation 
demonstrates the most gracious qualities of generosity and sacrifice, where 
a decision by a living organ donor or a deceased donor’s grieving family 
can mean the difference between a second chance at life or years spent 
waiting before time runs out.  Fundamentally, organ transplantation also 
remains a stark example of the classic economic theory of supply and 
demand.  Despite medical advancements, the growing acceptance of organ 
donation, and policy efforts to increase the donation rate, the waiting list of 
potential recipients grew 64% over the past ten years while the number of 
donors rose by only 39% during that same span of time.1  More than 
100,000 individuals are listed currently on the national organ transplant 
registry.2  Last year alone, 6,453 candidates died waiting for an organ 
donor match, or an average of 18 patients per day.3  For these reasons, the 
life and death decisions behind how to allocate available organs for 
transplantation must be sensitive to the ethical and policy interests of 
objectivity, efficiency and fairness. 
The health insurance sector plays a critical role in the organ 
transplantation specialty.  Insurance may interact with this medical field in 
ways which yield significant benefits, assisting patients in funding 
otherwise prohibitively expensive procedures or setting appropriate 
                                                                                                 
* J.D., University of Connecticut School of Law, 2010; B.A., University of 
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1See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., OPTN/SRTR ANNUAL REPORT 
app. at 1–1, 1–3  (2008). 
2 United Network for Organ Sharing, http://www.unos.org (last visited Mar. 
10, 2010). 
3 Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov 
(select “View Data Reports,” “National Data,” “Waiting List Removals” in Step 1 drop-
down menu; then follow “Death Removals by UNOS Status by Year” hyperlink in Step 
2) (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). 
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standards of care in this practice.  Still, insurance coverage issues also tend 
to expose glaring disparities with how organs are allocated among potential 
recipients based on the ability to pay for these life-saving procedures. 
This Note examines both the positive and negative consequences 
which result when insurance matters intersect with the practice of organ 
transplantation.  Part I summarizes the medical developments behind organ 
transplantation and subsequent legislative efforts to support the 
infrastructure and health policies of this field.  Part II examines the primary 
forms of insurance coverage for both organ donors and recipients and the 
most commonly litigated issues which arise based on each funding option.  
Part III then addresses the unexpected and unintended connections formed 
as a result of this interaction, such as the correlation between insurance 
status and the likelihood of receiving or donating an organ.  Finally, Part IV 
proposes recommendations to promote the beneficial interplay between 
insurance and organ transplantation while minimizing the more negative 
effects of the relationship. 
 
I.  MEDICAL AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ORGAN 
TRANSPLANTATION 
 
While the earliest attempts at organ and tissue transplantation date 
back thousands of years, the era of modern transplant surgery has been 
established only in the past few decades.4  In 1954, the kidney was the first 
major organ to be transplanted successfully, followed rapidly by the first 
transplants for the pancreas, heart and liver all within the next fifteen 
years.5  Further advancements stalled due to the complications of future 
organ rejection, but with the development of Cyclosporine and other anti-
rejection immunosuppressive drug therapies in the 1970s and 1980s,6 as 
well as other surgical improvements such as the use of laparoscopic or 
single-incision techniques, the practice of organ transplantation has grown 
to include lung and intestinal transplants, dual organ transplants, artificial 
or animal organ transplants, stem-cell transplants, and most recently, face, 
                                                                                                 
4 Laurence A. Turka, M.D., Historical Overview, PRIMER ON 
TRANSPLANTATION 1 (2nd ed. 2001). 
5 UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, UNOS FACTS AND FIGURES 4, 
http://www.unos.org/resources/brochure. 
6 Jed Adam Gross, E Pluribus Unos: The National Organ Transplant Act and 
Its Postoperative Complications, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 145, 170 
(2008).  With the introduction of cyclosporine therapy, one-year kidney transplant 
survival rates climbed from 55% from 85% while five-year liver transplant 
survival rates increased from 18.2% to 68%.  Id. 
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limb and ovary transplantation.7  Today, more than 250 medical facilities 
across the United States perform major organ transplant procedures at a 
rate of 27,000 per year.8 
 
A.  THE UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT 
 
Shortly after the first successful heart transplant procedure and as 
major organ transplantation became more commonplace, the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws established the 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) in 1968.9  The UAGA represents 
the first attempt to codify in some form the standards and guidelines for the 
donation and receipt of anatomical gifts.  The UAGA provides that any 
individual aged eighteen years or more, may give all or any part of his or 
her body upon death for any purpose specified in the Act.10  This is a right 
that was not clearly recognized in common law at the time.11  The UAGA 
also mandates that surgeons remove the gifted organ “without unnecessary 
mutilation”12 and that the time of death of the potential donor be 
determined by a physician who does not participate in the transplant 
procedure itself.13  This stipulation is intended to combat fears that 
overeager doctors could declare brain or cardiac death prematurely in the 
hopes of salvaging organs for donation.14  The UAGA also exempts from 
criminal or civil liability a hospital, physician, public health officer or other 
person who acts in good faith in accordance with the terms of the Act or a 
similar anatomical gift statute of another state or foreign country,15 
presumably in the public interest of encouraging medical professionals to 
                                                                                                 
7 See, e.g., UNOS FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 5; Lawrence K. Altman 
and Anahad O’Connor, Cleveland Clinic Gets Victim of Chimp Attack, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, at A26;  Jon W. Jones, M.D. et al., Successful Hand 
Transplantation: One-Year Follow-Up, NEW ENG. J.  MED. 468 (Aug. 17, 2000); 
Robert Dobson, Ovarian transplant raises hope for women facing cancer 
treatment, 319 BRIT. MED. J. 871 (Oct. 2, 1999). 
8 UNOS FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 5, at 1, 10; United Network for 
Organ Sharing, supra note 2. 
9 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, at p. 3 (amended 2009). 
10 Id. § 4. 
11 Id. at p. 3. 
12 Id. § 14(h). 
13 Id. § 14(i). 
14 See id. at p. 3. 
15 See id. § 18. 
538 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:2 
         
participate in the removal of organs after death for the purpose of 
donation.16 
While all jurisdictions had enacted into state law the Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act of 1968, only twenty-six states adopted the later 1987 
revisions to the UAGA.17  Several states have since incorporated their own 
non-uniform amendments to original statutes.18  As a result, there is 
significance divergence in previously consistent state anatomical gift laws, 
posing a serious impediment to organ transplant processes extending 
beyond state lines.  Since only a short window for transplantation exists, as 
brief as four to six hours for a heart or lung,19 there may not be enough time 
for extensive research into and compliance with each state’s policy.  The 
UAGA has been revised again in 2006 and 2009 in attempts to re-secure 
more uniform adoption across the states and to align more closely with 
federal laws regulating organ transplantation.20  Thirty-seven states have 
enacted this latest set of revisions to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, with 
five more states scheduled to introduce the bill in 2010.21 
 
B.   THE NATIONAL ORGAN TRANSPLANT ACT 
 
The National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) of 1984 sets federal 
guidelines for organ donation and transplantation.  Congress enacted 
NOTA to address the growing competition for donor organs and the 
unequal distribution of available organs.22  The Act set a new national 
health policy to ensure the equitable allocation of organs through the 
                                                                                                 
16 See Williams v. Hoffman, 223 N.W.2d 844, 848–49 (Wis. 1974) (stating 
that the “limitation on liability ... is justified by the legitimate public purpose of 
encouraging doctors to participate in the removal of organs following death, and 
therefore increasing their supply.”).  See also Ramirez v. Health Partners of 
Southern Ariz., 972 P.2d 658, 666 (Ariz. 1998) (“There is a critical state interest in 
encouraging organ donation and protecting procurement personnel who engage in 
that important work.”). 
17 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, at p. 1 (amended 2009). 
18 Id. 
19 UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, PARTNERING WITH YOUR 
TRANSPLANT TEAM: THE PATIENT’S GUIDE TO HEALTH 10, http://www.unos.org/ 
resources/brochures.asp.  For example, the liver or pancreas lasts for 12-24 hours 
and the kidney up to 72 hours.  Id. 
20 See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, at p. 4 (amended 2009). 
21 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, http://anatomicalgiftact.org/ 
DesktopDefault.aspx (follow “Enactment Status”).  
22 See United Network for Organ Sharing, supra note 5, at 5; National Organ 
Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 273-74 (2000). 
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establishment of a national organ procurement and transplantation network, 
while at the same time working to increase the overall number of organs 
available for transplantation.23  The Act also authorized funding for fifty-
nine regional Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs) to consolidate and 
coordinate donation efforts and help foster public awareness about the 
critical need for organ donors.24  Finally, NOTA expressly forbids the 
buying and selling of human organs and body parts, imposing up to a 
$50,000 fine or five years imprisonment for organ trafficking and other 
actions to commercialize the donative process.25 
Prior to the enactment of NOTA, private regional transplant 
networks managed the donor matching process but were limited by strict 
regional borders and a lack of coordination across systems.26  As a result, 
medical facilities in some areas were forced to compete for available 
organs while in other localities, donor organs went unused.27  NOTA 
authorized the creation of a centralized Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network (OPTN) to better facilitate organ matching, 
delivery, and transplant surgeries.28  Congress contracted with a private 
entity, the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), to oversee this 
network in the hopes that management by a private entity would be the 
fastest method to establish nationwide coordination given bureaucratic 
delays with federal ownership and the initiative of the private sector in 
establishing original networks in the first place.29       
UNOS is responsible for coordinating organ transplant efforts 
among 58 organ procurement organizations (OPOs) and 250 hospital and 
medical facilities which maintain organ transplant programs.30  UNOS also 
formulates the network’s membership criteria and the ensuing medical 
standards for transplant procedures.31  Each hospital with a transplant 
program is a member of the OPTN and must adhere to the standardized 
                                                                                                 
23 See National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 273-74 (2000); R. R. 
Bollinger et al., Organ Procurement Organization (OPO), Best Practices, 15 
CLINICAL TRANSP. 16 (2001). 
24 Id. § 273(a). 
25 Id. § 274(e). 
26 United Network for Organ Sharing, supra note 2. 
27 Id. 
28 National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274 (2000). 
29 See UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, supra note 5, at 5. 
30 UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 3, 18, 
http://www.unos.org/docs/AnnualReport2009.pdf). 
31 Id. at 4. 
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criteria for patient eligibility and wait-list priority.32  Eligibility and priority 
factors include the degree of medical compatibility between the donor and 
donee and the urgency for medical intervention.33  The patient’s location is 
also an important consideration, since decreased transfer time leads to 
better preservation of the organ and better survival rates.34  Additionally, 
the network measures the amount of time a donee spends on the waiting list 
to determine priority over other potential recipients.35  In certain cases, the 
highest-ranked patient on the waiting list may be passed over if the 
individual cannot be located, is temporarily sick, would likely reject a 
transplanted organ, or would benefit only minimally from the procedure 
because of age or medical condition as determined by his or her transplant 
team.36 
 
C.   ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION TODAY 
 
As thousands of patients join the organ transplant list each year, the 
continual shortage of available organs lingers as a major challenge despite 
widespread efforts to increase the rates of donation.37  Some of the reasons 
behind diminished donation numbers are attributable to positive medical 
advancements, such as more rigorous medical screening processes, an 
overall decrease in accidental death, and the increase in survival rates for 
infants delivered prematurely.38  Other explanations reflect problems which 
                                                                                                 
32 See Organ Procurement and Transplant Network Policy 1 on Member 
Rights and Obligations, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/policiesAndBylaws/ 
policies.asp. 
33 See Organ Procurement and Transplant Network Policies 3.2-3.4 on Organ 
Distribution UNOS Patient Waiting List, Acceptance Criteria, and Organ 
Procurement, Distribution and Allocation, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ 
policiesAndBylaws/policies.asp 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 See id.   
37 Additional efforts to promote organ donation include the Organ Donation 
Insert Card Act, which established a national initiative through the Department of 
Health and Human Services to increase donation by 20% by 2000 and authorized 
the mailing of organ donor cards along with income tax refunds. Organ Donation 
Insert Card Act, Pub. L. No. 104-91 (1996). 
38 See Raja B. Khauli, Issues and Controversies Surrounding Organ Donation 
and Transplantation: The Need for Laws That Ensure Equity and Optimal Utility 
of a Scarce Resource, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1225, 1226 (1993); see also Mark F. 
Anderson, The Future of Organ Transplantation:  From Where Will New Donors 
Come, To Whom Will Their Organs Go?, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 249, 278 (1995). 
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have plagued the donation process for decades, including common 
scenarios where potential donors fail to sign directives or medical 
personnel neglect to search for donor cards, leaving the decision in the 
hands of family members who may refuse consent or are unaware of the 
patient’s wishes. 39  Meanwhile, the demand for organs continues to grow.  
To cite just one statistic, the national diagnosis rate for diabetes, a leading 
cause of kidney failure, has increased from 2.7% in 1985 to 5.5% in 2005 
and will continue to rise based on obesity, aging and ethnic demographic 
trends.40 
Still, there is little to justify the overwhelming deficit in the overall 
number of donors.  Almost every religion supports organ donation as 
consistent with its beliefs, though some may not be aware of their particular 
religion’s support for the practice or instead experience general reluctance 
to donate based on other principles.41  Non-traditional donors, such as 
living donors and donors over 50 who would have been previously 
ineligible to donate due to age, are compensating for lower donation rates 
elsewhere.  For example, the number of living donors increased by 245% 
over the past twenty years, while donors aged 50 and older increased by 
456% over the same period of time.42  Comparatively, the average rate of 
growth in the amount of all donors increased only by 125% overall.43  
Additionally, hospitals are evaluating new protocols which allow for organ 
donation after cardiac death instead of brain death, creating an expanded 
class of donors beyond the diminishing number of eligible brain-dead 
patient-donors.44 
                                                                                                 
39 Andrew C. MacDonald, Organ Donation: The Time Has Come to Refocus 
the Ethical Spotlight, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV., Winter 1997, at 177, 180 (1997). 
40 Gross, supra note 6, at 241. 
41 Summary Statements of Various Religious Groups About Organ and Tissue 
Donation, http://www.unos.org/news/newsDetail.asp?id=236 (last visited Mar. 10, 
2010); see also Larissa MacFarquhar, The Kindest Cut, NEW YORKER, July 27, 
2009, at 39 (“Reluctance that many feel toward donating organs, even after death, 
is not selfishness or superstition but a sign that our sense of body as something 
whole, something human, something sacred has not yet withered.”). 
42 Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov 
(select “View Data Reports,” “National Data,” “Waiting List Removals” in Step 1 drop-
down menu; then follow “All Donors By Donor Type” hyperlink in Step 2) (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2010). 
43 Id. 
44 Darshak Sanghavi, When Does Death Start?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2009, at 
MM38. 
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Even without incorporating new subsets of organ donors, according 
to the medical and ethical standards set by the National Organ Transplant 
Act, current donor eligibility guidelines are in fact expansive enough to 
include 13,091 patients who died under the age of 70 and were otherwise 
eligible for donation in 2005.45  Of that subset, only 58%, or 7,593 patients, 
became actual donors, generating a supply of over 23,000 organs for 
transplantation.46  Living donors, primarily for the donation of a kidney, 
contributed about 6,800 more organs to yield a combined total of about 
28,000 organs transplanted that year.47  This data suggests that there were 
still 5,498 eligible individuals who died in 2005 without donating their 
organs upon death.48  That number of individual donors would have 
generated 17,000 additional organs for transplantation, more than enough 
to make up for the deficits in our donated organ supply.49 
 
II.   INSURANCE COVERAGE AND ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 
 
The following section will focus on private and government-
funded insurance options for organ donors and recipients.  While private 
insurers serve as major sources of funding for organ transplant procedures, 
disputes between insurers and insureds often arise due to ambiguities in 
policy language which dictate coverage or professional disagreement in the 
health care and insurance sectors as to whether a certain transplant 
procedure should be covered given its experimental nature or predicted 
success rate.  In addition, government benefit programs like Medicaid and 
Medicare come with its own host of conflicts, including whether the federal 
government or the state may set its own coverage criteria in jointly funded 
and administered programs.  Ultimately, the affected parties are forced to 
balance legitimate concerns of cost and funding health care for the masses 
with the most intrinsic ideals of saving the life of one identifiable human 
being.  
                                                                                                 
45 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, at p. 6 (amended 2009), available at 
http://www.anatomicalgiftact.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=1&tabid=63. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
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A.   PRIVATE OR EMPLOYER-BASED INSURANCE 
 
As the court in Delmarva Health Plan v. Aceto50 notes, insurers 
“must make difficult, and at times excruciating, decisions about which 
medical services to cover.”51 
 
It is a regrettable reality that the more extensive the 
coverage that is provided under a health insurance policy, 
the higher the cost of that policy and the fewer individuals 
who can afford to purchase it. The question of how to 
balance this tension between access and adequacy is an 
enormous one with which health insurers and our society 
as a whole grapple.52 
 
Organ transplants are expensive.  A heart transplant can cost up to 
$300,000.53  Lung or liver transplants come in at $250,000 per procedure 
while a kidney transplant is priced at $100,000.54  The cost of a bone 
marrow transplant, a procedure with its own extensively litigated body of 
case law, is estimated at around $500,000.55  In some cases, a patient must 
provide a down payment or prove coverage that guarantees payment even 
before he or she can be listed on the active transplant list.56   
 
1. Express Coverage 
 
Most insurers provide coverage for traditional organ transplant 
procedures, even if they are not expressly listed as covered benefits, as long 
as the treatments are considered medically necessary and non-experimental.  
For example, in Aceto, a Delaware court held that an insured’s lung 
transplant was an included benefit even though the health insurance policy 
listed coverage only for kidney, bone marrow and cornea transplants.57  
While the insurer argued for the maxim inclusio urius est exclusio, 
asserting that the inclusive list for organ transplant coverage automatically 
                                                                                                 
50 750 A.2d 1213 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
51 Id. at 1218. 
52 Id. 
53 United Network for Organ Sharing, supra note 2. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 See, e.g., Montoya v. Johnston, 654 F. Supp. 511 (W.D. Tex. 1987); see 
also Ellis ex rel. Ellis v. Patterson, 859 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1998). 
57 Delmarva Health Plan v. Aceto, 750 A.2d 1213, 1216 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
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excludes items not on the list, the court instead found the lung transplant, 
“a medically necessary, non-experimental, surgical procedure,” falls within 
the policy’s broader definition of covered services.58   
At the same time, private insurers have no obligation to provide 
coverage if it is specifically excluded, even if the transplant is determined 
to be medically necessary.  In Hawaii Medical Serv. Assoc. v. Adams,59 the 
health insurer denied coverage for an allogenic stem-cell transplant to treat 
the insured’s multiple myeloma.60  Policy guidelines specifically classified 
the use of this procedure as “investigational” when used as a treatment for 
multiple myeloma, though the therapy would be covered by the insurance 
policy if used to treat a listed set of other conditions.61  The court in Adams 
held that if the language of the plan “‘specifically excluded’ from coverage 
the requested allo-transplant for treatment of . . . multiple myeloma,” the 
insurer had “no obligation to provide coverage.”62  Here, the insurer 
successfully claimed inclusio urius est exclusio where this argument failed 
in Aceto.  If the insurer were required to list every special medical 
exclusion instead of including only the conditions that the policy would 
cover, then the insurer would have to list “every conceivable medical 
condition for which coverage for allo-transplants would be excluded,” an 
expectation the court found neither “practical” nor “reasonable.”63 
 
2. Contract Ambiguities 
 
Where policy exclusions and inclusions are not as specific, 
insureds challenging coverage decisions argue that, according to contra 
proferentem, ambiguities in the policy language are construed against the 
insurer and in favor of the insured, since the insurer drafts the language and 
“must suffer the costs of its own drafting imprecision.”64   
In Simkins v. NevadaCare, Inc.,65 the insured sought coverage for 
high-dose chemotherapy with peripheral stem cell rescue (HDC/PSCR) as a 
treatment for breast cancer.66  As part of the HDC/PSCR procedure, stem 
                                                                                                 
58 Id. 
59 209 P.3d 1260 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009). 
60 Id. at 1263.  During an allogenic stem-cell transplant, stem cells from a 
matched donor are harvested and transplanted into the recipient.  Id. 
61 Id. at 1263–65. 
62 Id. at 1268. 
63 Id. at 1271. 
64 Delmarva Health Plan, Inc. v. Aceto, 750 A.2d 1213, 1218 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
65 229 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2000). 
66 Id. at 731-32. 
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cells are harvested and filtered as blood is drawn from the patient’s body 
and later reintroduced in the system after chemotherapy, in the hope that 
the stem cells will grow to produce healthy red and white blood cells and 
platelets.67  While the insurance policy included coverage for the 
administration of blood and blood plasma and chemotherapy, the only 
transplants approved for coverage under the policy were for heart, kidney, 
cornea, liver, and tissue transplants limited to allogenic bone marrow 
only.68  The court in Simkins found that a “person of average intelligence 
and experience” would not understand stem cells to be tissue under the 
policy’s tissue transplant exclusion.69  Instead, the court believed the 
average person would consider stem cells to be a component of the 
patient’s blood.  Especially since the policy “specifically discusses blood 
transfusions separately from tissue transplants and places tissue transplant 
coverage within the organ transplant section,” the policy retained the 
“distinct potential of misleading and confusing average plan participants” 
(emphasis omitted).70  “[T]he insurer should be expected to set forth any 
limitations on its liability clearly enough for a common layperson to 
understand; if it fails to do this, it should not be allowed to take advantage 
of the very ambiguities that it could have prevented with greater 
diligence.”71 
On the other hand, in Hilliard v. BellSouth Medical Assistance 
Plan,72 the court refused to find a similar insurance policy description 
ambiguous.73  The insured was diagnosed with multiple myeloma and 
sought coverage for an autologous bone marrow transplant (ABMT), where 
the patient’s own bone marrow is extracted for reinfusion.74  Similar to 
Simkins, the insurance policy only covered cornea, heart, kidney and bone 
marrow transplants, further specifying coverage for autologous bone 
marrow transplants in the treatment of three specific conditions: Hodgkin’s 
disease in individuals where conventional therapy has failed, resistant non-
Hodgkin’s lymphomas, and acute leukemia in remission but with a high 
probability of relapse.75  The court in Hilliard agreed with the plan 
                                                                                                 
67 Id. at 732. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 735. 
70 Id.  
71 Simkins, 229 F.3d at 736 (quoting Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 
F.2d 534, 540 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
72 918 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D. Miss. 1995). 
73 Id. at 1024-25. 
74 Id. at 1019-20. 
75 Id. at 1020. 
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administrator that the plan provided coverage only for these three 
conditions and that multiple myeloma was “simply not covered.”76  It also 
noted that the insured’s employer offered a Supplemental Transplant 
Assistance Plan at a nominal premium for the purpose of providing 
additional coverage for autologous transplants and other medical 
procedures not covered by the primary plan.77 
 
B.   MEDICARE AND MEDICAID 
 
Government benefits programs, including Medicare and Medicaid, 
may be used to finance an organ transplant procedure.  Medicare is a 
federally run program that provides health insurance coverage to 
individuals who are age 65 and older as well as individuals with who meet 
other special criteria, including patients who suffer end-stage renal disease 
(ESRD) and require either dialysis or a kidney transplant.78  Medicaid is a 
cooperative program between the federal government and individual states 
to fund certain health care expenses for low-income or disabled persons 
who qualify.79  The state pays medical facilities for health care provided to 
those eligible under Medicaid.80  The federal government subsequently 
reimburses the state for a substantial portion of that outlay as long as the 
state is compliant with federal statutory and regulatory requirements.81 
  
1.   State Discretion in Medicaid-Funded Organ Transplants 
 
While the federal government may set broad policies and ensure 
state compliance with the Medicaid statute, it is up to the states to develop 
state eligibility and coverage criteria subject to federal approval and 
reimbursement.82  For instance, the Medicaid statute was amended in 1985 
to include specific organ transplant criteria that states were required to 
adopt in order to receive for federal financial assistance for these types of 
procedures.83  Under this provision, the federal government will not 
                                                                                                 
76 Id. at 1023. 
77 Id. at 1027. 
78 Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395rr(a) (2006). 
79 C. David Flower, State Discretion in Funding Organ Transplants Under the 
Medicaid Program: Interpretive Guidelines in Determining the Scope of Mandated 
Coverage, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1236 (1994). 
80 42 C.F.R. § 430.0 (2009). 
81 Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396a(a) (2006). 
82 Flower, supra note 79, at 1240-41. 
83 Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(i)(1) (2006). 
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reimburse states for organ transplants unless the state develops written 
standards for transplant coverage where similarly situated individuals are 
treated alike and the accessibility of high quality care is maintained.84  
Whether this statute functions as an express grant of discretion to the states 
in their decisions to fund organ transplants under Medicaid, or merely sets 
forth the conditions for federal matching funds in transplant procedures, 
remains unsettled.85  The Eighth Circuit in Ellis by Ellis v. Patterson and 
the Ninth Circuit in Dexter v. Kirschner have held that states have complete 
discretion in choosing whether or not to fund organ transplants within state 
Medicaid plans.86  However, the Fourth Circuit in Pereira v. Pereira v. 
Kozlowski and the Eleventh Circuit in Pittman by Pope v. Secretary, 
Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services have held that 
states must fund organ transplants that are medically necessary, albeit for 
different reasons.87 
In Ellis, the Eighth Circuit held Arkansas was not required to fund 
through Medicaid a liver transplant for a ten-month-old infant suffering 
from a fatal liver condition.88  The court found that the federal organ 
transplant provision governing payment for organ transplants, 42 U.S.C. § 
1396b(i), “can be read as merely laying out additional standards the states 
must meet to receive federal funds for organ transplants, but the legislative 
history of the provision reveals that Congress intended the states to have 
discretion whether to include organ transplants in the Medicaid plans.”89  
Just as states are permitted to limit other medically necessary services, such 
as the number of doctor visits or the length of hospital stays, state 
discretion in funding medical procedures was found to be consistent with 
an overarching policy to “provide the largest number of necessary medical 
services to the greatest number of needy people.”90  Furthermore, the court 
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in Ellis determined Congress “did not intend to require states to provide 
funds for exotic surgeries which, while they might be the individual 
patient’s only hope for survival, would also have a small chance of success 
and carry an enormous price tag.”91   
The Ninth Circuit adopted the Eighth Circuit’s line of reasoning 
and held in Dexter that Arizona likewise retained discretionary power to 
fund autologous bone marrow transplants but not allogenic bone marrow 
transplants through its Medicaid program.92  The same federal statute cited 
in Ellis applicable to payments for organ transplants “does not make 
payments mandatory [but] . . .  states only what must occur in the event a 
state should decide, in its discretion, to pay for organ transplants.”93  The 
court in Dexter also found compelling the fact that while medical facilities 
in Arizona could perform autologous bone marrow transplants, no 
corresponding program for allogenic bone marrow transplants existed in 
the state at the time.94  “Arizona’s decision not to fund the additional 
expenditures despite the similarity in cost for both types of bone marrow 
transplants was . . . rational.”95 
One year later, the Fourth Circuit in Pereira expressly rejected the 
findings of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits and held that Virginia was 
required to fund medically necessary organ transplants for patients who 
qualify under Medicaid.96  The court rejected “the . . . contention that 
section 1396b(i)(1) affirmatively confers upon the states the unqualified 
discretion whether to fund transplants.”97  Even if “Congress intended . . . 
to afford the states absolute discretion whether to fund organ transplants . . 
. (and there is no evidence in either the statute or its history that this was its 
intention), it did not embody that intention in statute.”98 
The Eleventh Circuit in Pittman drew the same conclusion as the 
Fourth Circuit and mandated Medicaid coverage for a fifteen-month-old 
child’s liver-bowel transplant based on statutory requirements that states 
provide medically necessary services to children receiving early and 
periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment (EPSDT) services under 
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Medicaid.99  Even where courts have granted state discretion in coverage 
determinations, Medicaid participants under the age of 21 would still be 
funded for organ transplants since the EPDST program requires coverage 
for all medically necessary treatment for eligible recipients.100 
 
2.   Arbitrary and Unreasonable Standard 
 
Even in jurisdictions where courts have decided in favor of state 
discretion in their ability to set their own coverage criteria for funding 
organ transplants, Medicaid participants nevertheless are protected against 
standards that result in arbitrary or unreasonable outcomes.  A state 
Medicaid agency “may not arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount, duration 
or scope of a required service . . . to an otherwise eligible recipient solely 
because of the diagnosis, type of illness, or condition.”101  “[O]nce a state 
has adopted a policy to cover a category of organ transplants, it may not 
arbitrarily or unreasonably deny services to an otherwise eligible Medicaid 
recipient.”102 
In Montoya v. Johnston,103 two plaintiffs aged six months and six 
years, respectively, could not be listed on the liver transplant waiting list 
because of a required $100,000 pre-payment or insurer guarantee of 
coverage.104  The children were covered under Medicaid but Texas capped 
in-patient hospital services at $50,000 over the course of twelve months.105  
The court held that this state cap violated federal standards which “prohibit 
the arbitrary and/or unreasonable denial of services to otherwise eligible 
recipients.”106  Since the cost of the medically appropriate and non-
experimental liver transplants would cost approximately $200,000, the 
$50,000 cap would functionally deny otherwise eligible recipients benefits 
even though liver transplants are covered under Texas Medicaid.107  
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Ellis held that any state-imposed cap on 
funding that would prevent a patient from being listed on a transplant 
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waiting list would functionally deprive that patient of the procedure and 
therefore result in an arbitrary and unreasonable denial of that benefit.108 
In addition to reimbursement caps, plaintiffs have successfully 
challenged specific state Medicaid criteria for transplant eligibility using 
the arbitrary and unreasonable standard.  Michigan, for example, employed 
patient selection criteria which required that a prospective liver transplant 
recipient suffering from alcoholic cirrhosis must have a documented two-
year period of abstinence from alcohol.109  In Allen v. Mansour, the court 
deemed this requirement arbitrary and unreasonable since it would screen 
“out an entire class of otherwise qualified liver transplant applicants” who 
would die before completing that two-year period or would develop such 
severe complications that they would be rendered ineligible for an 
operation anyway.110  Although the state retained “substantial discretion to 
choose the proper mix of amounts, scope, and duration limitations for the 
services offered in its Medicaid plan,”111 the court deemed this two-year 
abstinence requirement as arbitrary due to a lack of expertise on alcoholism 
and recidivism or statistical data to make a rational and scientific decision 
on the proper length of an abstinence requirement.112  The court also found 
significant that “[i]f a potential donee could survive two years without a 
transplant, the donee did not need the transplant in the first place.”113   
 
3. Medicare Designations of Experimental or 
Investigational Treatments 
 
Organ transplantation coverage under Medicare is most frequently 
invoked by litigants to support or rebut a contention that a specific 
transplant procedure should be considered experimental or investigational 
and therefore excluded under most private insurance and government 
benefit program policies.  These insurers may utilize the expert 
determinations and findings of Medicare’s oversight and quality assurance 
agency, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), to help define 
or inform how they view unproven medical technologies or procedures. 
For instance, in Bechtold v. Physicians Health Plan of Northern 
Indiana, Inc.,114 the private insurer “chose to link the experimental nature 
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of a treatment to the neutral (third party) determination of the medical 
experts responsible for drafting the HCFA Medicare Coverage Issues 
Manual.”115  The insurer’s express intent was to avoid resorting to a “case-
by-case battle of the experts each time a self-proclaimed ‘expert’ publishes 
a new article” about a new procedure.116  The court in Bechtold allowed the 
insurer to rely on HCFA opinions to determine whether a procedure should 
be considered experimental because this deference was unambiguously 
expressed in the policy language.117 
Other courts, however, have looked for reasons to circumvent 
HCFA classification of experimental procedures.  The Third Circuit in 
Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp.118 explained why reliance on Medicare 
guidelines could be problematic: 
 
First, the guidelines themselves are, by their terms, 
directory rather than mandatory...  Second, expert 
witnesses for both sides agreed Medicare relied on dated 
literature and data in determining the appropriate 
conditions for coverage of liver transplants...  Third, 
Belden & Blake's health coverage expert admitted it is “not 
uncommon in the health care industry” for insurers to 
approve treatments even though Medicare has not 
approved them.119 
 
In Meusberger v. Palmer, Iowa’s Medicaid agency denied 
coverage of a participant’s pancreatic transplant because their policy was 
“to fund only those organ transplants designated non-experimental by 
Medicare.”120  The Eighth Circuit upheld the district court’s holding that 
reliance on Medicare’s designation of non-experimental was “intended as 
an administrative convenience rather than an inalterable adherence.”121  “A 
state cannot avoid scrutiny and evade review of unreasonable policies by 
simply delegating absolutely the decision-making to a federal agency 
charged with a substantially different mission.”122  Furthermore, in Nichols 
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v. Trustmark Insurance Company,123 the court noted that the actual 
language of the insured’s policy granted coverage for “drugs, therapies or 
other treatments... that are approved for reimbursement by the Health Care 
Financing Administration.124  However, the policy did not specify HCFA 
approval under Medicare as opposed to Medicaid.125  In this case, Ohio’s 
Medicaid policy did cover the insured’s high-dose chemotherapy with 
autologous bone marrow transplant (HDC/ABMT) procedure where the 
federal Medicare policy did not.126  
 
C.   INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR DONORS 
 
The medical procedures involved with extracting an organ from a 
donor for transplantation is considered part of the recipient’s overall 
procedure and is funded as such.  Still, insurance coverage becomes a 
significant issue in the event that a living donor experiences unanticipated 
post-transplant complications. 
Any costs incurred by an organ donor, from medical evaluation and 
testing to the actual surgery, are covered by the eventual organ recipient.127  
After an organ donation, the hospital will bill the organ procurement 
organization, which then bills the recipient or recipient’s insurer.128  In 
Zwerin v. Group Health Incorporated,129 the insurer was obligated to 
reimburse the costs of tests performed on the insured’s sister in the course 
of an evaluation to determine her suitability as a potential bone marrow 
transplant donor.130  The insurer had claimed that since the sister was not a 
covered dependent under the insurance policy, her medical tests, “even if 
for the claimant’s benefit or as part of his overall treatment,” would be 
excluded from coverage.131 The court in Zwerin, however, rejected the 
insurer’s “illogical and tenuous position” and instead relied upon the 
insurance policy’s broad provision for the coverage of “general medical 
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care” and “treatment of illness.”132  These tests were “a necessary step in 
exploring the possibility of a bone marrow transplant operation as part of 
the claimant’s treatment.”133  The insured “is permitted to explore all 
reasonable avenues of treatment which might arrest and reverse the 
progress” of his debilitating disease and therefore entitled to recover the 
costs of the medical tests performed for his benefit.134 
While the costs of the immediate tests and procedures related to 
organ donation are funded by the recipient, additional costs incurred as a 
result of unexpected complications or adverse long-term effects may fall to 
the living donor.  The number of living organ donors have matched or 
exceeded the number of traditional cadaveric donors since 2001, mostly 
through directed donations by family members. 135  The probability of 
adverse effects continues to be quite low and most complications are minor 
when they do occur, especially since unlike most surgeries, living organ 
donors are usually in excellent health before undergoing the operation.   
Even so, in an analysis conducted by Seoul National University 
College of Medicine, the morbidity rate of a specific type of liver 
transplant, where the right section of the liver of the living donor is 
extracted, reached a high of 78.3%.136  While most of this subset 
experienced only minor post-operative complications, several patients 
suffered potentially life-threatening complications which required 
additional treatment.137  Even organ donation through less-invasive 
laparoscopic procedures versus conventional open operations has its risks.  
In a medical comparison study of these two technologies, two out of twenty 
patients who underwent laparoscopic donor nephrectomies still experienced 
poor oxygen saturation in the immediate postoperative period and unilateral 
pulmonary congestion.138 
Despite the low incidence of post-surgical complications for an 
organ donor, health problems related to but following the actual donation 
may not be covered by the recipient’s insurer.  If a recipient’s insurance 
policy provides coverage for a limited time but the recipient dies, coverage 
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for the donor may also disappear.139  In theory, a kidney transplant donor 
who suffers the loss of the remaining kidney later in life moves to the top 
of the transplant waiting list, but the patient must cover the cost of the 
operation herself, even though the original donation necessitated the second 
transplant.140  Other financial expenses, including the personal expenses of 
travel, housing and lost wages or even the increased difficulty and cost in 
obtaining health, disability or life insurance, remain the responsibility of 
the living donor.141  
 
III.  UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES WHEN INSURANCE AND 
ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION INTERSECT 
 
Insurance intersects with the medical practice of organ 
transplantation to yield surprising connections beyond the more basic 
issues of coverage and funding.  This section reveals the insurance sector’s 
unintended or unexpected influence in determining which entities or 
individuals have the opportunity to participate in the organ donation and 
receipt process. 
 
A.   INSURERS MAKE MEDICAL DETERMINATIONS 
 
While assessments of a patient’s need for certain procedures seem 
best left to the expertise of medical practitioners, many of the cases 
discussed above demonstrate that insurers act at least as a key participant, if 
not the final arbiter, in the medical decision-making process.  Both public 
and private insurers include explicit requirements of medical necessity for 
coverage and insert exclusions for procedures considered experimental or 
investigational.  In the field of organ transplantation, these exclusions may 
serve to preclude reimbursement or access to emerging transplant 
technologies, like dual organ transplants, or accepted therapies applied for 
the treatment of certain conditions, such as the use of bone marrow or 
stem-cell transplants to treat cancer.   
Experimental treatment exclusions originally arose out of concerns 
that procedures have limited or no medical value and that this potentially 
unnecessary medical care might actually be harmful to patients.142  Today, 
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the economics of health care play a bigger role.  “By requiring clinicians to 
prove that new procedures are efficacious before they are covered, the hope 
is that existing resources will be better allocated to maximize the health 
status of the overall population.”143  Either way, insurers still act as 
gatekeepers where medical professionals must petition for the approval of 
non-medical entities on medical matters. 
 
B.  INSURANCE STATUS DETERMINES ACCESS TO DONATED ORGANS 
 
A potential organ recipient’s access to donated organs is 
determined in large part by the patient’s ability to fund the life-saving 
transplant procedure through insurance.  An uninsured patient or one 
subject to reimbursement caps may be excluded from a transplant waiting 
list without a substantial deposit or proof of insurance coverage.144  More 
than 99% of organ recipients are covered by insurance at the time of the 
procedure.145  Private insurance and Medicare were equally the most 
common sources of payment for organ recipients at 44.2% each.146  Only 
9% of total organ recipients were covered by Medicaid, even though 
Medicaid participants comprised 18.5% of the general in-patient 
population.147  Consequently, Medicaid organ recipients are less likely to 
be funded for organ transplants than other procedures requiring hospital 
admission.148 
While some organ transplant recipients may be funded through 
specific benefit programs, such as Medicare’s ESRD Program or similar 
state benefit plans, or through the admirable efforts of transplant social 
workers and financial coordinators to obtain financing on a patient’s behalf, 
the highly disproportionate number of insured versus uninsured organ 
recipients is troubling in a system that is explicitly mandated to ensure 
equality in access.149  A ground-breaking 1999 study examining California 
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ESRD patients revealed for the first time the strong correlation between 
health insurance status and access to organ transplant procedures.150  Nearly 
all ESRD patients are entitled to benefits offered under Medicare’s ESRD 
program, though about 8% of ESRD dialysis patients were ineligible for 
the program in 1992, the year the analysis was conducted.151  Many of these 
individuals who lack Medicare coverage are forced to rely on state 
Medicaid programs for financial support, though beneficiaries must meet 
financial eligibility criteria first.152   
The 1999 California study separated all California ESRD patients 
under the age of 65 into three, mutually exclusive cohorts:  Medicaid 
participants, Medicare participants, and patients enrolled in both Medicaid 
and Medicare.153  Only 31.4% of all Medicaid patients were eventually 
listed on the OPTN transplant waiting list, compared to 45% of Medicare 
patients and 38.8% of the dually eligible patients.154  This disparity is even 
more exaggerated when examining subsets within these patient cohorts.  
Only two-thirds of all patients under 15 years old insured by Medicaid 
were placed on the transplant waiting list while 91.7% of Medicare patients 
under age 15 were listed.155 
Further examination of pertinent socio-economic factors revealed 
important differences in the Medicaid patient population.  Medicaid 
participants show a higher incidence of HIV/AIDS, mental illness and non-
compliance based on past dialysis attendance, all important considerations 
which weigh against a patient’s eligibility for transplant.156  They are also 
“clearly more disadvantaged, less likely to be highly educated, potentially 
more apprehensive about the transplant procedure, and less assertive about 
being wait-listed.”157  However, once an ESRD patient makes it onto the 
transplant waiting list and is entered into the system, insurance status does 
not influence the receipt of a cadaveric kidney transplant.158 
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C.   INSURANCE COVERAGE PREDICTS WHO WILL DONATE 
 
The extent of coverage also plays a significant role in which 
individuals are most likely to donate.  Unlike presumed consent systems in 
other countries, primarily in Europe, where an individual is automatically 
presumed to be a donor unless the individual or a representative opts out, 
an organ donor in the United States must make an affirmative gift.159  This 
reflects the free choice of the individual to elect for donation upon death, 
and the latest set of revisions to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 
strengthens this right even further by barring others from making a gift 
after death if the individual donor previously refused.160 
For those who do elect to donate their organs at death, lack of 
insurance coverage was a stronger predictor for donation than any other 
characteristic or demographic factor except for age.  Americans without 
health insurance are much more likely to donate a liver or kidney for 
transplant than to receive one.161  Nearly 17% of organ donors in 2003 
lacked health insurance, but only 0.8% of organ recipients are uninsured.162  
Additionally, the percentage for uninsured organ transplant recipients, at 
0.8%, is far less than the overall 4.6% uninsured rate for all in-patient 
hospitalizations.163  Since transplantation is markedly different than other 
procedures in that the operation requires a scarce resource that can only 
come from other human beings, the pressure for fairness in patient access 
to this treatment is even more pronounced.  Instead, while the uninsured 
tend to donate organs at relatively high rates, they are much less likely to 
receive an organ if they are in need of one.   
This disparity is noteworthy particularly given that the 47 million 
Americans without health care tend to suffer from illnesses and conditions 
that otherwise exclude them from the organ donor pool.164  The uninsured 
suffer from higher mortality rates and more restrictive access to 
preventative and essential care, increasing the rates of chronic disease in 
this subset.165  They are less likely to have regular check-ups, less likely to 
see personal physicians managing their long-term care and less likely to 
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benefit from early diagnosis when diseases are most treatable.166  Their 
ability to pay for advanced treatment is also compromised, so that overall, 
“the uninsured poor are more likely to suffer untreated health problems that 
will disqualify them medically as donors.167  Yet, the opposite is true, that 
while the health care system “denies adequate care to many of the 
uninsured during life..., in death, the uninsured often give strangers the 
ultimate gift.”168  
 
IV.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This last section suggests several options, which address some of 
the more troubling effects and negative externalities exposed when 
insurance and organ transplantation intersect.  The nature of the public and 
private insurance sector’s business model presents significant obstacles in 
obtaining full or even expanded coverage for organ transplantation, since 
the needs of one insured in need of a transplant must be balanced against 
the stark economics required to fund health care for the rest.  With this in 
mind, the following recommendations attempt to promote and prioritize 
efforts to establish greater clarity, consistency and fairness in both the 
organ donation and transplantation process. 
 
A.   CLEAR COVERAGE POLICIES, INFORMED POLICYHOLDERS 
 
Insurance contract language should be drafted with as much clarity 
as possible to indicate to the policyholder whether organ transplants are 
covered and if so, the extent of coverage as it relates to the type of 
procedures and for the treatment of which specific conditions.  
Undoubtedly, insurers have the right to exclude coverage for certain 
procedures as long as their exclusionary policies are non-discriminatory, 
properly disclosed and otherwise consistent with the law.  If the insurer 
elects to incorporate organ transplant exclusions, at the very least “it should 
do so conspicuously and unambiguously so a reasonable insured can 
determine this fact by looking at her policy.”169 
Well-drafted insurance policies permit the parties the freedom to 
fairly contract according to their own terms without the interference of the 
court system.  If confronted with unambiguous policy language, courts 
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“need not look outside the policy for indications of the intent of the 
parties.”170  However, once the court system is brought in to interpret the 
relevant contract language, courts may “out of deference to treating 
physicians... refus[e] to respect the mechanism the parties have chosen to 
define the scope of coverage, forcing them to contract in ways they prefer 
not to, and even then refusing to enforce the provisions other courts have 
imposed.”171  The risk of “judge-made insurance” then is that the court’s 
newly defined parameters of coverage may very well serve to create 
policies that “informed consumers in the private marketplace would have 
chosen not to purchase.”172 
Courts have imposed a higher standard for drafting insurance 
contracts specifically if such an agreement is considered a contract of 
adhesion, where a standardized contract is “written entirely by a party with 
superior bargaining power... [while] the weaker party to an adhesion must 
‘take it or leave it’... without an opportunity to bargain.”173  Language, and 
especially exclusionary language where a limitation of coverage may 
disappoint an insured’s expectations, must be precise, conspicuous and 
worded in language that is plain and clear.174  For example, an insurer may 
be expected to position and format an important exclusion in a way that 
would attract a reader’s attention and offer proper notification that a 
procedure may not be covered by the insurance policy.175 
Still, even the best contracting practices will fail to generate 
completely unambiguous and consistent policy language.  Too much 
precision or specificity only creates complexity and confusion.  Using the 
context of organ transplantation, an insurer pursuing the highest level of 
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precision would have to create a “laundry list” of covered services and 
exclusions, classifying, at a minimum, each type of organ transplant, each 
condition for which an organ transplant may be used to treat, and each 
medical procedure or technology employed to execute the transplant.176  A 
policy containing all these exponential combinations would result in a “sea 
of print” where important policy conditions are so densely packed that they 
could be easily overlooked.177  Additionally, given the rapid progress of 
new medical research and technology, detailed lists of inclusions and 
exclusions would have to be updated constantly to reflect the latest 
developments.178 
Instead, insurers can more fairly communicate contract terms by 
including direct information about their coverage decision processes in the 
policy itself.179  Policyholders may not understand arguably vague language 
like “medical necessity” or “experimental” unless they are educated as to 
how insurers may make these determinations should the need arise.  Rather 
than listing every experimental procedure that falls outside of the policy’s 
coverage, insurers may supplement general exclusions with greater detail 
about what the insurer may do to classify a treatment as experimental, such 
as whether the insurer relies on data in peer-reviewed academic procedures 
or technology assessments performed by reliable third-party governmental 
agencies or private organizations.180  
Additionally, insurers as well as employers and associations who 
maintain health benefit programs for their employees and members should 
have mechanisms in place which clearly inform policyholders as to their 
organ transplant coverage, especially if insureds were to lose coverage with 
the selection of a new insurer or policy.  In Swanson v. Sioux Valley 
Empire Electric Association, a member organization was forced to switch 
to a new health care plan when its previous health insurer sought to raise 
premiums by 38%.181  The organization informed all its members through 
direct mailings and member newsletters that the new plan excluded 
coverage for liver transplants.182  The plaintiff in Swanson therefore could 
not sustain claims against the association for negligent misrepresentation or 
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a breach of good faith and fair dealing since the organization acted to 
provide notice of the terms of the new health policy.183 
 
B.  CONSISTENT MEDICAID COVERAGE OF ORGAN 
TRANSPLANTATION 
 
Despite the circuit split over the question of state discretion in the 
funding of organ transplants under Medicaid, coverage should be required 
in every state for transplant procedures that are medically necessary, 
appropriate, and non-experimental.  The Eighth and Ninth Circuit decisions 
in Ellis and Dexter respectively fail to look to the plain language of the 
federal Medicaid transplant funding provision under 42 U.S.C. § 
1396b(i)(1) or account for the political backdrop and legislative intent 
when the statute was enacted.184  In addition, consistency across state 
borders minimizes existing disparities in access to organ transplants for 
Medicaid beneficiaries based on state funding criteria. 
First, § 1396b(i)(1) only provides that the federal government will 
not supplement state payments “for organ transplant procedures unless the 
State plan provides for written standards,” primarily standards to ensure 
that “similarly situated individuals are treated alike” and that any 
restrictions imposed are at least “consistent with the accessibility of high 
quality care to individual eligible for the procedures.”185  Whether a state 
has discretion to fund or exclude organ transplants in their programs is a 
question that lies outside the scope of this statute.  Instead, “by its plain 
terms, the statute simply provides that federal Medicaid payments will not 
be made for organ transplants unless the state has promulgated the 
specified written procedures.”186 
Furthermore, the federal transplant funding provision was enacted 
in 1985 during continuing legislative efforts to expand Medicaid coverage, 
offering additional services including hospice care, case management 
services and ventilator care for institutional children.187  Congress also 
approved expanded eligibility criteria to extend coverage to individuals 
who did not qualify previously.188  Finally, Congress by this time already 
took steps to address public concerns over the shortage of donor organs and 
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the cost of organ transplants, enacting both NOTA in 1984 and the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) in 1986.189  OBRA extended 
Medicare coverage for drug therapy related to transplant procedures and 
required that hospitals which received Medicare funding to encourage 
organ donation and conform to the appropriate organ procurement 
protocol.190  These actions combined “demonstrate a congressional 
preoccupation with the ability of needy individuals to obtain and pay for 
transplants and a genuine commitment to facilitating the procedure.”191 
The Seventh Circuit in Miller by Miller v. Whitburn offers perhaps 
the best justification for federally mandated coverage of organ 
transplantation in state Medicaid programs.192  In Miller, the Seventh 
Circuit argued that reliance on §1396b was inappropriate given that organ 
transplants that are medically necessary and non-experimental already fall 
into the mandatory service category of in-patient hospital service, one of 
seven mandatory medical services a state must provide in order to qualify 
for federal funding.193  Consequently, the Seventh Circuit limited review of 
Wisconsin’s decision to deny funding for the plaintiff’s liver-bowel 
transplant only as to whether or not a liver-bowel transplant could be 
considered a “necessary treatment” if its effectiveness was unproven.194 
  
C.   COURTS SHOULD AVOID MAKING MEDICAL DETERMINATIONS  
 
1.   Courts Exhibit Biases and Lack Scientific Expertise to 
Make Medical Determinations 
 
While the court system provides an important mechanism which 
works to produce fair results in transplant coverage disputes, judicial 
review should accord high deference to the insurers who make coverage 
determinations in consultation with independent medical experts.  Because 
of understandable biases in favor of a plaintiff seeking a life-saving 
operation, judges are inclined “to adopt every conceivable argument in 
favor of coverage..., essentially preclud[ing] insurers from exercising any 
meaningful oversight of medical appropriateness.”195 
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First, courts tend to “balance the equities between the parties in a 
manner that inevitably favors avoiding the possible loss of life over the 
insurers’ monetary loss.”196  It is easy to be influenced by a sympathetic 
plaintiff who has exhausted all other avenues in the treatment of a serious 
illness.  In J.D. by Devantier v. Sherman, the plaintiff was an eight-year-old 
boy afflicted with a debilitating genetic disorder which could be cured by a 
liver transplant.197  However, Missouri Medicaid considered the transplant 
an elective option rather than a medical necessity since the disease could be 
managed through careful dietary restrictions.198  The court in J.D. held that 
“even if it were obvious that the state could save some money by treating, 
as opposed to curing J.D., the fiscal harm suffered by Missouri Medicaid is 
outweighed by the harm to J.D. should he not receive a liver transplant.”199   
In addition, judges are forced to rely on expert testimony presented 
in an adversarial setting that often devolves into a battle of the experts.  In 
this scenario, experts do not present objective and balanced scientific 
perspectives focused on truth-finding and accuracy, but rather introduce 
arguments most persuasive in supporting their party’s side.200  The Seventh 
Circuit in Bechtold proposes an interesting alternative: 
 
In order to resolve the question of whether health insurance 
providers should cover treatments..., the prudent course of 
action might be to establish some sort of regional 
cooperative committees comprised of oncologists, 
internists, surgeons, experts in medical ethics, medical 
school administrators, economists, representatives of the 
insurance industry, patient advocates and politicians.  
Through such a collective task force perhaps some 
consensus might be reached concerning the definition of 
experimental procedures, as well as agreement on the 
procedures, which are so cost prohibitive that requiring 
insurers to cover them might result in the collapse of the 
healthcare industry. While such a committee would in no 
way be a panacea for our skyrocketing health care costs, it 
may help to reduce the incidence of suits in which one 
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“expert” testifies that a procedure is experimental and 
another equally qualified “expert” testifies to the opposite 
effect.  This so called battle of the experts occurs all too 
frequently in federal court.201 
 
But are insurers capable of making educated, independent 
assessments of medical necessity when those same companies profit from 
avoiding payment of claims?  In order to minimize conflicts of interest, the 
insurance sector should make sure to engage outside independent medical 
experts for consultation before making determinations of medical 
necessity.202  These consultants help assure neutrality in the decision-
making process, particularly if practitioners are compensated in a manner 
that does not reward or incentivize the number of claim denials. 
 
2.   Coverage of HDC/ABMT 
 
There is perhaps no better example of court interference in medical 
decisioning than the substantial case law surrounding high-dose 
chemotherapy with autologous bone marrow transplant (HDC/ABMT) as a 
last resort treatment for cancer.203  During HDC/ABMT, a patient’s bone 
marrow cells are extracted and stored temporarily before the patient 
undergoes high-dose chemotherapy, after which the stored cells are 
transplanted back into the patient to counter the toxic effects of the 
chemotherapy.204  While Phase II clinical studies supported the use of this 
procedure at the time, many insurers refused to pay for the treatment based 
on exclusions for experimental procedures, since there was a lack of 
evidence that HDC/ABMT was superior to chemotherapy alone or safe and 
effective in its own right.205  Denials of coverage led to intense litigation 
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and lobbying which in turn led to “unpredictable and inconsistent” court 
decisions about coverage.206 
Rather than fight litigants in this arena, insurers instead quietly 
decided to include HDC/ABMT as a covered service anyway despite their 
own misgivings about the efficacy of the treatment.207  This trend was due 
in large part to the courts’ readiness to regard HDC/ABMT as the legal 
standard of care.208  To be fair, both sides could validly argue for and 
against the suggestion that HDC/ABMT represented the standard of care 
for the treatment of breast cancer.209  The procedure was indeed used to 
treat more than 30,000 women before studies discounting HDC/ABMT 
were published, showing the “medical community’s inability to control the 
procedure’s diffusion.”210  Still, the courts often succumbed to the more 
emotional appeals of plaintiffs desperate for this treatment and discounted 
medical expert after medical expert presented by defendant-insurers.211 
 
Had the courts, for instance, adopted a standard based on 
what a reasonable managed care organization would have 
decided..., the result may have been entirely different.  
Taking this approach could have had the salutary effect of 
compelling a more productive dialogue between physicians 
and plans, along with accelerating the clinical trials 
process.212 
 
D.   CONTINUING COVERAGE FOR ORGAN RECIPIENTS 
 
Insurance coverage for organ transplants should extend beyond the 
transplant operation itself to include continuing coverage for follow-up care 
and immunosuppressive drug therapies required to protect rejection of the 
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transplanted organ.  While courts have found prohibitively low insurance 
caps to be arbitrary or unreasonable,213 insurance coverage could still be 
limited based on the specific procedure, treatment or total amount of 
subsidized drugs per year.   Medicare, for example, currently covers the 
cost of anti-rejection drugs for participants only 36 months after transplant 
even though it fully funds the cost of the transplant itself.214 
These restrictions yield particularly harsh results on organ 
recipients who may receive transplants at a young age.  Younger recipients 
have a longer lifespan during which to maintain the costs of on-going care, 
since they must be medicated against organ rejection for the rest of their 
lives.215  Pediatric patients could lose coverage once their plans expire or 
when the patient becomes an adult.216  Additionally, subsequent coverage 
may be difficult to obtain as an organ transplant is considered a pre-
existing condition.217  Some states offer high-risk insurance pools which 
guarantee coverage regardless of prior medical history, but such coverage 
varies widely by state and premiums remain 50% to 200% higher with 
more restricted benefits than the more traditional insurance options 
available.218 
According to a recent study in Pediatric Transplantation, young 
transplant recipients who lose their insurance coverage are more likely to 
stop taking anti-rejection drugs.219  Transplant recipients between the ages 
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of eighteen and twenty-three years face the greatest risk, since one-third of 
this subset lacks coverage to begin with.220  Even if pediatric transplant 
recipients are insured, coverage is likely to run out 36-44 months after the 
transplant or when the child becomes an adult.221  In a study of 1,001 
children who underwent kidney transplants between 1995 and 2001, one-
half lacked insurance coverage and experienced a nine times greater chance 
of organ failure and death.222   
 
Whether payment is from private insurance, Medicaid, or 
Medicare, almost all providers discontinue insurance 
coverage for health care and immunosuppressive 
medications as these young people complete school and 
leave their parent’s care.  These patients are frequently 
faced with the challenges of transition to independent life, 
changing from pediatric to adult transplant centers, with no 
clear means of payment for their expensive care and 
medications.223 
 
Even if an organ transplant recipient funds the actual procedure 
without insurance reimbursement, the Seventh Circuit held that an insurer 
can deny coverage for subsequent expenses connected to an underlying 
illness or procedure that was not covered in the first place.224  In Loyola 
University of Chicago v. Humana Insurance Company, in the middle of 
cardiac bypass surgery, the insured’s heart surgeon decided to insert a 
Jarvik-7 artificial heart once it was determined that the patient could not 
survive the operation otherwise. 225  The artificial heart would serve to 
prolong the patient’s life until a suitable organ donor could be found.226  
The insurer, however, denied coverage for all expenses after the insertion 
of the artificial heart, including the subsequent human heart transplant one 
month later, because it believed all following expenses were connected to 
the experimental procedure and therefore excluded by the policy.227   
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The court agreed with the insurer’s refusal of coverage.228  While 
the policy ordinarily covers expenses connected to a major organ 
transplant, an exclusionary clause stated that “no benefit is payable for or in 
connection with a major transplant” if the coverage for the original 
transplant is denied based on the procedure’s experimental nature.229  The 
Seventh Circuit admits that its decision could seem “callous,” essentially 
finding the insurer is justified in refusing coverage because the patient 
“should be dead.”230 
It is unfortunate that a transplant recipient’s insured status impacts 
the sustainability of a donated organ so directly, especially since post-
transplant mortality rates otherwise are extremely low.231  In the event of 
organ failure, a transplant recipient must be placed back on the waiting list 
for retransplantation.  From 1995 to 2005, retransplant candidates 
represented 13.5%, 7.9%, 4.2% and 5.5% of all newly registered candidates 
on the kidney, liver, heart and lung transplant waiting lists respectively. 232  
In addition, the survival rates for repeat transplants are much lower than the 
rates for first-time transplantation.233  Since re-transplantation increases the 
overall demand for an already scarce supply of donated organs, and the 
benefits for repeat transplant patients are so limited, resources are better 
allocated if the original organ transplantation procedure is given the best 
possible chance to succeed. 
  
E.  CONTINUING COVERAGE FOR ORGAN DONORS, REMOVE 
DISINCENTIVES 
 
Despite the rarity of post-transplant complications, living donors 
who are generous enough to donate an organ for the benefit of another 
should be protected from any adverse results post-donation.  Organ donors 
may face many of the same concerns as organ recipients.  In one study 
sampling a subset of living organ donors, 29% of donors had concerns 
about financial repercussions from time missed from work, while 2% 
worried about job security and another 2% reported anxiety about future 
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health insurance coverage.234  Prospective donors who ultimately did not 
donate reported similar concerns.235  Addressing these concerns would not 
only satisfy a degree of moral or ethical responsibility we owe to organ 
donors for their own sacrifice, but would minimize some of the 
disincentives which affect a potential donor’s willingness to donate as well. 
At the same time, any actions taken to assist organ donors must 
strike a delicate balance between removing disincentives and providing a 
form of remuneration.  First, according to NOTA, the acquisition of human 
organs for valuable consideration is illegal.236  In addition, the use of 
incentives or a more deliberate move to an organ market system would 
generate unintended but harmful consequences that would undercut any 
short-term increase in the total organ supply.  In a study of both paid and 
unpaid blood donation, Antonio Fernandez-Montoya references continuing 
donor concerns in Spain, where 20% of blood donors still fear the 
possibility of commercial exploitation even twenty years after the switch 
from a paid donation model.237  Even a small decrease in the number of 
donors repelled by the notion of payment in a traditionally voluntary blood 
donation system “would severely compromise the service” given that donor 
numbers are so hard to maintain now.238  A paid donation model also 
creates greater vulnerability in the system through decreased safety and 
quality in the supply of donated blood or organs.  Paid donors are often 
“poorly monitored, belong to lower social classes and often 
malnourished.”239  They tend to donate in inferior sanitary conditions and 
experience higher rates of transmittable disease.240  All parties in the 
transplant infrastructure must then assume additional risk and expenses that 
come with managing higher-risk donations, including increased monitoring 
and testing as well as liability issues if contaminated organs are mistakenly 
transferred to recipients. 
Instead, we should consider longer-term donor health insurance as 
part of “a package of benefits that would not enrich anyone... but rather is 
designed to leave the donor as well off (fiscally and physically) as before 
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donation.”241  To offset the slight but present risk of medical complications 
after donation, donors should be insured against catastrophic medical 
expenses which may occur as a result of organ donation.  This specific type 
of supplemental, non-transferrable policy would be designed solely to 
cover any gaps in an insured’s existing coverage should problems arise in 
the future.242   
As one option, Medicare’s existing ESRD program could be 
modified to allow coverage for kidney donors as well as patients suffering 
from renal disease.  A 2006 analysis in the American Journal of 
Transplantation calculated the estimated cost of this additional coverage.243  
Given that the current median donor age is 40 years, on average, Medicare 
would have to fund benefits until the donor reaches age 65, the standard 
age that all citizens become eligible for Medicare244.  The projected cost of 
extended coverage based on the current cost of coverage for disabled 
beneficiaries is $18,124, but since many donors already have private 
insurance and represent an extremely healthy segment of the general 
population, actual costs will be much less.245  Additionally, with benefits 
targeted to cover only donation-related complications, the comparatively 
small number of donors, and the rarity of adverse outcomes post-donation, 
the final amount is a small price to pay to ensure living donors are 
protected well after their donation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
When insurance and organ transplantation intersect, the most 
essential principles of both fields collide.  Insurance requires a sense of 
objectivity and steadfast adherence to policies that serve to sustain its own 
survival in economic reality, where the decision to fund one patient’s life-
saving operation will force trade-offs in coverage for the rest of the insured 
base.  Meanwhile, the practice of organ transplantation necessitates a more 
emotional appeal to the values that we admire most in society - qualities of 
altruism and gratitude at the foundation of how our donative process 
functions.  The by-products of the ensuing clash are real, definable and 
quantifiable.  By recognizing how insurance impacts the practice of organ 
transplantation, we may start to salvage the more damaging components of 
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the relationship and reinforce the ways in which the two fields complement 
each other. 
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